human-ethology : Messages : 20346-20375 of 20375

Timothy Miller: My understanding of the research to date is that religious belief in the absence of religious participation does not protect the believer from depression.

Jay R. Feierman: If one defines belief as "that which is held to be true," I agree with you in terms of what the literature shows. However, if one defines religious belief in a more bio-behavioral-friendly way as "a unit of information (that which is necessary to make decisions) that biases behavior (~ movement) in a predictable way," then one has to behave in predictable ways to believe! And, if God is the object of and reason for religious behavior, one actualizes the presence of God by one's religious motivated behaviors. Otherwise, if one just sits around and thinks, one has a non-actualized belief, which I call a simple idea. Natural selection is (metaphorically) blind to ideas but is very observant of beliefs and the behaviors they predictably bias. If one belongs to an organized religion, one will get inundated with different religious beliefs, especially in the sacred narratives, which will bias one's behavior in predictable ways. If for example one is a Roman Catholic, the beliefs the Church tries to instill in one is to go to Mass weekly, etc. As a result, one will be engaging in religious participation. There are lots of psychological and health benefits that correlate with religious participation. The best data are the Mormons compared to the non-Mormon population in Utah. The differences are very striking.

#20374

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Wed Dec 2, 2009 12:26 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jrfeier

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Jay R. Feierman: Currently, we do not have the technology to determine if someone's brain contains a specific belief, such as "God exists."

Timothy Miller: Self reports regarding subjective private experience can be reliable and valid.

Jay R. Feierman: They can be. But how does one know if they are reliable and valid?

Timothy Miller: Think of medical research regarding pain for example. Pain behavior is observed, but self-reports are also taken seriously.

Jay R. Feierman: Did you ever hear of the saying, "All junkies have migraines"? What about psychosomatic pain or pain in which one can not find tissue pathology? I find people's self-reports very interesting and useful, especially when I use them to compare to the person's non-verbal behaviors as they are telling me their self-report. I don't put a lot of weight on information obtained by self-report, if the person might have a motive to be deceptive. The best example is someone saying, "I'm not suicidal." What is true is that the person reported that they are not suicidal. It does not at all mean that they are not suicidal.

#20373

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Fri Nov 27, 2009 6:05 pm
Subject: Morphological Correlates of Learning in the Human Brain

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http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=watching-the-brain-learn

Watching the Brain Learn

By R. Douglas Fields

Practice makes perfect, but how? Two groups of
neuroscientists using MRI brain imaging announced
last month that they were able to see changes
inside the brains of people after mastering a new
skill. The big surprise is that the part of the
brain that changed has no neurons or synapses in
it! The cerebral remodeling during learning was
seen in the mysterious and still largely
unexplored �white matter� region of the brain.

Grey matter� is synonymous with smarts, but in
fact only half of the human brain is grey
matter. White matter, the �other brain tissue�,
is rarely mentioned. Neurons in the cerebral
cortex are packed into in the top layers of the
brain, where they are connected together through
synapses. Learning takes place in the grey
matter by linking neurons together into new
circuits by strengthening synapses or forming new ones.

But beneath the topsoil of the brain lies a dense
network of fibers packed into a spaghetti-like
snarl that is so complicated it is difficult to
study or comprehend. These fibers are the
wire-like axons projecting out from neurons in
grey matter that transmit electrical
impulses. Like buried telephone lines, these
tightly bundled cables transmit information over
long distances to communicate between distant
regions of the cerebral cortex that are
specialized to carry out different aspects of a complex cognitive function.

� 1996-2009 Scientific American Inc.

#20372

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 9:44 pm
Subject: Genome Wide Scanning and Natural Selection

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Source: PLoS One [Open Access]
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0007927

Genome-Wide Scan for Signatures of Human Population Differentiation and Their Relationship with Natural Selection, Functional Pathways and Diseases
Roberto Amato1,2, Michele Pinelli1,3, Antonella Monticelli4, Davide Marino2, Gennaro Miele1,2,5, Sergio Cocozza1,3

1 Gruppo Interdipartimentale di Bioinformatica e Biologia Computazionale, Universit� di Napoli �Federico II� - Universit� di Salerno, Naples, Italy,
2 Dipartimento di Scienze Fisiche, Universit� degli Studi di Napoli �Federico II�, Naples, Italy,
3 Dipartimento di Biologia e Patologia Cellulare e Molecolare �L. Califano�, Universit� degli Studi di Napoli �Federico II�, Naples, Italy,
4 Istituto di Endocrinologia ed Oncologia Sperimentale, CNR Napoli, Naples, Italy, 5 Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare � Sezione di Napoli, Naples, Italy

Abstract
Genetic differences both between individuals and populations are studied for their evolutionary relevance and for their potential medical applications. Most of the genetic differentiation among populations are caused by random drift that should affect all loci across the genome in a similar manner. When a locus shows extraordinary high or low levels of population differentiation, this may be interpreted as evidence for natural selection. The most used measure of population differentiation was devised by Wright and is known as fixation index, or FST. We performed a genome-wide estimation of FST on about 4 millions of SNPs from HapMap project data. We demonstrated a heterogeneous distribution of FST values between autosomes and heterochromosomes. When we compared the FST values obtained in this study with another evolutionary measure obtained by comparative interspecific approach, we found that genes under positive selection appeared to show low levels of population differentiation. We applied a gene set approach, widely used for microarray data analysis, to detect functional pathways under selection. We found that one pathway related to antigen processing and presentation showed low levels of FST, while several pathways related to cell signalling, growth and morphogenesis showed high FST values. Finally, we detected a signature of selection within genes associated with human complex diseases. These results can help to identify which process occurred during human evolution and adaptation to different environments. They also support the hypothesis that common diseases could have a genetic background shaped by human evolution.

#20371

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Fri Nov 27, 2009 5:59 pm
Subject: Home Movies of Autistic Infants

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Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
Article in Press, Corrected Proof - Note to users

What studies of family home movies can teach us about autistic infants: A literature review

References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.

Catherine Saint-Georges^a^,^b^,, Raquel S. Cassel^a^,^b^,, David Cohen^a^,^b^,^,, Mohamed Chetouani^c^,¹^,, Marie-Christine Laznik^d^,, Sandra Maestro^e^,²^, and Filippo Muratori^e^,²^,

^aDepartment of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, AP-HP, Groupe Hospitalier Piti�-Salp�tri�re, Universit� Pierre et Marie Curie, 43-87 boulevard de l�H�pital, 75013 Paris, France

^bLaboratoire Psychologie et Neurosciences Cognitives, CNRS UMR 8189, Institut de Psychologie, Universit� Paris V, 71 avenue Edouard Vaillant, 92774 Boulogne-Billancourt, France

^cInstitut des Syst�mes Intelligents et de Robotique, CNRS UMR 7222, Universit� Pierre et Marie Curie, Pyramide � Tour 55, Boite courrier 173, 4 place Jussieu, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France

^dDepartment of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Association Sant� Mentale du 13^�me, Centre Alfred Binet, 76 avenue Edison, 75013 Paris, France

^eIRCCS Scientific Institute Stella Maris, University of Pisa, Viale dei Tirreno, 331 Calambrone (PI), Italy

Received 14 October 2009;

accepted 27 October 2009.

Available online 26 November 2009.

Abstract

The current study reviewed all prior studies conducted on family home movies of infants who would be later diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Out of 41 original reports found since 1975, we retained 18 studies (317 films, maximum), sorted according to their methodological design using a quality grid. In the first 2 years of life, signs that differentiated children with ASD from children with developmental delays were as follows: less of a response to their name, less looking at others, lower eye contact quality and quantity, less positive facial expression and intersubjective behaviors (e.g., showing shared attention). Studies focusing on regression confirmed the clinical validity of the phenomena. We conclude that findings from home movies studies along with prospective studies have created the bases for identification of infants and toddlers at risk of developing ASD before the 18�24-month period, despite early diagnosis of autism remains a complex challenge.

Keywords: Autism; Pervasive Developmental Disorder; Home movies; Early identification; Regression

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Methods
3. Results
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References

Fig. 1. Early signs of autism according to age and main developmental domain from home movie studies. Signs that are more specific to autism (compared to children with developmental delays) appear in bold. N indicates the number of studies reporting the corresponding item. ¹Significant in the 6�12-month period in 1 study; ²significant in the last months of the first year in 3 studies; ³significant in the 0�6-month period in 1 study; ⁴significant in the 6�12-month period in 2 studies; ⁵significant in the last months of the first year in 2 studies; ⁶significant in the 6�12-month period in 1 study.

Table 1.

Main methodological characteristics of home movie studies on infants who later exhibit ASD (1975�2008).

JA = joint attention; aut. signs = autistic signs; dev. skills = developmental skills; DD = developmental delay; TD = typical development; EOA = early onset autism; LOA = late-onset autism; AD = autism disorder; ASD = autism spectrum disorder; PDDNOS = pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified; D3 = DSMIII; D3R = DSMIIIR; D4 = DSMIV; HF = high-functioning; MR = mental retardation; Qual. score = quality score; N.A. = not appropriate.

^a Indicating intermediate age, meaning that authors realized sub-analysis for each intermediate age range.
^b Unless specific indication (DD), control were normally developing children.
^c Mean IQ, or repartition of the autistic sample according to IQ, or IQ range/when indicated, mean IQ in DD sample.
^d Studies excluded from the review of early signs of autism and used in other analyses.

Table 2.

Early signs of PDD in home movie studies (N = 18): significant differences for infants with ASD compared with typically developing children.

JA = joint attention; EOA/LOA = children with early-onset/late-onset autism; DD = children with developmental delay; TD = typically developing children.

Table 3.

Early screening for risk of autism according to prospective and home movie studies.

ISB: intersubjective behaviors; RJA: response to joint attention.

