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Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity
Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease
by Philip J. van der Eijk
Cambridge University Press, 2005
Review by Elizabeth McCardell, Ph.D. on Dec 2nd 2005


Two basic errors have confounded the writing of histories of medicine: the
popularist accounts that labor under hearsay scholarship where the writers have
no grasp of the original language of the texts they quote, nor the cultural
aspects of this intellectual discourse, nor an adequate understanding of
bio-archeology and environmental history. This approach tends to take one
poorly researched account and repeat it so often that it nearly achieves
authenticity.

A second category of histories of medicine that gets in the way of genuine
scholarship are those that extract pieces of ancient text from the
socio-linguistic context in which it was originally produced to promote a
teleological raison d'etre for a rationalism that is often quite misplaced.

Professor van der Eijk, in a footnote on p. 9 of Medicine and Philosophy in
Classical Antiquity, notes that the notion of 'rational medicine' has, until
about thirty years ago, taken pridefully the Greeks and Romans as models of the
founders of this rational, positivist medicine. The fashion for shaping history
according to the preoccupations of one's own day has given way to another
fashion: historical texts are situated in the social and cultural traditions of
their time, but assessed as meaningful only relative to the ideas from which
they arose. This relativism Philip van der Eijk cautions against, for he says
Greek and Roman medicine has a distinctive quality and enduring peculiar to it.

The idea of rationalism, anyway, though it seems self-explanatory, cloaks a
range of meanings that are not immediately obvious. Rationality can mean not
irrational, nor supernatural, without appeal to gods or divine or supernatural
powers. This particular meaning of rationalism is not true for Greek medicine,
at least in the way we understand it. Throughout this book it becomes clear that
Greek and Roman medical thinkers dipped in and out of belief in gods, divine or
supernatural powers. They were, afterall, people of their time. A rationality
that doesn't suggest an appeal to divinity does lend itself to a description of
Greek and Roman medical thinkers. Prof van der Eijk writes

a different use of the word 'rational' is in the sense in which ancient medical
writers themselves used it, where 'rational' stands for 'rationalist',
'theoretical' (logikos, rationalis) as opposed to empirical/practical, thus
denoting the speculative, theorectical nature of Greek medical thought and its
close relation with natural philosophy, epistemology, etc. On this view, one can
safely say -- and comparisons with other ancient medical traditions have
confirmed -- that Greek medicine, with its emphasis on explanation, its search
for causes, its desire for logical systematization, its endeavour to provide an
epistemic function for prognosis and treatment, and especially its argumentative
nature and urge to give accounts (logos, ratio) of its ideas and practices in
debate, does show a distinctive character.

The scholarly study of the history of medicine has benefited from some of the
major developments in the study of philosophy. The contextualization and
historicization of philosophical inquiry allows us a better view of contemporary
definitions of philosophy, thus permitting our better sight of what the ancients
actually meant, versus our preconception of it. This in turn permits a closer
scrutiny of the ancient texts themselves.

In this closely researched and often difficult collection of new and previously
published essays Philip van der Eijk takes us into the language, the philosophy
and history of the ancients practitioners and thinkers in medicine and
philosophy. Philosophy and medicine are, as he says, intrinsically entwined for
whatever is said about the body and its conditions true for the formation of
philosophic thought. The one configures the development of concepts and
methodologies of the other.Galen (or Claudius Galen of Pergamum, c. 130-200 CE)
said that the best doctor is also a philosopher. Given this is true, how can we
continue to hold the studies of medicine and philosophy apart? The title of this
volume, after all, still refers to 'medicine' and 'philosophy' as though they
are distinct disciplines. Philip van der Eijk notes, in this regard, that such
folly is conceals 'the very substantial overlap that existed between the various
areas of activity.' Empedocles, Democritus, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Philolaus,
Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Strato, and later thinkers as Sextus Empiricus,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Nemesius of Emesa and John Philoponus (all usually
identified as philosophers) took an active interest in those subjects we
commonly consider the domain of medicine: anatomy, physiology, psychiatric
illnesses, reproduction and embryology, youth and old age, respiration, pulses,
fevers, the causes of diseases, and the effects of food, drink and drugs on the
human body. In fact it was under the umbrella of philosophy that a theoretical
study of medicine first took hold. It was Hippocrates that first suggested the
separation of the art of healing from the theoretical study of nature that the
study of medicine, as such, was instituted. It is necessary to note that in
recent years this separation is again coming under increased scrutiny as it is
realized that the "what" of medical practice we do is defined reflexively by the
theories and beliefs we have concerning it as much as our involvement in it.
This is changing medical education, in the first instance, and gradually, in the
second instance, the practice of medicine itself.

