That the computation is analog can explain, among other things, that we never see pixels :D I know it sounds silly, as I usually don't consider theses from ...
... You might want to have a look at: Eliasmith, C. (2000) Is the brain analog or digital?: The solution and its consequences for cognitive science. Cognitive...
... Huh? I nver suggested properties cannot change. ... You can say more. You can say what consistency consists of. It turns out that it consists of similarity...
... Well, nevermind what Eray wrote, but he did initiate the topic. The brain is not a computer. Therefore the brain is not an analog computer. QED ;) I have...
... You are missing the point. My comment was about consistency of behavior, not about consistency of things. ... There is a certain received view of how...
MindForth as a natural-language (NL) comprehension system In the MindForth artificial general intelligence (AGI) system, natural-language (NL) generation and...
... Try making it again, it was not at all clear. ... You can express your view without changing the meanings of any words. eg: "all you can legitimately...
... I am not changing the meaning of "properties". As I mentioned in my first post in this thread, the nature of properties has long been controversial. And...
... Really. So if I say "Bush is Dumb", what is going on 1. "Dumb" is not a predicate? 2. It is but, I din't ascribe it. Some force of nature did. ... You have...
... Let's stick to non-personal cases. If I decide that grass is green, then I am ascribing the property of greenness to grass. If I tell you that grass is...
... And your ascriptions of characteristics to things are not themsleves characteristics and the things don't have to match them. Your ascriptions work in evey...
Language is irrelevant predicate is just a binary property. And mental states are not properties they are material features. Only an idiot like chalmers would...
... Nice, but that is still physical, obviously so? -- Eray Ozkural, PhD candidate. Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara Research Assistant, Erendiz...
A plan is a program. Minsky talks about "scripts" in The Emotion Machine. In daily life we talk about "plans". "I am planning to go to a seaside vacation next...
... It hasn't been solved just because duality, in the philosopher's sense, is seen to be without explanatory value. Planning may well be a behavior of the...
Hi all, I finally finished a new story. Our favorite duo contemplate the nature of God, in an effort to fit in with some recent astronomical observations. ...
... That is not straightforward. The version for physicalism which holds that everything can ultimately be described physically has the implication that there...
... I don't think that such a thing is implied at all. Not at all. This would be right though: "The version for physicalism which holds that everything can ...
... What I wrote is an argument not an opinion. To flesh it out:- The version of physicalism which holds that everything can ultimately be described physically...
... I disagree. I don't think there is a connection at all. Or even if we grant that: "a subjectivity that has already been reduced to the objective physical...
Here is an idea that I have been playing with for the last few years, but didn't make much mention of it. GR allows us to ascertain about subjective (i.e....
... I am exploring the consequences of two combined claims: 1) explanatory physicalism 2) the Dual Aspect theory --that subjectivity is a special kind of...
... You are misreading. I have not said that something is a property just because it is not a predicate. Rather, what I said what that "predicate" is just...
... Can you explain what "described physically" actually means? I am inclined to think that descriptions could not be purely physical, because they have to...
I think one useful definition of intelligence may be temporal compression -- i.e., intelligent agents generally outperform genetic algorithms in speed. If it...
... Huh? ... Predicates often are names of properties ... So are you actually basing any claim on some claim of nominalism that you haven't argued for? ... But...