Specificity in autistic/delayed comparison: (�) not specific in home movie studies; (+/−) partially specific in home movie studies; (++) specific in home movie studies; (+++) specific in home movies + prospective studies.

Sensitivity: rate of studies that found significance for this item; S = sensitivity as calculated in one study. Most pertinent items (as regards sensitivity, reproducibility and specificity) appear in bold.

Corresponding author at: Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Groupe Hospitalier Piti�-Salp�tri�re, APHP, Universit� Pierre et Marie Curie, 47 bd de l�H�pital, 75013 Paris, France. Tel.: +33 1 42 16 23 51; fax: +33 1 42 16 23 53.
¹ Tel.: +33 06 79 09 22 18; fax: +33 01 44 27 44 38.
² Tel.: +39 050 886111; fax: +39 050 886202.

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Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders
Article in Press, Corrected Proof - Note to users

#20370

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 7:09 pm
Subject: Emotion-Specific Modulation of Attention

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Source: PLoS One [Open Access]
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0007924

Emotional Modulation of Attention: Fear Increases but Disgust Reduces the Attentional Blink
Nicolas Vermeulen 1, Jimmy Godefroid 1, Martial Mermillod 2

1 Psychology Department, Universit� catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium,
2 Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive (LAPSCO), Universit� Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, France

Abstract
Background
It is well known that facial expressions represent important social cues. In humans expressing facial emotion, fear may be configured to maximize sensory exposure (e.g., increases visual input) whereas disgust can reduce sensory exposure (e.g., decreases visual input). To investigate whether such effects also extend to the attentional system, we used the �attentional blink� (AB) paradigm. Many studies have documented that the second target (T2) of a pair is typically missed when presented within a time window of about 200�500 ms from the first to-be-detected target (T1; i.e., the AB effect). It has recently been proposed that the AB effect depends on the efficiency of a gating system which facilitates the entrance of relevant input into working memory, while inhibiting irrelevant input. Following the inhibitory response on post T1 distractors, prolonged inhibition of the subsequent T2 is observed. In the present study, we hypothesized that processing facial expressions of emotion would influence this attentional gating. Fearful faces would increase but disgust faces would decrease inhibition of the second target.

Methodology/Principal Findings
We showed that processing fearful versus disgust faces has different effects on these attentional processes. We found that processing fear faces impaired the detection of T2 to a greater extent than did the processing disgust faces. This finding implies emotion-specific modulation of attention.

Conclusions/Significance
Based on the recent literature on attention, our finding suggests that processing fear-related stimuli exerts greater inhibitory responses on distractors relative to processing disgust-related stimuli. This finding is of particular interest for researchers examining the influence of emotional processing on attention and memory in both clinical and normal populations. For example, future research could extend upon the current study to examine whether inhibitory processes invoked by fear-related stimuli may be the mechanism underlying the enhanced learning of fear-related stimuli.

#20369

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 9:42 pm
Subject: Eating and the Circadian Clock

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Source: Salk Institute (news : web)
http://www.physorg.com/news178369757.html

Feeding the clock: Cycles of feeding and fasting drive circadian gene expression in the liver

November 25th, 2009 in Medicine & Health / Research

When you eat may be just as vital to your health as what you eat, found researchers at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies. Their experiments in mice revealed that the daily waxing and waning of thousands of genes in the liver -- the body's metabolic clearinghouse -- is mostly controlled by food intake and not by the body's circadian clock as conventional wisdom had it.

"If feeding time determines the activity of a large number of genes completely independent of the circadian clock, when you eat and fast each day will have a huge impact on your metabolism," says the study's leader Satchidananda (Satchin) Panda, Ph.D., an assistant professor in the Regulatory Biology Laboratory.

The Salk researchers' findings, which will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, could explain why shift workers are unusually prone to metabolic syndrome, diabetes, high cholesterol levels and obesity.

"We believe that it is not shift work per se that wreaks havoc with the body's metabolism but changing shifts and weekends, when workers switch back to a regular day-night cycle," says Panda.

In mammals, the circadian timing system is composed of a central circadian clock in the brain and subsidiary oscillators in most peripheral tissues. The master clock in the brain is set by light and determines the overall diurnal or nocturnal preference of an animal, including sleep-wake cycles and feeding behavior. The clocks in peripheral organs are largely insensitive to changes in the light regime. Instead, their phase and amplitude are affected by many factors including feeding time.

The clocks themselves keep time through the fall and rise of gene activity on a roughly 24-hour schedule that anticipates environmental changes and adapts many of the body's physiological function to the appropriate time of day.

"The liver oscillator in particular helps the organism to adapt to a daily pattern of food availability by temporally tuning the activity of thousands of genes regulating metabolism and physiology," says Panda. "This regulation is very important, since the absence of a robust circadian clock predisposes the organism to various metabolic dysfunctions and diseases."

Despite its importance, it wasn't clear whether the circadian rhythms in hepatic transcription were solely controlled by the liver clock in anticipation of food or responded to actual food intake.

To investigate how much influence rhythmic food intake exerts over the hepatic circadian oscillator, graduate student and first author Christopher Vollmers put normal and clock-deficient mice on strictly controlled feeding and fasting schedules while monitoring gene expression across the whole genome.

He found that putting mice on a strict 8-hour feeding/16-hour fasting schedule restored the circadian transcription pattern of most metabolic genes in the liver of mice without a circadian clock. Conversely, during prolonged fasting, only a small subset of genes continued to be transcribed in a circadian pattern even with a functional circadian clock present.

"Food-induced transcription functions like a metabolic sand timer that runs for 24 hours and is continually reset by the feeding schedule while the central circadian clock is driven by self-sustaining rhythms that help us anticipate food, based on our usual eating schedule," says Vollmers. "But in the real world we don't eat at the same time every day and it makes perfect sense to increase the activity of metabolic genes when you need them the most."

For example, genes that encode enzymes needed to break down sugars rise immediately after a meal, while the activity of genes encoding enzymes needed to break down fat is highest when we fast. Consequently a clearly defined daily feeding schedule puts the enzymes of metabolism in shift work and optimizes burning of sugar and fat.

"Our study represents a seminal shift in how we think about circadian cycles," says Panda. "The circadian clock is no longer the sole driver of rhythms in gene function, instead the phase and amplitude of rhythmic gene function in the liver is determined by feeding and fasting periods�the more defined they are, the more robust the oscillations become."

While the importance of robust metabolic rhythms for our health has been demonstrated by shift workers' increased risk of developing metabolic syndrome, the underlying molecular reasons are still unclear. Panda speculates that the oscillations serve one big purpose: to separate incompatible processes, such as the generation of DNA-damaging reactive oxygen species and DNA replication.

Panda, for one, has stopped eating between 8 pm and 8 am and says he feels great. "I even lost weight, although I eat whatever I want during the day," he says.

#20368

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 11:38 pm
Subject: Re: Re: Well-being and religious faith

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James Francis Doyle: I believe it is logically inconsistent to use the bifurcation above (JRF: "Belief in God and God are not the same, which I presume you would agree.") and then reason that that which biases observable behavior does NOT exist. If beliefs exist, then God exists.

Jay R. Feierman: I appreciate you asking these questions. I see how you could think this is logically inconsistent. However, I never said that "that which biases observable behavior [in a predictable way]," which is a belief, does not exist. I said that God does not have to exist for the belief (in God) to exists. I've also said that God can be conceptualized as the object of and reason for religious behavior. However, I didn't say that God is the only object of and reason for religious behavior. Religious behavior (as defined below) could have other objects and reasons for being executed. That's a weakness of this naturalistic concept of God. One can never know for certain that a particular behavior is religious behavior. The more observations that are made, the more certain one can be. However, one will never be 100% certain. One can be certain enough to be within the realm of scientific certainty, however.

One can engage in religious behavior (defined as per Lyle Steadman as behavior associated with the communicated acceptance of [someone else's] supernatural claims that can not be verified by the senses) and not believe in God. It is not God that biases a human's behavior in a predictable ways, it is the belief in God (and therefore in many individuals the belief in the human-written sacred narratives presumed to be inspired by God) that biases human behavior in an observable and predictable ways.

If you read Magnus Magnusson's Chapter 4 in The Biology of Religious Behavior, you will see his argument that the information strings in only two books (the Holy Bible and Koran) predictably bias the behavior of nearly half the world's human population. In order for the information strings in these two books to predictably bias behavior, the individual has to "believe" that these two holy books were divinely inspired. Because the information strings in these two holy texts bias the behavior of almost half the world's humans in predictable ways, Magnus argues that the Koran, the Holy Bible, and DNA molecules are similar by analogy - different origins but same function, which is to bias human behavior in predictable ways.

James Francis Doyle: What's not likeable, as reported back to me by one belief holding individual and as one would suspect, is that seems to mean God is a belief (which may be true), implying there is not God `out there'.

Jay R. Feierman: I don't think that God is a belief at all. I never suggest this. In the naturalistic theology I'm working on, God is the object of and reason for religious behavior. If one's belief in God does not bias one's behavior in a predictable way, then there is no behavior whose object and reason for being executed is God. As a result, without the predictably biased human behavior, there would be no God for that person. In order for God to be for a particular human, that human's behavior has to be biased in a predictable way. Does that mean that God (only) exists within the human brain? No. The belief or non-belief in God only exists in the human brain. That does not mean that God exists or does not exist only in the human brain. God only exists when human behavior is biased in predictable ways that are influenced by belief in God, which for all practical purposes in the world religions, means that human behavior is predictably biased by the presumably divinely inspired writings in the holy texts. However, the argument is somewhat of a tautology, as the writing of the holy texts also was executed by inspired believers. That's why Magnus's chapter is so powerful in its analogy.

