--- In ai-philosophy@yahoogroups.com, Bill Modlin <wdmodlin@...> wrote:
>
> ... GOFAI workers to attempt a misguided implementation
> of AI in which the elements of mental experience are formal
> symbols instantiated in the program for direct manipulation.
>
...
>
> So we program algorithms to implement that development, not
> to implement directly the things that will develop.
Implement Conway's rules not the gliders and oscillators that
emerge from those rules?
... Of course. Was hoping you might. ... Right. Of course. That's essentially what I'm saying, but I was hoping that a different way of expressing the idea...
... Yes. Good analogy, I think. Thanks. The rules we need are a lot more complex, and the system is not closed, so the emergent results are influenced by...
I previously remarked that computers can implement connectionist networks, heuristics, or any other seemingly "non-algorithmic" or "non-computational"...
... You are right, the computer doesn't just "simulate" them, but it can implement in their full glory, that is, it can implement them AS WELL AS ANY MACHINE...
... That's faint praise ... What is the best way to understand computer *software* ? ... But that;s not actually very real. The gap beteen simulation and...
... It's not a faint praise. The connectionist networks, heuristics, statistical information processing, all of these can be realized by the computers to the...
... Connectionist networks do not have to be implemented by biological neurons. They can be implemented by silicon hardware or just computer software. I...
... I wish Eray had left off the "and mathematical". To me it adds nothing but fuzziness to the idea that cognition is information processing or equivalently...
... Let's say "constructivist mathematics" then, or all the mathematics that matters. The part of mathematics that isn't constructivist has no cognitive...
... You've brought up "software" several times now Peter, and it occurs to me that if we can get this concept properly sorted out perhaps much of our quibbling...
... I bring up software because it is key to certain postions and argumetns in the philosophy of AI, eg computatiopanlism and Searles' arguemtns. Someone who...
... Software isn't key to any philosophical position that I can think of. Reconfigurability can be in hardware as well as in software, does not matter as much...
... in the philosophy of AI, eg computatiopanlism and Searles' arguemtns. So you say. But you still have not answered the question at all, you have not told...
... Well it is an active component of a system, it's just that there is no magical distinction from other bits of the system. Best, -- Eray Ozkural, PhD...
... Maybe the question is what the people who hold those positions think it is. Searle certainly thinks it is important The Critique of Computationalism and...
... Lol. Ok, my way of saying this was wrong. Certainly in a general-purpose computer, there are active components that read the software and put the...
... No it's correct. Of course the same people who think there is no software in the brain could also look at a computer chip, see that it does pretty ...
Eray O> ...Particular computers do not require any software to compute. They just take input and run. Anything that processes information *is* a computer. ...
... No, it would mean that the universe is a computer. That would make computer science physics and vica versa, but no another definition would not be needed....
... It or a similar abstraction is necessary to delineating the difference between concrete functions and abstract functions, and it is also necessary to...
... True. Programs can be implemented in hardware or software equivalently. We can consider prysical machines, languages, programs, data and memery to allo be...
... I'm not sure how Eray would respond, but if you read the things I posted before, I explained a distinction between purely physical processes and those...