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The last of the great French
postmodernists has gone. His ideas were often mocked, but many of them were
less ridiculous than they seem
Simon
Blackburn
Simon Blackburn is
professor of philosophy at Cambridge
University
In the play
Travesties, Tom Stoppard’s character James Joyce asks: “What now
of the Trojan war if it had been passed over by the artist’s touch?
Dust. A forgotten expedition prompted by Greek merchants looking for new
markets. A minor redistribution of broken pots.” Contrast what it is for
us, mediated by Homer: an epic of gods and heroes, struggle, lust and glory.
The point generalises. Thackeray remarked how a bald, stupid, heartless
little man with a paunch became the majestic Louis XIV if put in the right
shoes, robes and wig—and that then, having set up the fantasy, we had
to worship the result. The mirage suits us better than the truth.
The late Jean Baudrillard pursued the same theme, with his theatrical
declamation that “Le gulf war n’existe pas.” On the face of
it, this is a crashing falsehood—which we must therefore read,
charitably, as pointing to some other claim. That is the French style, and it
is a close cousin to any use of metaphor. Those who called Mrs Thatcher the
iron lady did not mean that she clanked when she walked.
Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what
happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of
action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was
won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer
screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of
these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the
image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have
been something more than a war: an episode in America’s
cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a
Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional
video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland.
So Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked
outrage by it, but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the
iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it
“logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to
ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for
many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God,
it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction.
Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an
old philosophical panic. Perhaps our senses are no better than our
televisions. Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive.
They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. Perhaps, at the
limit, we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position,
sentenced to a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and illusion.
Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself
from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and
then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its
ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since generalised scepticism
implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late
capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture
critic want to draw that conclusion?
In any event, it is not all simulacra. We are participants in a public world,
not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas. The cure for the sceptical
nightmare is action. Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or
choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by
people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival, there is a
lot that is hors texte—although
this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than for the
politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs
and messages.
French postmodernism may be passing, but it had a point. Even if engagement
with the world is the cure, the respite it gives may be short-lived. No
sooner has the real moment gone than the work of memory begins, once more
selecting, massaging, suppressing and spinning. That moment is like a glimpse
of the naked king, or the politician’s one-day dash into the war zone:
it may be a glimpse of truth, but even if we are honest enough to see
anything we do not want to see, that in turn may just reinvigorate the work
of disguise. That can’t have been the real Louis XIV, or the real Iraq. And
heaven forfend that people see them like that—otherwise it might really
destroy our legacy, or at any rate the bit that counts: its representation in
self-image, story and picture.

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