James Francis Doyle: With our previous use, a belief is "a unit of information that biases behavior in predictable ways."; meaning that God is information.

Jay R. Feierman: No. You have read The Biology of Religious Behavior. You won't find that in the book. No one in the book says that God is information. God is not a belief. See above.

James Francis Doyle: You will say that a belief must bias behavior, but without knowing the form of the belief, but considering it transmissible, there is no reason to believe a unit of information cannot undergo intra or extra-individual transformation.

Jay R. Feierman: Yes, I agree. Beliefs can mutate like genes can mutate in an analogous way. If you read Jeremy Campbell's The Many Faces of God: Science's 400-Year Quest for Images of the Divine (WW Norton, 2006), you will see that in western Europe over the last 400 or so years, our image of God or what God is has changed a number of times as well. That's significant because when someone says, "I believe in God," the God they believe in is a variable, not a constant. Michael Dowd's provocative book, Thank God for Evolution, looks outward, rather than inward, to find God. Again, the Lionel Tiger and Michael McGuire forthcoming book, God's Brain, addresses some of these issues.

James Francis Doyle: Nonetheless, an intra-individual unit of information may only affect behavior when active, otherwise being what you call an "idea", which could be both an object and contributing cause ("reason") of `religious'-behavior.

Jay R. Feierman: For me, a belief is an actualized idea. Both are units of information. When an idea biases behavior in a predictable way, it becomes a belief, by definition. Having only an idea of God won't influence one's inclusive fitness/survival at all, as it has to bias one's behavior in a predictable way to do that.

James Francis Doyle: Otherwise, you'll need to claim that which biases behavior does not exist.

Jay R. Feierman: I don't understand. I'm not agreeing that an idea can be an object of and contributing cause of religious behavior. To me, ideas are not contributing causes of anything, other than when they become beliefs. This may sound like semantic trivia but I find making the distinction between an idea and a belief, as defined above, useful. However, it needs to be emphasized that one can never know with 100% certainty that anyone else's belief exists, especially a religious belief. That's why the usual definition of religious behavior as behavior associated with religious beliefs is not useful.

#20367

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 11:52 pm
Subject: QRe: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jrfeier

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James Francis Doyle: God-believing is a function of phylogenetically acquired structures adaptively modified within ontogeny by units of information.

Jay R. Feierman: I agree with you.

James Francis Doyle: Then I do not understand why you do not accept my argument that those who study religion ought to argue for the existence of God.

Jay R. Feierman: It depends on what you mean by "God." If God is conceptualized naturalistically as the object of and reason for religious behavior, as I said in another posting, there could be other, non-God, objects of and reasons for religious behavior. And, it depends on what you mean by religious behavior.

The bottom line is that there is no logical argument that is persuasive for God's existence. Neither is there any empirical scientific evidence that God exists. I like my question and answer session with an old Orthodox Jewish rabbi, who was 97 years old when I asked him these questions. He's going to be 100 years old in two months. He also has a Ph.D. in Philosophy and is a survivor of Mathausen Concentration Camp in World War II. I've known him for 50 years. I wrote about him in the Preface of The Biology of Religious Behavior. Appreciate that in the Preface I said that he told me that in Mathausen, when everything else in the world had been taken from him, all he had was God.

Q: Why do you believe in God?

A: Because I want to believe in God.

Q: Why do you want to believe in God?

A: Because it feels good to believe in God.

Q: Why does it feel good to believe in God?

A: I don't know.

#20366

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Wed Dec 2, 2009 12:09 am
Subject: Re: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jrfeier

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Jay R. Feierman: As a result, my prediction is that secularism in Western Europe is not the final stage of religion's evolution. Neither is it the end of civilization as we have come to know it. Rather, it is the replacement of one set of religion's ontogenetically acquired units of information with another.

James Francis Doyle: The units of information that may be acquired in development are what may evolve. That being if they are not replaced by new units of information that have no prior `ancestor'.

Jay R. Feierman: The new units of religious information (in the Koran) are analogous to mutations in DNA.

James Francis Doyle: In my opinion, more dogmatic religions are not as easily acquired by more `liberal' personalities, because they are less accommodating to the modifications these people would like to impose in further iterations.

Jay R. Feierman: The evidence is that the more dogmatic and conservative a religion is and the more it expects from its congregants, the better it will grow. The Mormon Faith (Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints) is very conservative and it expects a lot from its congregants, such as 10% of their pre-tax income. The Catholic Church only gets about 1% of people's pre-tax earnings and half the members don't believe in things like no use of artificial birth control, no pre-marital sex, etc. The Roman Catholic Church has been static over the past 50 years in terms of world growth, whereas the Mormon Church is growing at about 3% a year. Only about 185 years ago the Mormon faith had 1 member. It now has 14 million members in 60 countries. Islam is another very good example of a very dogmatic and conservative religion that is growing. Within the Roman Catholic Church, the religious orders that are growing (and not dying) are the more conservative ones.

James Francis Doyle: Even though evangelical type religions may be perceived as for the more conservative (or whatever the personality type terms are), their users are more `liberal' with their use of the codes and so when they reiterate them they contain more variations. More easily changed beliefs may have more variations better fitting a wider audience. But I dunno.

Jay R. Feierman: The evangelical type religions would be considered more conservative. However, they don't have a Magisterium of official teachings like the Roman Catholic Church. The Evangelicals are growing, especially in South American, where they are slowly but surely taking "market share" away from Roman Catholicism.

#20365

From: "jamesfrancisd" <jamesfrancisd@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 10:45 pm
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jamesfrancisd

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Timothy,

Here is a link:
http://www.johnprice.me.uk/site/default.asp?p=pubs

Other papers can be found online using PDF searches.

Oh, John Price suggests a reptilian, not just mammalian model. Submissive
behaviors have been around longer than mammals.

