Q: What was the best solution to remove Baath Regime, Saddam Hussein?

War, undoubtedly, is by far the most efficacious, certain and immediate method of obtaining regime change. But see my previous answer for the risks such a course of action entails. Moreover, regime change is not one of the accepted justifications for declaring war. The concept of regime change is of dubious provenance as far as international law goes. It opens the door to breaches of sovereignty brought on by less than wholesome motives (such as the wish to secure economic gains or to resolve ideological disagreements).

Q: Under the Obama administration, what will be the future of Iraq? What are the possibilities that you expect?

It is wrong to believe that the long-term policies of the United States change with every new administration. As Obama is discovering now, many of the measures implemented and decisions taken by George Bush were unavoidable and must be continued. The same applies to Iraq: for public opinion and pecuniary reasons, the USA is seeking to withdraw the bulk of its troops, while working with and maintaining a largely friendly regime there. This is untenable. Geopolitics does not suffer a vacuum: as the presence of the USA diminishes, the void will be filled by Islamist militants and fundamentalists, sectarian and secessionist operatives (including Kurdish ones), other foreign powers (Russia and China come to mind), and rampant organized crime gangs. Finally, a new Saddam Hussein is likely to emerge, replete with a promise to restore law and order to the territory. The West will support him out of fear that, if it doesn’t, Iraq will implode.

Q: The issue Kirkuk province, and other disputed areas is one of the main problem facing the Iraqis in their quest to establish new Iraq. How can they solve these problems? Can the Americans do anything about that? How do you see the future of Kirkuk?

In many parts of the world – from the United Kingdom to Nigeria – resource-rich regions are subsidising and supporting poorer parts of the country. Sometimes this results in tensions and fighting (as in Nigeria) and, at other times, in a peacefully-negotiated increased autonomy (as in Scotland). A durable, consensual solution requires the following elements: (1) That a large chunk of oil revenues remain in the province and are used to better the lives of the local inhabitants in a tangible and visible way; (2) That decision-making regarding contracting and extraction policies devolves to the regional authorities and is effected transparently; (3) That the regional authorities are fairly and democratically elected and are representative of the ethnic and religious composition of their constituency; (4) That the regional authorities have a say (though not veto right) as to how oil revenues are used at the national level; (5) That clear mechanisms of consultation and dispute resolution are in place (if necessary, with resort to an international component). This is where the USA can come in: as one of the arbiters in cases where the regional and national authorities are at odds and cannot resolve their differences. If the issue of Kirkuk is not settled more or less in the manner I describe, Iraq will experience increasing instability with the potential to break down in the throes of an ugly civil war in which will suck in the entire region. That’s why I believe that the Iraqi government will be pressurized by the USA and the EU into settling the issue of Kirkuk and Mosul soon and for good.

Q: In these days, most of the Kurdish media are talking about the Kurdish-Israel relations. Are there any relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Israel? Do you support relations between your nation and Kurdistan? How it should be organized?

Israel has always regarded the Kurds as an important ally in its struggle for survival against murderous and extremist Arab regimes, such as Saddam Hussein’s. The Kurds are also a back channel to countries such as Turkey and Iran. Israel continues to support the Kurds in Iraq to this very minute with weapons, military training and consultants, intelligence-sharing, transfer of agricultural knowledge, and some financial and development aid. Unfortunately, both parties tend to regard each other only within the narrow confines of the martial and geopolitical benefits that they confer. This tunnel vision precludes a true, long-term alliance between the two nations, one that involves economic, scientific, cultural, educational and other non-military exchanges. Israel and the Kurds should establish a permanent bilateral council that will direct such modes of collaboration within a coordinated, long-term plan to encourage moderate elements in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Q. Can Israel do anything for Kurds in order to get their independence?

No. Israel will not risk its strategic alliance with Turkey (currently under serious strain) to further Kurdish national aspirations. Israel is dependent for its survival on the United States and for its economic welfare on the European Union, both of which are strongly opposed to Kurdish independence. Moreover: destabilizing Iraq, Iran, and Turkey (by establishing a Kurdistan) is not in the interests of Israel.

Q. How do you see the future of Kurds within Iraq?

In the short to medium term, the autonomy of the Kurdish region within Iraq will wax and wane as successive central governments seek to reassert their control either by incorporating pliant Kurdish leaders into the administration, or by subduing the more rebellious heads of clans and politicians. The next few years will be dedicated to renegotiating the issue of Kirkuk and Mosul as I delineated above. In the long-term, with the rise of a new Saddam Hussein, the Kurds will opt out of Iraq. This could well lead into a “war of independence” and an internationally-mediated secession, akin to Kosovo’s.

Indeed, the Kurds would do well to study the precedent of Kosovo.

The new state of Kosovo has been immediately recognized by the USA, Germany, and other major European powers. The Canadian Supreme Court made clear in its ruling in the Quebec case in 1998 that the status of statehood is not conditioned upon such recognition, but that (p. 289):

"...(T)he viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states."

