Swathes of southern and central China have been blacked out for days after heavy snow and ice storms left transport links at a standstill.

"This year, because of the bad weather in southern and eastern China, we have demanded and advised some of the major state-owned coal mines to maintain their production," Zhi Tongxiang, an official at the State Administration of Work Safety, told a news conference on Saturday.

Mines normally stop production for up to three days over the New Year for maintenance work and to allow miners to go home for the holiday, but this year that would be cut back to one day, Zhi said.

Even before the bad weather hit, power plants in several Chinese provinces were already running short of coal, due in part to a shut-down of small coal mines that has led to a fall in production and to low state-set electricity tariffs that have dented the balance sheets of power companies.

The freak weather, which could last another week, meant that more than 3,500 mines in the hard-hit provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi and Hubei had suspended production, the Work Safety administration said.

The mines account for a combined annual output of more than 160 million tonnes of coal, it added.

But officials stressed that despite the crunch, they would not allow production to resume at the cost of safety. China's mines are already the world's deadliest, claiming some 3,700 lives last year alone.

"We must strictly prohibit production that goes beyond abilities, beyond the established limits and beyond strength of the mine," Huang Yi, the administration's spokesman, said.

"For mines that have been suspended and want to restart production, they must first be strictly appraised according to the regulations and they must guard against any fatal accidents," he added.

During the New Year period, officials would give up their holidays "to combat the natural disaster together with all mine workers to ensure safe coal production and coal supplies," Huang said.

Management at mine owner LKAB, the Swedish state mining company confirmed on Saturday night that one person was feared dead after the collapse earlier in the evening, according to local newspaper Norrländska Socialdemokraten. The supposed victim had been in a truck before the mine collapsed.

"We don't know whether the driver was in or out [of the truck] when it happened. My information is that quite a lot of material landed on the truck," said Harry Rantakyrö of the Gruvtolvan union.

The accident occurred at about 8pm, 700 metres below ground. LKAB says that about 70 people were working in the mine at the time of the collapse.

Rescue workers were working through the night on Saturday to try to reach the trapped miner. The work was being hampered by the risk of further collapses.

"When you have have a large seismic event of this kind it is likely that more of the mountain is damaged and could be loose. This needs to be secured before we can allow people to work in the area," said Christina Dahnér, operations manager for mining engineering at LKAB.

The tremor was felt in nearby towns:

"I felt it myself in the apartment block I live in," said Rantakyrö.

LKAB officials say only a small part of the mine was affected, and staff were able to continue to move around the facility following the incident.

The Fletcher Mine is part of the Doe Run Corporation off of TT Highway in Reynolds County.

Reynolds County Sheriff Gary Barton says they do not know how the explosion happened.  Barton says it may be a few days before a cause can be determined.

Note: The Fletcher Mine is an underground lead-zinc ore mine which began production in 1994.

The Appalachian Center’s Mine Safety Project, the Appalachian Citizens Law Center, United Support and Memorial for Workplace Fatalities and the United Mine Workers union made the request in a petition filed with the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.

The groups want MSHA to require neutral trainers on miners’ rights instead of mine operators. They also want miners to be given annual refresher courses.

Under the 1977 federal Mine Act, miners have the right to speak up about unsafe conditions without retaliation. They also can name a representative to accompany federal inspectors during mine inspections.

The agency has ordered regional managers to deny requests from mine operators for conferences about citations issued for all but the most serious violations. The directive sent Monday also ordered managers to cancel conferences they've already scheduled.

The action comes as MSHA tries to fix a chronic inability to assess penalties on a small percentage of violations.

The conferences are spelled out in federal regulations as an early appeal mechanism. Eliminating that opportunity drew a quick response from the National Mining Association, a Washington, D.C.-based trade group.

Vice President Bruce Watzman labeled the action illegal and unwise in a letter sent to MSHA director Richard Stickler and obtained by The Associated Press Wednesday.

Among other things, Watzman argued the conferences help resolve disagreements over facts and give operators the chance to address criteria for penalties. If they're eliminated, more disputes are going to be pushed into litigation, Watzman wrote.

"If the agency has now concluded either that it is inadequate to the task or it no longer subscribes to the regulation's purpose and objective, the Administrative Procedure Act demands that the agency use the transparent rulemaking process to lawfully change agency policy and rules."

Stickler countered that some mine operators abused the opportunity and clogged the system with conferences rather than handling disputes during meetings at the mine when citations are issued.

"They want all the bites out of the apple they can get," Stickler said, noting that some operators dispute citations at every opportunity. "I think there's plenty of bites in there that we can be effective, but in the meantime, we're not going to allow this to just logjam the system."

MSHA already has problems with its citation system. The agency said Tuesday it failed to assess penalties for 0.4 percent of violations issued from 1995 through part of 2006. The problems spiked in 2000, when 506 violations weren't assessed, then declined to 473 in 2001. They spiked again to 807 in 2003 and 1,045 in 2004, before falling to 685 in 2005, the last full year of MSHA data.