James

--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Timothy Miller <gandalf@...> wrote:
>
> Greetings, Arthur,
>
> On Dec 1, 2009, at 12:53 AM, arthurcnoll wrote:
>
> > I'm not sure what your point is with this. First you have data, in a
> > previous post, that religious believers like "red state Christians"
> > are statistically happier, less prone to depression, and then here
> > you seem to be unsure that we have any such information or that it
> > means anything.
> >
> > Perhaps you have missed an important part of what this discussion
> > was about. I don't feel we were arguing that it isn't possible to be
> > a non believer and to avoid depression, or that being a believer
> > makes it sure that you won't be depressed. I was seeing this matter
> > as a statistical one and I think the others are too.
> >
>
> I, too, see it as a question of probabilities, not absolutes. I merely
> employed convenient language.
>
> > And the question of what mechanism might be involved to explain such
> > statistics, is then the matter of interest.
> >
>
> Quite so.
>
> > I believe it is John Price who has this idea about submission, and
> > the benefits of that for a social creature, as a possible
> > explanation. It sounds quite plausible to me.
> >
>
> Plausible but far from proven, as far as I know.
>
> I think someone posted a link to a John Price page. Will you re-post
> it? Do you have any John Price e-prints you could send me? I'd like to
> know more about this. Has Price published a book on this topic?
>
> >
> > And I'm giving my own experience of the lessening of anxiety I might
> > be feeling, to submit to the laws of physics.
> >
>
> This could be generally true. Idiosyncratically true for you may not
> be of general interest. And, for that matter, it's hard to be sure
> it's idiosyncratically true for you, even though it seems so. A single-
> subject study might be feasible.
>
> Whether this effect applies to a large number of people is a testable
> hypothesis, which has not been tested, to my knowledge. It would be
> hard to test because there are 1000 or 10,000 "religious" or
> "spiritual" people for every person who reasons as you do.
>
>
> > Not much different from submitting to God, and saying humbly, "thy
> > will be done". You do that and you stop fighting to make things
> > happen, you submit. And in stopping the fight, your anxiety about
> > losing, is reduced. I have to agree that submission can indeed
> > reduce anxiety, can counter a slip into serious depression.
> >
>
> I have some sympathy for your position. I'm agnostic about whether it
> is generally true.
>
> I practice Vipassana meditation, though my associated beliefs are
> pretty vague. In meditation, one sometimes has the experience of
> submission. Submission to what? Submission to "reality" or "what-is"
> or "suchness," perhaps. Like you, such experiences seem to make me
> less anxious and more cheerful.
>
> Maybe that has some resemblance to submission to the  laws of physics.
>
> In meditation, one must "pay dues" before a comfortable or pleasurable
> sense of submission to the universe takes hold. It's a slow, arduous
> process. Personally, I don't think I could reason my way to this state
> of mind.
>
>
> > My submission does have some profound differences from the religous
> > person though, because in submitting to the laws of physics, I'm not
> > expecting miracles to happen, but the person who submits to a
> > mystical God, can be expecting miracles.
> >
>
> Funny... Religious types often speak of miracles, but they rarely
> observe them. Yet the absence of miracles does not seem to discourage
> them.
>
> > If the religious person submitting to God is similar in brain
> > chemistry to our beta ancestor submitting to the alpha ape, then
> > expectations of the benefits of submission can follow that kind of
> > act. Submit to the alpha ape and you have this creature stronger
> > than you, leading the way in defending against possible problems of
> > all kinds. A good player to have on your team, a good ape to follow.
> > And that sort of expectation can simply be transfered over in
> > submitting to a mystical being, and because this mystical being is
> > felt to be the ultimate power, the ultimate alpha, then you can hope
> > in benefits that include miracles. Miracles that transcend the laws
> > of physics.
> >
>
> That's rather speculative, but it strikes me as reasonable
> speculation. I think some empirical research supports your position,
> but I'm not very familiar with that literature. Maybe we're back to
> John Price's work.
>
> If I'm not mistaken, some chimpanzees seem depressed after they move
> down the status hierarchy, because of health problems, age, defeat in
> combat, or loss of an important alliance. If so, this represents a
> possible animal model for depression in humans. Do they remain
> depressed and cease to thrive?
>
> I get the impression from reading Frans de Waal that defeated alpha
> chimpanzees become obsessed with regaining their previous status. If
> the defeat is severe, and regaining their previous status appears
> hopeless, they never really thrive again. I could be wrong though. Ape
> experts on the list, or more diligent students of de Waal, please jump
> in here!
>
> I own a copy of Subordination and Defeat, a volume of papers edited by
> Sloman and Gilbert, published in 2000. I haven't looked at it for some
> time, and don't have time to review it now. As I recall, the editors
> see it your way, and the papers therein provide supportive empirical
> evidence.
>
> One hopes that others on the list, familiar with this literature, and
> will soon put their oars in.
>
> On the other hand, Seligman's helpless electrocuted dogs are often
> regarded as a good animal model of depression. Submission seems to be
> part of the problem in that case. The dogs become paralyzed by
> submission to an impossible situation.
>
> Maybe Seligman's helpless dogs aren't such a good animal model of
> human depression. Analogs to the torturous impossible situation that
> defeats them would not often happen in nature. Defeat by another dog
> (or wolf or coyote) would be much more common. I imagine there's a
> lively scientific debate about the validity of Seligman's animal
> model. I am not familiar with that literature.
>
> Dogs are hierarchical social animals, like apes. Do alpha dogs living
> in naturalistic conditions seem to become depressed when they suffer
> defeat and loss of dominance? Maybe that would be a better animal
> model of depression. Do they recover when they "accept" their new
> subordinate position, or do they stop thriving, drop to the bottom of
> the hierarchy, remain depressed and soon die? I suppose this might be
> known and documented. I dunno.
>
> I'm not sure about baboons. Bonobos are a different case, because
> their social hierarchies are more hereditary and determined by
> females, not males. What happens to alpha male gorillas when they are
> defeated by another male who takes over the harem? I dunno...
>
> Nature is complicated, isn't it?
>
> > That people who don't attend church but claim to have faith, don't
> > get the benefits, fits this idea about submission quite well. Just
> > because a person says they have faith doesn't mean they have really
> > submitted, and the fact they don't go to church shows a kind of
> > defacto rebellion against submitting. So, no submission in reality,
> > just lip service, and no benefits of submitting, either.
> >
>
> That makes a lot of sense. I hadn't thought of it that way. Your
> argument removes religious "belief" from its usual murky
> epistemological status and operationalizes it as an observable form of
> behavior. I think Jay would approve.  Jay?
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> Stockton, CA
>
>
>
> >
> > Arthur Noll
> >
> > --- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Timothy Miller <gandalf@>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread,
> > which
> > > is starting to branch and twine.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:
> > >
> > > > Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science,
> > > > but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what
> > > > people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the
> > > > same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my
> > > > answer.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, "Jay R. Feierman"
> > > > <jfeierman@> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hello Arthur,
> > > > >
> > > > > I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different
> > > > needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets
> > > > emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just
> > > > benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met
> > > > to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think
> > > > that science can replace religion.
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious
> > > faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier
> > than
> > > they would be otherwise...
> > >
> > > Or it may not be.
> > >
> > > This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard
> > to
> > > imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence, noted
> > > below, suggests it is incorrect.
> > >
> > > In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial
> > > evidence seems inconclusive.
> > >
> > > I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough.
> > I'm
> > > talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring theme
> > > is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of various
> > > evolved human characteristics combined with various memes, which
> > > differ quite a lot from one society to another.
> > >
> > > A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious
> > faith
> > > is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for decent
> > > behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian
> > gentlemen
> > > and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed him, did not
> > > become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor did their
> > children
> > >
> > > Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less
> > > suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and
> > > suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy,
> > emotionally
> > > stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.
> > >
> > > It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain personality
> > > traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize" in
> > > adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high
> > > Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable
> > > Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in
> > > adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are
> > > discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or religions
> > > faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.
> > >
> > > It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent
> > > variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.
> > >
> > > One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith
> > > does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation
> > that
> > > makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly
> > > reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how
> > > certain they are about their faith.
> > >
> > > In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes
> > > herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith"
> > > but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed.
> > She
> > > is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them,
> > > because she does not participate.
> > >
> > > Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-
> > > being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or
> > socialize
> > > with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise from social
> > > interaction with like-minded believers.
> > >
> > > If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw
> > clear
> > > conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.
> > >
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > >
> > >
> > > Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> > > Stockton, CA
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>

#20364

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 4:43 pm
Subject: Re: Re: Well-being and religious faith-Attn: Dr. Miller

bopshibobshibop

Offline

On Dec 1, 2009, at 1:09 AM, jamesbond_007_19 wrote:

Could it be that religious participation could be correlated with well-being instead of religious participation bringing about the well-being? Could it be that "very spiritual people," such as Arthur's sister, could be emotionally well off as a result of her spirituality while not participating that much in religion?
jamesbond_007_19

Well, that's not what the data say, to this point. It's a complex topic which has not been adequately investigated.

My understanding of the research to date is that religious belief in the absence of religious participation does not protect the believer from depression.

Of course, many "spiritual" people are not depressed. I was being a bit facetious about the "spiritual" sister in law. But religious participation seems to protect people from depression.

It seems possible that the arrow of causality is pointing in the wrong direction. It seems possible that certain personality types are associated with more religious participation. Those types might also be depression-resistant. In that case, religious participation would be incidental. I don't think we know the answer to that question. However, I'm not an expert on that topic. Maybe someone else on the list knows more than I do.

Cheers,

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.

Stockton, CA

#20363

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 5:04 pm
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

bopshibobshibop

Offline

On Nov 30, 2009, at 9:01 PM, Jay R. Feierman wrote:

Timothy Miller: "God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other "transcendent" beliefs.

Jay R. Feierman: It seems to me that you may be equating God with a belief in God, based on what you wrote above. Belief in God and God are not the same, which I presume you would agree. Also, for the record, whether God exists or does not exist is not relevant to whether someone believes in God or does not believe in God. The usual philosophical/psychological way of defining a belief is "that which is held to be true." One can hold something to be true that is not true.

You skimmed my message too hastily. You're disagreeing with things I did not write. I previously agreed with assertions you are now writing.

I've been working on a naturalistic perspective on God which I'm hoping to give as a paper at the European Conference on Science and Theology in Edinburgh, Scotland in April, 2010. One gets a naturalistic perspective on God by relating and referencing God to something that is observable and measurable, which is religious behavior (~ the movement of the individual). God then becomes the object of and reason for religious behavior. Belief in God just biases one's behavior in a predictable way, depending on which version of God you believe in. One can often tell which "face of God" the particular religion uses by watching people's behavior as they pray. As an example, it is easy to tell if someone's God is the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam by observing the person during petitioning prayer. Their behaviors are predictably different. Predictably biased behavior is some of the evidence used to support that someone (else) believes in a particular God, since we can not ever know what someone else believes. However, it is just supporting evidence.

I think we mostly agree on this. See my comment below.

Timothy Miller: Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane event, which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study purely private events.

Jay R. Feierman: Currently, we do not have the technology to determine if someone's brain contains a specific belief, such as "God exists."

Self reports regarding subjective private experience can be reliable and valid. Think of medical research regarding pain for example. Pain behavior is observed, but self-reports are also taken seriously.

The best evidence that someone has a particular belief (which biases their behavior in a predictable way) is to observe their behavior over time. However, one can never be absolutely certain that someone else harbors a specific belief; one can just get more certain the more one observes their behavior and sees that it is biased in a predictable way. However, intelligence agents infiltrate religious groups and feign their behavior, which is why one can never be absolutely certain what someone else believes.

Timothy Miller: Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public events. That makes it a little easier to study.

Jay R. Feierman: I don't understand that.

I just meant to say that people who claim to have religious faith also overtly behave in certain observable ways. We agree on that.

There are two concepts of belief that I find useful: (1) that which is held to be true and (2) a unit of information (that which is necessary to make decisions) that biases behavior (~ movement) in a predictable way. I'm not sure what you mean that belief in God is a typical mixture of private and public events. The belief, as information, is a structure (with mass, rather than a function without mass) that is capable of inducing thermodynamic chanage in the brain tissue that acquires, holds, and then uses the belief to bias behavior in a predictable way.

I encourage you to think more carefully about the concept of "belief" or "believing." "Believing" refers to a wide variety of mental phenomena. E.g.:

--I "believe" that 8 times 8 is 64.

--I "believe" Obama is a good president.

--I "believe" there's a big tree growing outside my window.

--I "believe" my wife loves me.

--I "believe" in random mutation and differential reproduction.

--I "believe" it's about time for breakfast.

--Some people "believe" that Jesus Christ was the only begotten son of God who died on the cross to redeem our sins.

All these different beliefs somehow occur and reside in the brain. Beyond that, they have little in common.

Cosmides and Tooby, in a chapter of The Adapted Mind, proposed that the concept (and terminology) of "learning" be discarded altogether, because it refers indiscriminately to a vast variety of mental mechanisms and processes, which might occur in a vast variety of anatomical locations, under a vast variety of circumstances.

I don't recall that Cosmides and Tooby ever seriously proposed this, but the argument ought to be extended to "believing," for exactly the same reasons. After all, "belief" is one of the outcomes of "learning."

Your thoughts?

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.