The constitutional law of some federal states provides for a mechanism of orderly secession. The constitutions of both the late USSR and SFRY (Yugoslavia, 1974) incorporated such provisions. In other cases - the USA, Canada, and the United Kingdom come to mind - the supreme echelons of the judicial system had to step in and rule regarding the right to secession, its procedures, and mechanisms.

Again, facts on the ground determine international legitimacy. As early as 1877, in the wake of the bloodiest secessionist war of all time, the American Civil War (1861-5), the Supreme Court of the USA wrote (in William vs. Bruffy):

"The validity of (the secessionists') acts, both against the parent State and its citizens and subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail (sic) to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed (sic), and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation."

In "The Creation of States in International Law" (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 2006), James Crawford suggests that there is no internationally recognized right to secede and that secession is a "legally neutral act". Not so. As Aleksandar Pavkovic observes in his book (with contributions by Peter Radan), "Creating New States - Theory and Practice of Secession" (Ashgate, 2007), the universal legal right to self-determination encompasses the universal legal right to secede.

The Albanians in Kosovo are a "people" according to the Decisions of the Badinter Commission. But, though, they occupy a well-defined and demarcated territory, their land is within the borders of an existing State. In this strict sense, their unilateral secession does set a precedent: it goes against the territorial definition of a people as embedded in the United Nations Charter and subsequent Conventions.

Still, the general drift of international law (for instance, as interpreted by Canada's Supreme Court) is to allow that a State can be composed of several "peoples" and that its cultural-ethnic constituents have a right to self-determination. This seems to uphold the 19th century concept of a homogenous nation-state over the French model (of a civil State of all its citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religious creed).

Pavkovic contends that, according to principle 5 of the United Nations' General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, the right to territorial integrity overrides the right to self-determination.

Thus, if a State is made up of several "peoples", its right to maintain itself intact and to avoid being dismembered or impaired is paramount and prevails over the right of its constituent peoples to secede. But, the right to territorial integrity is limited to States:

"(C)onducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour."

The words "as to race, creed, or colour" in the text supra have been replaced with the words "of any kind" (in the 1995 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations).

Yugoslavia under Milosevic failed this test in its treatment of the Albanian minority within its borders. They were relegated to second-class citizenship, derided, blatantly and discriminated against in every turn. Thus, according to principle 5, the Kosovars had a clear right to unilaterally secede.

As early as 1972, an International Commission of Jurists wrote in a report titled "The Events in East Pakistan, 1971":

"(T)his principle (of territorial integrity) is subject to the requirement that the government does comply with the principle of equal rights and does represent the whole people without distinction. If one of the constituent peoples of a state is denied equal rights and is discriminated against ... their full right of self-determination will revive." (p. 46)

A quarter of a century later, Canada's Supreme Court concurred (Quebec, 1998):

"(T)he international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations ... where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development."

In his seminal tome, "Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal" (Cambridge University Press, 19950, Antonio Cassese neatly sums up this exception to the right to territorial integrity enjoyed by States:

"(W)hen the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the State structure ... A racial or religious group may secede ... once it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail." (p. 119-120)

Q. Can Muslims and Israelis have good relations? How could it be achieved?

Israel has problems with Arab Muslims, not with all Muslims. The conflict with the Arabs can never be resolved for three reasons: (1) Israel is perceived by the Arabs as a foreign body, a colonial outpost of the West, whose culture, ethnicity, religion, and affiliations are alien to the region. The Arabs’ reaction to Israel is immunological and is a private case of their animosity towards the United States; (2) Both the Israelis and the Palestinians nurture and harbour identical, competing, and mutually-exclusive claims to the very same piece of land and to the same history; (3) Both parties believe that they will prevail and triumph, given resources and enough time. This set of beliefs coupled with these emotional reactions renders peace the less rational and less attractive course of action.

Q: Finally, what else do you want to say?

There is a debate in the Western media about Islam: is it belligerent by its very nature or is it being abused and misused by fanatics and fundamentalist militants?

In my view, Islam is not merely a religion. It is also - and perhaps, foremost - a state ideology. It is all-pervasive and missionary. It permeates every aspect of social cooperation and culture. It is an organizing principle, a narrative, a philosophy, a value system, and a vade mecum. In this it resembles Confucianism and, to some extent, Hinduism.

Judaism and its offspring, Christianity - though heavily involved in political affairs throughout the ages - have kept their dignified distance from such carnal matters. These are religions of "heaven" as opposed to Islam, a practical, pragmatic, hands-on, ubiquitous, "earthly" creed.

Secular religions - Democratic Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, Nazism, Socialism and other isms - are more akin to Islam than to, let's say, Buddhism. They are universal, prescriptive, and total. They provide recipes, rules, and norms regarding every aspect of existence - individual, social, cultural, moral, economic, political, military, and philosophical.

At the end of the Cold War, Democratic Liberalism stood triumphant over the fresh graves of its ideological opponents. They have all been eradicated. This precipitated Fukuyama's premature diagnosis (the End of History). But one state ideology, one bitter rival, one implacable opponent, one contestant for world domination, one antithesis remained - Islam.