This is an essential book for the student of ancient philosophy and science, but
it isn't a book to lazily take to bed. It requires concentrated effort on the
part of the reader. Despite, or maybe because of this, Medicine and Philosophy
in Classical Antiquity will be an important addition to the serious scholar's
library and not easily parted with. Recommended.



© 2005 Elizabeth McCardell



Elizabeth McCardell, PhD, Independent scholar, Australia.



The Necessity Of Madness

by John Breeding
Chipmunkapublishing, 2003
Review by Kevin Purday on Dec 4th 2005



This book is a sincerely felt attempt to add to the literature about the abuse
of psychiatry. Thomas Szasz has probably been the major voice in this movement
for the last forty years or so. More recently Peter Breggin has added his
powerful concerns. Both have built on the earlier insights of Michel Foucault.
John Breeding is a clinical psychologist and his book is an idiosyncratic but
nonetheless valuable addition to this tradition.

In many ways the book is a collection of essays about different aspects of
psychiatry's abuse of its position. However, the author would like the reader to
be aware of a central position around which the chapters or 'essays' are
grouped. That position is made up of several strands. Firstly, the author argues
against a reductionist view of human nature. Although he does not use that
precise technical term, he is constantly attacking those who view human beings
purely as organic mechanisms. This reviewer is in wholehearted agreement with
him that psychiatrists often seem to resort to the use of drugs or
electro-convulsive therapy to treat deep-seated psychological problems which
have their roots either in the pain and suffering that people have received at
the hands of others or in the pain and suffering that they have inflicted on
others. Either way can lead to trauma but such a psychological state is not a
'disease'. Secondly, the author argues that this psychological pain can not be
treated as though it were a case of appendicitis. An appendectomy is the
appropriate treatment for a diseased appendix. A lobotomy or any other physical
treatment is totally inappropriate for a psychological problem. Thirdly, and
this is where the title of the book is relevant, the author argues that the only
way out of these psychological problems is by long term therapy and this will
entail facing up to the causes of the trauma. This will almost always involve
pain and it is the expressions of this pain that reductionist psychiatrists call
'mental illness' or 'madness'. The author argues that far from being an illness,
these expressions of pain are a necessary stage along the road to
self-acceptance. Fourthly, he argues that human beings are complex creatures
with a profoundly spiritual side to them. If we fail to get in touch with this
spiritual side, then not only do we deny a vital aspect of our humanity but we
also run the risk of dehumanizing others as so many psychiatrists have done
during the Nazi period in Germany and during the eugenic movement in the States
and elsewhere. Sadly, as the author points out, many psychiatrists are still
behaving in the same way and his discussion of why they do so is quite
interesting. Basically his argument is that they are in thrall to our
materialist and ultra-capitalist society. He gives two supporting reasons for
this point of view. The first is that in a materialist capitalist society only
the producer-consumer is of use. Anyone who is being unproductive is not
contributing to the gross product and must therefore be brought back into
productive mode as quickly as possible. If that is not possible, then they must
be psychologically neutered i.e. reduced to near vegetable status so that
everyone else can see why they are non-productive. The second is that
psychiatrists are well paid by Medicare to inflict ECT and by the drug companies
to prescribe their products. Since the psychiatrists in question are
materialist/reductionist in their view of human nature, there is nothing to stop
them accepting money to brain damage their patients by ECT or reduce them to a
zombie state with drugs.

The author uses case studies of clients whom he has tried to help to illustrate
the dilemma for those people undergoing profound pain and suffering as a result
of terrible experiences. Psychiatrists are often in positions of great power and
authority. Clinical psychologists and therapists are usually less powerful. The
author obviously feels intensely frustrated that he is often unable to help a
client in the face of institutional psychiatry. Several of the case studies he
shares with us are very moving. Also very moving is his use of the Native
American legend of the Peacemaker as a parable for how a deeply damaged person
can be helped to regain her/his humanity and dignity.

The book has a working bibliography, a good set of endnotes and two appendices
the first of which, on ECT by Dr. Moira Dolan, is particularly useful. There are
also details of organizations which people can join -- organizations which help
the survivors of psychiatric abuse and organizations which are campaigning to
end ECT and drug treatment of those suffering from psychological pain. This book
is a very personal approach to the problem of psychiatric abuse but it is
nonetheless both eloquent and effective.



Link: ChipmunkaPublishing


© 2005 Kevin M. Purday



Kevin Purday works at The Modern English School, Cairo, Egypt, and has a
Master's degree in the Philosophy & Ethics of Mental Health from the Philosophy
Dept. at the University of Warwick.





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