Stockton, CA

#20362

From: Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 7:24 pm
Subject: Re: Re: Honesty among Orientals-Attn: Saso

michael_saso

Offline

Thank you again for your questions, I hope that I can answer them usefully, and readily admit that I do not have any truly "ultimate" or perfect responses. I am a professor, (PhD) but avoid the word Dr, just first name Michael is ok. I think that no nation or culture can be said to have a monopoly on honesty, nor that one culture/nation/ mode of life is better or worse than another, make better or worse drivers, or are superior or inferior to another. Learning a new language is like opening a window to a new kind of reality. I have learned so much, after joining this website, and do not hold any of my own statements or responses as more correct than others', there are so many scientist-experts on the site whose responses are backed by statistical and experimental evidence. My own fields are Social Anthropology , Chinese Language and Literarure, and Comparative religion, with multiple years of field work as a practicing Daoist, and an equal amount of time as a Tantric Buddhist monk in Japan (Tendai, Mt Hiei, Kyoto), followed by research in Tibet, since 1992. Not to be judgmental or condemn others' views is a quality that pervades living in Daoist and Tibetan Buddhist communities in China, perhaps that is a possible answer to your query.

The taking of bribes, by CCP cadres in China, is an endemic problem, that the daily newspapers, TV reports, and government policy makers admit to and work to solve. In my experience of neighboring cultures, such as Burma (one can cross the border from Chiangrai in Thailand, into Laos and Burma), or the Philippines (where I lived and did research for 5 years), things are far worse, in this respect. But the people are really nice, caring, many places relatively crime free. I take my students annually on week long treks, for Chinese New Year, through these areas, on both sides of the border. It is a life changing experience.

Thus I do not think we can judge a whole culture by the shortcomings of some members. And those brave and caring people, doctors who truly help people, especially the mentally ill, and seek remedies for illness, are worthy of our fullest respect. There are happy as well as depressed, honest and dishonest, giving and caring people, in all cultures, I feel.

michael

-USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan: Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580

From: jamesbond_007_19 <jamesbond_007_19@...>
To: human-ethology@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Tue, December 1, 2009 12:49:29 AM
Subject: [human-ethology] Re: Honesty among Orientals-Attn: Saso

(Note: In response to ISHE Listserv posting # 20342 at http://tech. groups.yahoo. com/group/ human-ethology/ message/20342 by Michael Saso.)

Dear Mr./Dr. Saso,

First of all, are you a "Dr." or "Mr." I'm trying to address you properly. Also, I just wanted to state that your statement that "'republicans' in the US do have one thing in common: party, not ordinary folk, comes first" and your implied statement about democrats in the U.S. is overly simplistic. Same applies for opposing one-sided arguments to what you are saying. However, I will not go into this on the listserv as it is mandated to be politically neutral and I do not wish to compromise that.

Most importantly, I do not feel that you completely answered my question. You spoke of politicians in China being corrupt. I am sure that many politicians in any country/society are corrupt. You went on to state: "But it is nevertheless a joyful place to be, banks are healthier than in the US, the recent communications about 'sadness' and depression being so common in the US (Americas) simply does not seem to apply in China." What does this have to do with the honesty of Chinese and/or Orientals in general? My question is if Orientals are indeed more honest (on the average) than people of other societies, such as Western societies.

I anxiously await your reply. Anyone with extended experience in Oriental cultures are encouraged to join in this conversation.

jamesbond_007_ 19

--- In human-ethology@ yahoogroups. com, Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@ ...> wrote:
>
> Thank you for addressing the query to myself as well as our peers who are more qualified than I on the medical and science front. China is ridden with corruption, due mainly to Communist Party Cadres, who since the 1980 economic reforms have become increasingly famous for taking bribes. Local citizens who demonstrated against the scandals cited below were arrested or kept away from complaining to public officials. If there were a vote today, the party would be out, which is why visitors were curtailed during the Olympics and kept away from the 2009 60th year "celebration. " Poverty in the provinces is endemic, and migrant workers can no longer as easily find employment in big cities. But it is nevertheless a joyful place to be, banks are healthier than in the US, the recent communications about "sadness" and depression being so common in the US (Americas) simply does not seem to apply in China. I say this with a sense of humor, tongue in cheek, as it
> were, but "communists" in China and "republicans" in the US do have one thing in common: party, not ordinary folk, comes first.
> michael
> -USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan: Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580

Reply | Forward | Messages in this Topic (4)

#20361

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 6:08 pm
Subject: Re: Re: Well-being and religious faith

bopshibobshibop

Offline

Greetings, Arthur,

On Dec 1, 2009, at 12:53 AM, arthurcnoll wrote:

I'm not sure what your point is with this. First you have data, in a previous post, that religious believers like "red state Christians" are statistically happier, less prone to depression, and then here you seem to be unsure that we have any such information or that it means anything.

Perhaps you have missed an important part of what this discussion was about. I don't feel we were arguing that it isn't possible to be a non believer and to avoid depression, or that being a believer makes it sure that you won't be depressed. I was seeing this matter as a statistical one and I think the others are too.

I, too, see it as a question of probabilities, not absolutes. I merely employed convenient language.

And the question of what mechanism might be involved to explain such statistics, is then the matter of interest.

Quite so.

I believe it is John Price who has this idea about submission, and the benefits of that for a social creature, as a possible explanation. It sounds quite plausible to me.

Plausible but far from proven, as far as I know.

I think someone posted a link to a John Price page. Will you re-post it? Do you have any John Price e-prints you could send me? I'd like to know more about this. Has Price published a book on this topic?

And I'm giving my own experience of the lessening of anxiety I might be feeling, to submit to the laws of physics.

This could be generally true. Idiosyncratically true for you may not be of general interest. And, for that matter, it's hard to be sure it's idiosyncratically true for you, even though it seems so. A single-subject study might be feasible.

Whether this effect applies to a large number of people is a testable hypothesis, which has not been tested, to my knowledge. It would be hard to test because there are 1000 or 10,000 "religious" or "spiritual" people for every person who reasons as you do.

Not much different from submitting to God, and saying humbly, "thy will be done". You do that and you stop fighting to make things happen, you submit. And in stopping the fight, your anxiety about losing, is reduced. I have to agree that submission can indeed reduce anxiety, can counter a slip into serious depression.

I have some sympathy for your position. I'm agnostic about whether it is generally true.

I practice Vipassana meditation, though my associated beliefs are pretty vague. In meditation, one sometimes has the experience of submission. Submission to what? Submission to "reality" or "what-is" or "suchness," perhaps. Like you, such experiences seem to make me less anxious and more cheerful.

Maybe that has some resemblance to submission to the laws of physics.

In meditation, one must "pay dues" before a comfortable or pleasurable sense of submission to the universe takes hold. It's a slow, arduous process. Personally, I don't think I could reason my way to this state of mind.

My submission does have some profound differences from the religous person though, because in submitting to the laws of physics, I'm not expecting miracles to happen, but the person who submits to a mystical God, can be expecting miracles.

Funny... Religious types often speak of miracles, but they rarely observe them. Yet the absence of miracles does not seem to discourage them.

If the religious person submitting to God is similar in brain chemistry to our beta ancestor submitting to the alpha ape, then expectations of the benefits of submission can follow that kind of act. Submit to the alpha ape and you have this creature stronger than you, leading the way in defending against possible problems of all kinds. A good player to have on your team, a good ape to follow. And that sort of expectation can simply be transfered over in submitting to a mystical being, and because this mystical being is felt to be the ultimate power, the ultimate alpha, then you can hope in benefits that include miracles. Miracles that transcend the laws of physics.

That's rather speculative, but it strikes me as reasonable speculation. I think some empirical research supports your position, but I'm not very familiar with that literature. Maybe we're back to John Price's work.

If I'm not mistaken, some chimpanzees seem depressed after they move down the status hierarchy, because of health problems, age, defeat in combat, or loss of an important alliance. If so, this represents a possible animal model for depression in humans. Do they remain depressed and cease to thrive?

I get the impression from reading Frans de Waal that defeated alpha chimpanzees become obsessed with regaining their previous status. If the defeat is severe, and regaining their previous status appears hopeless, they never really thrive again. I could be wrong though. Ape experts on the list, or more diligent students of de Waal, please jump in here!

I own a copy of Subordination and Defeat, a volume of papers edited by Sloman and Gilbert, published in 2000. I haven't looked at it for some time, and don't have time to review it now. As I recall, the editors see it your way, and the papers therein provide supportive empirical evidence.

One hopes that others on the list, familiar with this literature, and will soon put their oars in.

On the other hand, Seligman's helpless electrocuted dogs are often regarded as a good animal model of depression. Submission seems to be part of the problem in that case. The dogs become paralyzed by submission to an impossible situation.

Maybe Seligman's helpless dogs aren't such a good animal model of human depression. Analogs to the torturous impossible situation that defeats them would not often happen in nature. Defeat by another dog (or wolf or coyote) would be much more common. I imagine there's a lively scientific debate about the validity of Seligman's animal model. I am not familiar with that literature.

Dogs are hierarchical social animals, like apes. Do alpha dogs living in naturalistic conditions seem to become depressed when they suffer defeat and loss of dominance? Maybe that would be a better animal model of depression. Do they recover when they "accept" their new subordinate position, or do they stop thriving, drop to the bottom of the hierarchy, remain depressed and soon die? I suppose this might be known and documented. I dunno.

I'm not sure about baboons. Bonobos are a different case, because their social hierarchies are more hereditary and determined by females, not males. What happens to alpha male gorillas when they are defeated by another male who takes over the harem? I dunno...

Nature is complicated, isn't it?

That people who don't attend church but claim to have faith, don't get the benefits, fits this idea about submission quite well. Just because a person says they have faith doesn't mean they have really submitted, and the fact they don't go to church shows a kind of defacto rebellion against submitting. So, no submission in reality, just lip service, and no benefits of submitting, either.

That makes a lot of sense. I hadn't thought of it that way. Your argument removes religious "belief" from its usual murky epistemological status and operationalizes it as an observable form of behavior. I think Jay would approve. Jay?