Stickler said MSHA is addressing the problem by revising and simplifying five separate policy manuals that address the process and reprogramming its computer system.

"We're going to revise these policy manuals, make sure that the instruction is very clear, very concise and very consistent," he said.

MSHA's computer system, meanwhile, is being reprogrammed to eliminate problems such as automatically dropping citations when a penalty hadn't been assessed within 18 months, he said.

The new program will automatically send citations for assessment unless specifically held by a regional office and any citations that haven't been assessed within 11 months, said Stickler, who declined to set a specific timetable for fixing the system.

Separately, Stickler said MSHA is focusing on assessing penalties for citations less than 18 months old and trying to figure out whether it can legally assess older citations.

By R.G. Dunlop
rdunlop@...
The Courier-Journal
February 7, 2008

Fewer than 1 percent of the 1.3 million coal-company violations cited by federal inspectors nationwide between 1995 and 2006 were not assessed fines as they should have been, a review by the Mine Safety and Health Administration has concluded.

MSHA found that 5,093 violations went unassessed -- 0.4 percent of the total.

The number of unassessed violations in Kentucky was not available yesterday.

The agency said its review found that some of the unassessed violations resulted from "technical issues" associated with MSHA's computer system, and that others were not assessed because of "management oversight problems."

Richard Stickler, the acting assistant labor secretary for mine safety and health, said in a statement that the problem was an "institutional" one dating at least to 1995 and probably earlier. Before 1995, agency records were not computerized, making the reconstruction of unassessed violations more difficult.

Stickler said MSHA has taken steps to address both the computer and the oversight issues, including "new and improved management reports."

In an interview yesterday, he said he was "surprised and disappointed" by the findings.

But he added that no one was disciplined because the primary problem stemmed from employees who didn't understand procedures or made innocent mistakes. There was no evidence of willful misconduct, he said.

Federal fines for safety violations range from $60 -- for a condition that is considered unlikely to cause serious injury and corrected promptly -- to a maximum of $60,000 for most other violations.

The federal MINER Act passed in 2006 established a higher penalty, up to $220,000, for flagrant violations.

Stickler said that a majority of the unassessed violations, at least in recent years, appeared to be relatively minor and would have resulted in fines of $200 or less for each citation.

MSHA discovered the unassessed violations after The Courier-Journal inquired last month about agency enforcement actions against H&D Mining Inc. of Harlan County.

Agency records showed that the company owed MSHA more than $200,000 in unpaid fines, but had been assessed no financial penalty in connection with the December 2005 death of miner David "Bud" Morris.

After the newspaper's inquiry, MSHA discovered that violations had been cited -- but not assessed -- in many other instances as well. MSHA then fined H&D $60,000 and began its review to determine how many other unassessed violations existed.

Morris bled to death after being struck from behind by a mine vehicle loaded with coal. Medical personnel concluded that he would have lived had he received prompt first-aid from mine co-owner Gary Wayne Bentley, the only person on site trained to provide such assistance.

MSHA cited the company for failing to provide proper first-aid to Morris and for failing to train another supervisor who had been designated by H&D for emergency medical instruction but did not receive it.

State regulators charged Bentley in March 2006 with failing to render aid and for lying to investigators about it.

But they have failed to win approval from the Mine Safety Review Commission of four proposed settlements of the charges that would have imposed only minor penalties on Bentley.

Another hearing in the case is scheduled for Feb. 14.

• Requires a person knowledgeable in mine emergency response be present at each mine on each shift and receive annual emergency response training using an MSHA-prescribed course.

• Requires two certified mine rescue teams for each mine and includes criteria for certifying the qualifications of a mine rescue team.

• Requires mine rescue team members be available at the mine within one hour from the mine rescue station.

• Requires team members to participate in training at each mine serviced by the team (a portion of which must be conducted underground), and be familiar with the operations and ventilation of the mine.

• Requires team members to participate annually in two local mine rescue contests.

• Provides for four types of mine rescue teams: mine-site, composite, contract and state-sponsored.

• Requires annual training in smoke, simulated smoke or an equivalent environment.

• Increases required training from 40 to 96 hours annually.

MSHA published the proposed rule for mine rescue teams on Sept. 6, 2007. The agency held four public hearings in Salt Lake City, Utah; Lexington, Ky.; Charleston, W.Va.; and Birmingham, Ala. In response to a request from the public, MSHA extended the comment period from Nov. 9, 2007, to Nov. 16, 2007. 

See Rule (PDF)

I am trying to find mine list in USA and Canada. Strongly, I cannot
find any publication about it. It is easy find the same information
about Australia, Africa, South America and many other countries. How
could it be so difficult to find the mine information in North America?
It would be appreciated if any one knows any publication about it.
Thanks.

Ming

It all goes back to a cold Feb. 10 morning in 1928, when 921 miners were at work in the numerous drifts, stopes and raises at the Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mine in Timmins. It was the largest gold mine in North America at the time.