Militant Islam is, therefore, not a cancerous mutation of "true" Islam. On the contrary, it is the purest expression of its nature as an imperialistic religion which demands unmitigated obedience from its followers and regards all infidels as both inferior and avowed enemies.

The same can be said about Democratic Liberalism. Like Islam, it does not hesitate to exercise force, is missionary, colonizing, and regards itself as a monopolist of the "truth" and of "universal values". Its antagonists are invariably portrayed as depraved, primitive, and below par.

Such mutually exclusive claims were bound to lead to an all-out conflict sooner or later. The "War on Terrorism" is only the latest round in a millennium-old war between Islam and other "world systems".

Such interpretation of recent events enrages many. They demand to know (often in harsh tones):

But is there no difference between terrorists who murder civilians and regular armies in battle?

Both regulars and irregulars slaughter civilians as a matter of course. "Collateral damage" is the main outcome of modern, total warfare - and of low intensity conflicts alike.

There is a major difference between terrorists and soldiers, though:

Terrorists make carnage of noncombatants their main tactic - while regular armies rarely do. Such conduct is criminal and deplorable, whoever the perpetrator.

But what about the killing of combatants in battle? How should we judge the slaying of soldiers by terrorists in combat?

Modern nation-states enshrined the self-appropriated monopoly on violence in their constitutions and ordinances (and in international law). Only state organs - the army, the police - are permitted to kill, torture, and incarcerate.

Terrorists are trust-busters: they, too, want to kill, torture, and incarcerate. They seek to break the death cartel of governments by joining its ranks.

Thus, when a soldier kills terrorists and ("inadvertently") civilians (as "collateral damage") - it is considered above board. But when the terrorist decimates the very same soldier - he is decried as an outlaw.

Moreover, the misbehaviour of some countries - not least the United States - led to the legitimization of terrorism. Often nation-states use terrorist organizations to further their geopolitical goals. When this happens, erstwhile outcasts become "freedom fighters", pariahs become allies, murderers are recast as sensitive souls struggling for equal rights. This contributes to the blurring of ethical precepts and the blunting of moral judgment.

Would I rather live under Shari’a law? Don't I find Liberal Democracy vastly superior to Islam?

Superior, no. Different - of course. Having been born and raised in the West, I naturally prefer its standards to Islam's. Had I been born in a Muslim country, I would have probably found the West and its principles perverted and obnoxious.

The question is meaningless because it presupposes the existence of an objective, universal, culture and period independent set of preferences. Luckily, there is no such thing.

In this clash of civilization whose side am I on?

This is not a clash of civilizations. Western culture is inextricably intertwined with Islamic knowledge, teachings, and philosophy. Christian fundamentalists have more in common with Muslim militants than with East Coast or French intellectuals.

Muslims have always been the West's most defining Other. Islamic existence and "gaze" helped to mold the West's emerging identity as a historical construct. From Spain to India, the incessant friction and fertilizing interactions with Islam shaped Western values, beliefs, doctrines, moral tenets, political and military institutions, arts, and sciences.

This war is about world domination. Two incompatible thought and value systems compete for the hearts and minds (and purchasing power) of the denizens of the global village. Like in the Westerns, by high noon, either one of them is left standing - or both will have perished.

Where does my loyalty reside?

I am a Westerner, so I hope the West wins this confrontation. But, in the process, it would be good if it were humbled, deconstructed, and reconstructed. One beneficial outcome of this conflict is the demise of the superpower system - a relic of days bygone and best forgotten. I fully believe and trust that in militant Islam, the United States has found its match.

In other words, I regard militant Islam as a catalyst that will hasten the transformation of the global power structure from unipolar to multipolar. It may also commute the United States itself. It will definitely rejuvenate religious thought and cultural discourse. All wars do.

Isn’t this overdoing it? After all, al-Qaida is just a bunch of terrorists on the run!

The West is not fighting al-Qaida. It is facing down the circumstances and ideas that gave rise to al-Qaida. Conditions - such as poverty, ignorance, disease, oppression, and xenophobic superstitions - are difficult to change or to reverse. Ideas are impossible to suppress. Already, militant Islam is far more widespread and established that any Western government would care to admit.

History shows that all terrorist groupings ultimately join the mainstream. Many countries - from Israel to Ireland and from East Timor to Nicaragua - are governed by former terrorists. Terrorism enhances social upward mobility and fosters the redistribution of wealth and resources from the haves to haves not.

Al-Qaida, despite its ominous portrayal in the Western press - is no exception. It, too, will succumb, in due time, to the twin lures of power and money. Nihilistic and decentralized as it is - its express goals are the rule of Islam and equitable economic development. It is bound to get its way in some countries.

The world of the future will be truly pluralistic. The proselytizing zeal of Liberal Democracy and Capitalism has rendered them illiberal and intolerant. The West must accept the fact that a sizable chunk of humanity does not regard materialism, individualism, liberalism, progress, and democracy - at least in their Western guises - as universal or desirable.

Live and let live (and live and let die) must replace the West's malignant optimism and intellectual and spiritual arrogance.