Cheers,

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.

Stockton, CA

Arthur Noll

--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Timothy Miller <gandalf@...> wrote:
>
> This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread, which
> is starting to branch and twine.
>
>
>
> On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:
>
> > Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science,
> > but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what
> > people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the
> > same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my
> > answer.
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, "Jay R. Feierman"
> > <jfeierman@> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello Arthur,
> > >
> > > I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different
> > needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets
> > emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just
> > benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met
> > to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think
> > that science can replace religion.
> >
> >
>
>
> Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious
> faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier than
> they would be otherwise...
>
> Or it may not be.
>
> This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard to
> imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence, noted
> below, suggests it is incorrect.
>
> In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial
> evidence seems inconclusive.
>
> I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough. I'm
> talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring theme
> is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of various
> evolved human characteristics combined with various memes, which
> differ quite a lot from one society to another.
>
> A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious faith
> is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for decent
> behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian gentlemen
> and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed him, did not
> become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor did their children
>
> Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less
> suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and
> suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy, emotionally
> stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.
>
> It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain personality
> traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize" in
> adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high
> Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable
> Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in
> adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are
> discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or religions
> faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.
>
> It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent
> variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.
>
> One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith
> does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation that
> makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly
> reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how
> certain they are about their faith.
>
> In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes
> herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith"
> but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed. She
> is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them,
> because she does not participate.
>
> Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-
> being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or socialize
> with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise from social
> interaction with like-minded believers.
>
> If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw clear
> conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> Stockton, CA
>

#20360

From: "arthurcnoll" <arthurnoll@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 8:53 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

arthurcnoll

Offline

I'm not sure what your point is with this.  First you have data, in  a previous
post, that religious believers like "red state Christians" are statistically
happier, less prone to depression, and then here you seem to be unsure that we
have any such information or that it means anything.

Perhaps you have missed an important part of what this discussion was about.  I
don't feel we were arguing that it isn't possible to be a non believer and to
avoid depression, or that being a believer makes it sure that you won't be
depressed.  I was seeing this matter as a statistical one and I think the others
are too.  And the question of what mechanism might be involved to explain such
statistics, is then the matter of interest. I believe it is John Price who has
this idea about submission, and the benefits of that for a social creature, as a
possible explanation.  It sounds quite plausible to me.

  And I'm giving my own experience of the lessening of anxiety I might be
feeling, to submit to the laws of physics.  Not much different from submitting
to God, and saying humbly, "thy will be done".  You do that and you stop
fighting to make things happen, you submit. And in stopping the fight, your
anxiety about losing, is reduced. I have to agree that submission can indeed
reduce anxiety, can counter a slip into serious depression.
    My submission does have some profound differences from the religous person
though, because in submitting to the laws of physics, I'm not expecting miracles
to happen, but the person who submits to a mystical God, can be expecting
miracles.  If the religious person submitting to God is similar in brain
chemistry to  our beta ancestor submitting to the alpha ape, then expectations
of the benefits of submission can follow that kind of act.  Submit to the alpha
ape and you have this creature stronger than you, leading the way in defending
against possible problems of all kinds. A good player to have on your team, a
good ape to follow.   And that sort of expectation can simply be transfered over
in submitting to a mystical being, and because this mystical being is felt to be
the ultimate power, the ultimate alpha, then you can hope in benefits that
include miracles.  Miracles that transcend the laws of physics.

That people who don't attend church but claim to have faith, don't get the
benefits, fits this idea about submission quite well.  Just because a person
says they have faith doesn't mean they have really submitted, and the fact they
don't go to church shows a kind of defacto rebellion against submitting.  So, no
submission in reality, just lip service, and no benefits of submitting, either.

Arthur Noll





--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Timothy Miller <gandalf@...> wrote:
>
> This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread, which
> is starting to branch and twine.
>
>
>
> On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:
>
> > Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science,
> > but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what
> > people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the
> > same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my
> > answer.
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, "Jay R. Feierman"
> > <jfeierman@> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello Arthur,
> > >
> > > I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different
> > needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets
> > emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just
> > benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met
> > to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think
> > that science can replace religion.
> >
> >
>
>
> Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious
> faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier than
> they would be otherwise...
>
> Or it may not be.
>
> This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard to
> imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence, noted
> below, suggests it is incorrect.
>
> In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial
> evidence seems inconclusive.
>
> I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough. I'm
> talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring theme
> is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of various
> evolved human characteristics combined with various memes, which
> differ quite a lot from one society to another.
>
> A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious faith
> is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for decent
> behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian gentlemen
> and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed him, did not
> become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor did their children
>
> Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less
> suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and
> suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy, emotionally
> stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.
>
> It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain personality
> traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize" in
> adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high
> Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable
> Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in
> adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are
> discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or religions
> faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.
>
> It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent
> variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.
>
> One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith
> does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation that
> makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly
> reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how
> certain they are about their faith.
>
> In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes
> herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith"
> but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed. She
> is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them,
> because she does not participate.
>
> Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-
> being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or socialize
> with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise from social
> interaction with like-minded believers.
>
> If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw clear
> conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> Stockton, CA
>

#20359

From: "jamesfrancisd" <jamesfrancisd@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 6:47 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jamesfrancisd

Offline

James Francis Doyle: God-believing is a function of phylogenetically acquired
structures adaptively modified within ontogeny by units of information.

Jay R. Feierman: I agree with you.
JFD: Then I do not understand why you do not accept my argument that those who
study religion ought to argue for the existence of God.

Jay R. Feierman: Most (but probably not all) humans are born with the equivalent
of a religous grammar, which acquires content through society-specific
social-learning the same way that language acquires content through
society-specific social-learning. One should also appreciate that the genetic
determinants of religion, which would include the genetic determinants of
religious grammar, may require activation during a critical period in human
development the same way that human symbolic volcalized language requires
activation during a critical period in human development.

JFD: I agree with you.
  Jay R. Feierman: In the past few centuries the selection pressures on the
genetic determinants of religion appear to be under strong selection pressure in
the industrialized democracies of Europe. The religionists are out-reproducing
the secularists.

JFD: I was in Europe, Netherlands, about 11 years ago and a women was telling me
that the religious people there mate for God. She used different, more colorful,
terminology to describe it though. I don't know that she was herself not
religious, but I suspect it.

Jay R. Feierman: Whereas assortative mating (for being a religionist or
secularist) can only cause a reduction in heterozygosity in a population and can
change a normally distrubuted trait (religiosity) into a bi-modally distrubuted
trait (religionists and secularists), the fact that religionists are
out-reproducing the secularists in the same industrialized democracies of
Western Europe will change gene frequencies in the population.

JFD: In the case of secularism, as a trait, as opposed to a state (contributed
to by absence of "activation"). Otherwise, some of the rules of assortment are
transmitted across generations by social learning and these rules affect
gene-frequencies. In some counties, people acquire the rules for certain
reasons, such as to avoid taxation. Who knows if there is a less religious
`strain' in Europe (or anywhere); they may just acquire other organizing codes.

Jay R. Feierman: As a result, my prediction is that secularism in Western Europe
is not the final stage of religion's evolution. Neither is it the end of
civilization as we have come to know it. Rather, it is the replacement of one
set of religion's ontogenetically acquired units of information with another.

JFD: The units of information that may be acquired in development are what may
evolve. That being if they are not replaced by new units of information that
have no prior `ancestor'. In my opinion, more dogmatic religions are not as
easily acquired by more `liberal' personalities, because they are less
accommodating to the modifications these people would like to impose in further
iterations. Even though evangelical type religions may be perceived as for the
more conservative (or whatever the personality type terms are), their users are
more `liberal' with their use of the codes and so when they reiterate them they
contain more variations. More easily changed beliefs may have more variations
better fitting a wider audience. But I dunno.

As to your prediction, why call it "religion's evolution"?

Oh, I have a reading list in common with Mandell and think I know why you ran�

--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...> wrote:
>
> James Francis Doyle: God-believing is a function of phylogenetically acquired
structures adaptively modified within ontogeny by units of information.
>
> Jay R. Feierman: I agree with you. Most (but probably not all) humans are born
with the equivalent of a religous grammar, which acquires content through
society-specific social-learning the same way that language acquires content
through society-specific social-learning. One should also appreciate that the
genetic determinants of religion, which would include the genetic determinants
of religious grammar, may require activation during a critical period in human
development the same way that human symbolic volcalized language requires
activation during a critical period in human development.
>
> In the past few centuries the selection pressures on the genetic determinants
of religion appear to be under strong selection pressure in the industrialized
democracies of Europe. The religionists are out-reproducing the secularists.
Whereas assortative mating (for being a religionist or secularist) can only
cause a reduction in heterozygosity in a population and can change a normally
distrubuted trait (religiosity) into a bi-modally distrubuted trait
(religionists and secularists), the fact that religionists are out-reproducing
the secularists in the same industrialized democracies of Western Europe will
change gene frequencies in the population.
>
> As a result, my prediction is that secularism in Western Europe is not the
final stage of religion's evolution. Neither is it the end of civilization as we
have come to know it. Rather, it is the replacement of one set of religion's
ontogenetically acquired units of information with another.
>

#20358

From: "jamesfrancisd" <jamesfrancisd@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 6:11 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jamesfrancisd

Offline

Timothy Miller: "God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other
"transcendent" beliefs.

