] Can someone clarify something for me here ... near the top of the appeals
] court review is the following text:
]
] Restitution order reversed and remanded for reconsideration; otherwise
] affirmed.
]
] Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of three counts of
] computer crime. ORS 164.377. We reverse the order of restitution, but
] otherwise we affirm.
]
] Does this mean that the restitution that Randal was told to pay no longer
] needs to be paid? At least, that's how I read this. It would be cool if
] it were true.

I'm no lawyer, but my reading of this is that the Court thinks Randal
has a point:
He contends that $8,779.45 in attorney
fees incurred by Intel should not have been included in the
restitution amount that he was required to pay.

... specifically whether it was "reasonable and necessary" for
Intel to retain outside counsel to advise it when it could have more
cheaply obtained the same advice from its in-house counsel or from the
District Attorney.

I'm slightly more optimistic than Randal on what happened, I read it
as saying that the burden of proof on the $8,779.45 now lies with the
State, Intel and the Trial Court.

So if they want to collect that $9k as well as the other restitution,
Intel & the State would need to go back to the Trial Court and prove
it was appropriate, after this time giving Randal the chance to argue
that Intel hiring outside counsel was not necessary, so he shouldn't
have to pay for it.


Another interesting (but subtle) facet of the judgement is
The state observes that ORS 164.377(3) criminalizes alteration
of a computer only when a person KNOWS that he or she is without
authorization.

Confronted with
the phrase "without authorization," a potential violator of ORS
164.377(3) would be reasonably certain that he or she would run afoul
of that prohibition by doing something to a computer in violation of
the policy of the company that owned the computer without having
sought permission for an exception to the policy.

This suggests that there was a burden of proof on the State to show
that Randal did know at the time that he was "without authorization"
on counts 2 and 3. Or it sounds like that is what the Appeal Court
would expect to happen at trial.

I suggest that there is a significant difference between:
Randal knew that he was without authorization
and
Randal did not know that he had authorization

The first case would mean Randal knew he was doing something bad,
and the second case would apply if Randal didn't know what Intel
would think about his actions.

Is it too late now to argue that
Randal did not know that he was without authorization
on the basis that at the time Randal was unclear exactly what he
was authorized to do and what was unauthorized?

This wouldn't get very far on count 1 (Randal was informed about
company policy at the time), but might be useful for counts 2 & 3.
Unless someone told Randal beforehand that he was not allowed to
run crack, copy password files from SSD, etc.

__________________________________________________________________________
David Keegel <djk@...> URL: http://www.cyber.com.au/users/djk/
Cybersource P/L: Unix Systems Administration and TCP/IP network management