According evidence from the inquest, it was around 9:30 that morning that smoke was first noticed by underground and surface workers alike.

Mine officials were stunned. Conventional thinking at the time was that fires did not occur in hardrock metal mines, the way they occurred in "soft rock" such as coal mines. There were timbers in the mines, but the constant runoff of water made it unlikely for timbers to catch fire.

What no one considered at that moment was that there was an open excavation, on the 550-foot level, in Stope 55A, just east of crosscut tunnel number 12. A stockpile of trash, sawdust, powder boxes, paraffin paper and lumber had been accumulating.

Somehow that rubbish caught fire at about a quarter after nine that Friday morning.

In later years experts would suspect it was some form of spontaneous combustion. The result was a slow smoldering fire that would prove deadly.

As the trash burned, it created a grey-black smoke that began to roll along the tunnels. At 10 a.m. the first body was discovered and rushed to the surface. At 10:15, another body was found. This was enough to send the men scrambling for the ladders and the shaft. Within three hours, hundreds of the miners got to surface and saved themselves. But not everyone could find their way to safety.

There was no organized mine rescue or fire fighting program in place at the Hollinger, or any other hardrock mine in Ontario for that matter.

It would take five days to put out the fire and find all the dead, but in the end 39 miners were dead. As a mining disaster in Ontario, it was unprecedented.

Many of the men who were underground would never know what killed them. Experts later concluded it was carbon monoxide poisoning that killed all 39 men. The odorless and colorless gas was produced by the slow-burning trash.

Fire fighting resources and expertise at the Hollinger were so bleak at the time that organized mine rescue teams from the coal mines of Pennsylvania were rushed to Timmins.

The men and material were put aboard an express train at Pittsburgh which was then rushed to Timmins.

Rushed is a relative term, considering the steam locomotive pulling a few specially equipped cars had to roll through northern Pennsylvania, New York, cross the border at Niagara Falls, pick up provincial officials in Toronto and then chug north to Timmins. The trip took a day and a half.

Upon arriving in Timmins, the American coal miners were able to put on their special gear, descend into the mine and get to work at putting out the fire.

As they began recovering the bodies, company officials were shocked to find that some of the miners had died while eating their lunch. Some of the dead were found with food still in their mouths. Company officials had no idea how quickly carbon monoxide could kill a man. There was a huge public outcry over the loss of life. Within weeks, the Ontario government set up a royal commission through Ontario Mining Commissioner Judge T.E Godson to find out what happened and why.

Godson made his recommendations in September of that year.

He found that Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines had not cast aside safety in favour of profits. What happened was an error of omission, Godson concluded. No one knew or expected a fire would, or could, occur in a metal mine.

The report ordered that all accumulations of rubbish be removed from underground locations at least once a week. Both the manager and assistant mine manager at the Hollinger were reprimanded for not knowing there was an underground rubbish dump.

The report also ordered that fire doors be set on different levels to allow miners to escape smoke situations. One of the key suggestions was to establish special rescue stations in every major mining community that would have specialized equipment and training so the rescue operations could be mounted. The first ever Ontario Mine Rescue station was established in Timmins in 1929.

Lessons learned

The lessons learned from the Godson Commission are things that many miners take for granted today, but the manager of Ontario's Mine Rescue program says the Hollinger disaster highlighted the need for serious safety changes in mining in Ontario.

"Oh absolutely, there were so many recommendations integrated into legislation because of the Hollinger fire," said Gryska who runs the program through the Mines and Aggregates Safety and Health Association.

He says perhaps the most notable was the creation of a formal mine rescue program in Ontario, which began in 1929, one year after the fire. Gryska says Ontario Mine Rescue is now recognized as being one of the best such organizations in the world.

Another example is the fact that it is now against the law to store any garbage underground for more than a day.

"The fact that we don't store trash underground, it was because of that fire," said Gryska.

"What they did back then was they used explosives boxes, and all the cardboard and that, they just threw it into open stopes with greasy rags and things like that, they just threw it all in there and that was the source of the fuel for the fire."

"They didn't know, at that point in time. It probably made sense „ why bring all this stuff up from underground, the cost of bringing it out was so costly, so it wasn't done."

He says another important ruling was that signs had to be posted throughout the mines.

"Miners today will see signs underground showing them fire exits. At that point in time one of the problems was that miners didn't know where to go. They got lost in the smoke."

The accident happened Sunday afternoon.

According to Leslie Fitzwater with the Office of Miners Health, Safety, and Training, two employees with Petroleum Transfer were driving in a truck at the Elk Run Coal Company's Black Castle Surface Mine when their truck went over an embankment and landed in a creek.

The two men, whose names have not been released yet, were there several hours before they were found.

Fitzwater says the families of the men in the truck reported them missing, and that when crews started looking for the men and found them some time after midnight.

No word yet on the condition of the men or how the accident happened.