Jay R. Feierman: It seems to me that you may be equating God with a belief in
God, based on what you wrote above. Belief in God and God are not the same,
which I presume you would agree. Also, for the record, whether God exists or
does not exist is not relevant to whether someone believes in God or does not
believe in God. The usual philosophical/psychological way of defining a belief
is "that which is held to be true." One can hold something to be true that is
not true.
I've been working on a naturalistic perspective on God which I'm hoping to give
as a paper at the European Conference on Science and Theology in Edinburgh,
Scotland in April, 2010. One gets a naturalistic perspective on God by relating
and referencing God to something that is observable and measurable, which is
religious behavior (~ the movement of the individual). God then becomes the
object of and reason for religious behavior. Belief in God just biases one's
behavior in a predictable way, depending on which version of God you believe in.
One can often tell which "face of God" the particular religion uses by watching
people's behavior as they pray. As an example, it is easy to tell if someone's
God is the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam by observing the person during
petitioning prayer. Their behaviors are predictably different.  Predictably
biased behavior is some of the evidence used to support that someone (else)
believes in a particular God, since we can not ever know what someone else
believes. However, it is just supporting evidence.

JFD: I believe it is logically inconsistent to use the bifurcation above (JRF:
"Belief in God and God are not the same, which I presume you would agree.") and
then reason that that which biases observable behavior does NOT exist. If
beliefs exist, then God exists. What's not likeable, as reported back to me by
one belief holding individual and as one would suspect, is that seems to mean
God is a belief (which may be true), implying there is not God `out there'. With
our previous use, a belief is "a unit of information that biases behavior in
predictable ways."; meaning that God is information. You will say that a belief
must bias behavior, but without knowing the form of the belief, but considering
it transmissible, there is no reason to believe a unit of information cannot
undergo intra or extra-individual transformation. Nonetheless, an
intra-individual unit of information may only affect behavior when active,
otherwise being what you call an "idea", which could be both an object and
contributing cause ("reason") of `religious'-behavior. Otherwise, you'll need to
claim that which biases behavior does not exist.

Timothy Miller: Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane
event, which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study
purely private events.

Jay R. Feierman: Currently, we do not have the technology to determine if
someone's brain contains a specific belief, such as "God exists." The best
evidence that someone has a particular belief (which biases their behavior in a
predictable way) is to observe their behavior over time. However, one can never
be absolutely certain that someone else harbors a specific belief; one can just
get more certain the more one observes their behavior and sees that it is biased
in a predictable way. However, intelligence agents infiltrate religious groups
and feign their behavior, which is why one can never be absolutely certain what
someone else believes.

Timothy Miller: Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public
events. That makes it a little easier to study.

Jay R. Feierman: I don't understand that. There are two concepts of belief that
I find useful: (1) that which is held to be true and (2) a unit of information
(that which is necessary to make decisions) that biases behavior (~ movement) in
a predictable way. I'm not sure what you mean that belief in God is a typical
mixture of private and public events. The belief, as information, is a structure
(with mass, rather than a function without mass) that is capable of inducing
thermodynamic chanage in the brain tissue that acquires, holds, and then uses
the belief to bias behavior in a predictable way. Because we currently don't
have the technology to read a brain's beliefs (like we read DNA's sequence of
bases), beliefs are a private event. However, even then there are functional
brain scan differences in populations of individuals given some type of
psychological task who say that they believe in God and who say that they don't
believe in God. However, the functional brain scan is not picking up the belief.
Rather, it is picking up some type of change in brain function as the result of
the belief. The public event would also not be the belief. Rather, it would be
behavior (~ movement) for which the belief is a proximate, intra-individual,
contributing cause. I'm including the behavior that generates human symbolic
writing and human symbolic vocalized language.

JFD: To reiterate: scientist and atheists alike ought to be arguing for the
existence of God. In the first place, one as a scientist might like to
investigate things that exist as opposed to things that do not exist and in the
second, atheists need to identify the object which they claim does not exist, or
express what it is that they do believe exists so they can talk about it, or
behaviors.

Doubtful that'll catch on :^)

--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...> wrote:
>
> Timothy Miller: "God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other
"transcendent" beliefs.
>
> Jay R. Feierman: It seems to me that you may be equating God with a belief in
God, based on what you wrote above. Belief in God and God are not the same,
which I presume you would agree. Also, for the record, whether God exists or
does not exist is not relevant to whether someone believes in God or does not
believe in God. The usual philosophical/psychological way of defining a belief
is "that which is held to be true." One can hold something to be true that is
not true.
>
> I've been working on a naturalistic perspective on God which I'm hoping to
give as a paper at the European Conference on Science and Theology in Edinburgh,
Scotland in April, 2010. One gets a naturalistic perspective on God by relating
and referencing God to something that is observable and measurable, which is
religious behavior (~ the movement of the individual). God then becomes the
object of and reason for religious behavior. Belief in God just biases one's
behavior in a predictable way, depending on which version of God you believe in.
One can often tell which "face of God" the particular religion uses by watching
people's behavior as they pray. As an example, it is easy to tell if someone's
God is the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam by observing the person during
petitioning prayer. Their behaviors are predictably different.  Predictably
biased behavior is some of the evidence used to support that someone (else)
believes in a particular God, since we can not ever know what someone else
believes. However, it is just supporting evidence.
>
> Timothy Miller: Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane
event, which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study
purely private events.
>
> Jay R. Feierman: Currently, we do not have the technology to determine if
someone's brain contains a specific belief, such as "God exists." The best
evidence that someone has a particular belief (which biases their behavior in a
predictable way) is to observe their behavior over time. However, one can never
be absolutely certain that someone else harbors a specific belief; one can just
get more certain the more one observes their behavior and sees that it is biased
in a predictable way. However, intelligence agents infiltrate religious groups
and feign their behavior, which is why one can never be absolutely certain what
someone else believes.
>
> Timothy Miller: Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public
events. That makes it a little easier to study.
>
> Jay R. Feierman: I don't understand that. There are two concepts of belief
that I find useful: (1) that which is held to be true and (2) a unit of
information (that which is necessary to make decisions) that biases behavior (~
movement) in a predictable way. I'm not sure what you mean that belief in God is
a typical mixture of private and public events. The belief, as information, is a
structure (with mass, rather than a function without mass) that is capable of
inducing thermodynamic chanage in the brain tissue that acquires, holds, and
then uses the belief to bias behavior in a predictable way. Because we currently
don't have the technology to read a brain's beliefs (like we read DNA's sequence
of bases), beliefs are a private event. However, even then there are functional
brain scan differences in populations of individuals given some type of
psychological task who say that they believe in God and who say that they don't
believe in God. However, the functional brain scan is not picking up the belief.
Rather, it is picking up some type of change in brain function as the result of
the belief. The public event would also not be the belief. Rather, it would be
behavior (~ movement) for which the belief is a proximate, intra-individual,
contributing cause. I'm including the behavior that generates human symbolic
writing and human symbolic vocalized language.
>

#20357

From: "jamesbond_007_19" <jamesbond_007_19@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 8:49 am
Subject: Re: Honesty among Orientals-Attn: Saso

jamesbond_00...

Offline

(Note: In response to ISHE Listserv posting # 20342 at http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/message/20342 by Michael Saso.)

Dear Mr./Dr. Saso,

I anxiously await your reply. Anyone with extended experience in Oriental cultures are encouraged to join in this conversation.

jamesbond_007_19

--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@...> wrote:
>
> Thank you for addressing the query to myself as well as our peers who are more qualified than I on the medical and science front. China is ridden with corruption, due mainly to Communist Party Cadres, who since the 1980 economic reforms have become increasingly famous for taking bribes. Local citizens who demonstrated against the scandals cited below were arrested or kept away from complaining to public officials. If there were a vote today, the party would be out, which is why visitors were curtailed during the Olympics and kept away from the 2009 60th year "celebration." Poverty in the provinces is endemic, and migrant workers can no longer as easily find employment in big cities. But it is nevertheless a joyful place to be, banks are healthier than in the US, the recent communications about "sadness" and depression being so common in the US (Americas) simply does not seem to apply in China. I say this with a sense of humor, tongue in cheek, as it
> were, but "communists" in China and "republicans" in the US do have one thing in common: party, not ordinary folk, comes first.
> michael
> -USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan: Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580

Reply | Forward | Messages in this Topic (4)

#20356

From: "jamesbond_007_19" <jamesbond_007_19@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 9:09 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith-Attn: Dr. Miller

jamesbond_00...

Offline

(In response to ISHE Listserv posting #20340 at http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/human-ethology/message/20340 by Dr. Timothy Miller.)

Dear Dr. Miller,

You stated that:

"One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation that makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how certain they are about their faith.

In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes herself as 'a very spiritual person,' because she 'has deep faith' but 'does not believe in organized religion,' is kind of screwed. She is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them, because she does not participate."

Could it be that religious participation could be correlated with well-being instead of religious participation bringing about the well-being? Could it be that "very spiritual people," such as Arthur's sister, could be emotionally well off as a result of her spirituality while not participating that much in religion?

jamesbond_007_19

#20355

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 5:14 am
Subject: Re: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jrfeier

Offline

James Francis Doyle: God-believing is a function of phylogenetically acquired structures adaptively modified within ontogeny by units of information.

Jay R. Feierman: I agree with you. Most (but probably not all) humans are born with the equivalent of a religous grammar, which acquires content through society-specific social-learning the same way that language acquires content through society-specific social-learning. One should also appreciate that the genetic determinants of religion, which would include the genetic determinants of religious grammar, may require activation during a critical period in human development the same way that human symbolic volcalized language requires activation during a critical period in human development.

In the past few centuries the selection pressures on the genetic determinants of religion appear to be under strong selection pressure in the industrialized democracies of Europe. The religionists are out-reproducing the secularists. Whereas assortative mating (for being a religionist or secularist) can only cause a reduction in heterozygosity in a population and can change a normally distrubuted trait (religiosity) into a bi-modally distrubuted trait (religionists and secularists), the fact that religionists are out-reproducing the secularists in the same industrialized democracies of Western Europe will change gene frequencies in the population.

As a result, my prediction is that secularism in Western Europe is not the final stage of religion's evolution. Neither is it the end of civilization as we have come to know it. Rather, it is the replacement of one set of religion's ontogenetically acquired units of information with another.

#20354

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 5:01 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jrfeier

Offline

Timothy Miller: "God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other "transcendent" beliefs.

Jay R. Feierman: It seems to me that you may be equating God with a belief in God, based on what you wrote above. Belief in God and God are not the same, which I presume you would agree. Also, for the record, whether God exists or does not exist is not relevant to whether someone believes in God or does not believe in God. The usual philosophical/psychological way of defining a belief is "that which is held to be true." One can hold something to be true that is not true.

I've been working on a naturalistic perspective on God which I'm hoping to give as a paper at the European Conference on Science and Theology in Edinburgh, Scotland in April, 2010. One gets a naturalistic perspective on God by relating and referencing God to something that is observable and measurable, which is religious behavior (~ the movement of the individual). God then becomes the object of and reason for religious behavior. Belief in God just biases one's behavior in a predictable way, depending on which version of God you believe in. One can often tell which "face of God" the particular religion uses by watching people's behavior as they pray. As an example, it is easy to tell if someone's God is the God of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam by observing the person during petitioning prayer. Their behaviors are predictably different. Predictably biased behavior is some of the evidence used to support that someone (else) believes in a particular God, since we can not ever know what someone else believes. However, it is just supporting evidence.

Timothy Miller: Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane event, which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study purely private events.

Jay R. Feierman: Currently, we do not have the technology to determine if someone's brain contains a specific belief, such as "God exists." The best evidence that someone has a particular belief (which biases their behavior in a predictable way) is to observe their behavior over time. However, one can never be absolutely certain that someone else harbors a specific belief; one can just get more certain the more one observes their behavior and sees that it is biased in a predictable way. However, intelligence agents infiltrate religious groups and feign their behavior, which is why one can never be absolutely certain what someone else believes.

Timothy Miller: Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public events. That makes it a little easier to study.

Jay R. Feierman: I don't understand that. There are two concepts of belief that I find useful: (1) that which is held to be true and (2) a unit of information (that which is necessary to make decisions) that biases behavior (~ movement) in a predictable way. I'm not sure what you mean that belief in God is a typical mixture of private and public events. The belief, as information, is a structure (with mass, rather than a function without mass) that is capable of inducing thermodynamic chanage in the brain tissue that acquires, holds, and then uses the belief to bias behavior in a predictable way. Because we currently don't have the technology to read a brain's beliefs (like we read DNA's sequence of bases), beliefs are a private event. However, even then there are functional brain scan differences in populations of individuals given some type of psychological task who say that they believe in God and who say that they don't believe in God. However, the functional brain scan is not picking up the belief. Rather, it is picking up some type of change in brain function as the result of the belief. The public event would also not be the belief. Rather, it would be behavior (~ movement) for which the belief is a proximate, intra-individual, contributing cause. I'm including the behavior that generates human symbolic writing and human symbolic vocalized language.

#20353

From: "jamesfrancisd" <jamesfrancisd@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 4:28 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

jamesfrancisd

Offline

Two cents:

God-believing is a function of phylogenetically acquired structures adaptively
modified within ontogeny by units of information.


--- In human-ethology@yahoogroups.com, Timothy Miller <gandalf@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Nov 30, 2009, at 5:23 PM, Mr Michael Saso wrote:
>
> >
> > Science, which essentially measures speed, motion, and quantity of
> > particles, cannot measure "transcendent" or "absolute" act, so
> > Aristotle, Plato, and the "middle ages" thinkers of Islam and
> > Europe reasoned.
>
> "God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other
> "transcendent" beliefs.
>
> Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane event,
> which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study
> purely private events. Dreams, for example, are private events that
> are susceptible to scientific investigation.
>
> Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public events.
> That makes it a little easier to study.
>
>
> > Physical depression as well as elation do not per se depend on
> > belief or non-belief as cause or source of occurrence.
>
> What is the foundation for that assertion? It seems to me that this
> statement represents a testable hypothesis. Difficult to test, but
> probably testable... As far as I know, it has not yet been tested
> adequately.
>
> It has been partly tested, but more study is needed, replication is
> needed, and so on. It appears, so far, that belief, in the absence of
> public worship, does not protect the believer from depression. That's
> interesting as far as it goes. But, then, what is it about public
> worship that protects the worshippers from depression?
>
> I'm not sure if we understand each other...
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> Stockton, CA
>
>
> >  michael
> >
> > -USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los
> > Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports
> > University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan:
> > Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580
> >
> >
> > From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
> > To: human-ethology@yahoogroups.com
> > Sent: Mon, November 30, 2009 1:21:43 PM
> > Subject: [human-ethology] Well-being and religious faith
> >
> >
> > This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread,
> > which is starting to branch and twine.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science,
> >> but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what
> >> people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the
> >> same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my
> >> answer.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --- In human-etholog! y@ yahoogroups. com, "Jay R. Feierman"
> >> <jfeierman@ ..> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Hello Arthur,
> >> >
> >> > I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different
> >> needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets
> >> emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just
> >> benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met
> >> to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think
> >> that science can replace religion.
> >>
> >
> >
> > Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious
> > faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier
> > than they would be otherwise...
> >
> > Or it may not be.
> >
> > This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard
> > to imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence,
> > noted below, suggests it is incorrect.
> >
> > In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial
> > evidence seems inconclusive.
> >
> > I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough.
> > I'm talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring
> > theme is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of
> > various evolved human characteristics combined with various memes,
> > which differ quite a lot from one society to another.
> >
> > A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious
> > faith is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for
> > decent behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian
> > gentlemen and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed
> > him, did not become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor
> > did their children
> >
> > Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less
> > suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and
> > suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy,
> > emotionally stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.
> >
> > It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain
> > personality traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize"
> > in adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high
> > Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable
> > Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in
> > adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are
> > discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or
> > religions faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.
> >
> > It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent
> > variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.
> >
> > One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith
> > does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation
> > that makes the difference. Those who attend worship services
> > regularly reliably score higher on measures of well-being,
> > regardless of how certain they are about their faith.
> >
> > In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes
> > herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith"
> > but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed.
> > She is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from
> > them, because she does not participate.
> >
> > Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-
> > being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or
> > socialize with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise
> > from social interaction with like-minded believers.
> >
> > If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw
> > clear conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.
> >
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> >
> > Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
> > Stockton, CA
> >
> >
>

#20352

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 3:48 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

bopshibobshibop

Offline

On Nov 30, 2009, at 5:23 PM, Mr Michael Saso wrote:

Science, which essentially measures speed, motion, and quantity of particles, cannot measure "transcendent" or "absolute" act, so Aristotle, Plato, and the "middle ages" thinkers of Islam and Europe reasoned.

"God" is not a disconfirmable hypothesis. Same goes for other "transcendent" beliefs.

Although "God" is transcendent, belief in God is a mundane event, which can be studied scientifically, just as it is possible to study purely private events. Dreams, for example, are private events that are susceptible to scientific investigation.

Belief in God is typically a mixture of private and public events. That makes it a little easier to study.

Physical depression as well as elation do not per se depend on belief or non-belief as cause or source of occurrence.

What is the foundation for that assertion? It seems to me that this statement represents a testable hypothesis. Difficult to test, but probably testable... As far as I know, it has not yet been tested adequately.

It has been partly tested, but more study is needed, replication is needed, and so on. It appears, so far, that belief, in the absence of public worship, does not protect the believer from depression. That's interesting as far as it goes. But, then, what is it about public worship that protects the worshippers from depression?

I'm not sure if we understand each other...

Cheers,

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.

Stockton, CA

michael

-USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan: Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@doctortimothymiller.com>
To: human-ethology@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, November 30, 2009 1:21:43 PM
Subject: [human-ethology] Well-being and religious faith

This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread, which is starting to branch and twine.

On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:

Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science, but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my answer.

--- In human-etholog! y@ yahoogroups. com, "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@. ..> wrote:
>
> Hello Arthur,
>
> I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think that science can replace religion.

Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier than they would be otherwise...

Or it may not be.

This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard to imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence, noted below, suggests it is incorrect.

In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial evidence seems inconclusive.

I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough. I'm talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring theme is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of various evolved human characteristics combined with various memes, which differ quite a lot from one society to another.

A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious faith is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for decent behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian gentlemen and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed him, did not become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor did their children

Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy, emotionally stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.

It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain personality traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize" in adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or religions faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.

It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.

One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation that makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how certain they are about their faith.

In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith" but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed. She is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them, because she does not participate.

Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or socialize with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise from social interaction with like-minded believers.

If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw clear conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.

Cheers,

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.
Stockton, CA

#20351

From: Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 1:17 am
Subject: Re: Re: Major Depression

michael_saso

Offline

Yes, the notion that the intellect is the only tool for "knowing" is a common Greek, as well as Sanskrit- Indo-European linguistic - philosophical concept. Aristotle's take on it is found in the 12th chapter of the Metaphysics, and is paraphrased in the later writings of Moses Maimonides (Judaic scholar who wrote in Arabic), Avicenna, Averroes, and Ibn Arabi. Thomas Aquinas got his knowledge of Aristotle's Greek text, translated into Latin, from these Arabic (!)/Islamic sources (interpretations) found in the Summa Theologica, as well as the Summa Contra Gentiles. "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensibus" (nothing is in the intellect that did not come thru the senses); thus if one proposes that G_d is absolute, transcendent, then he/it/she cannot be seen as absolute in the intellect that depends on what is essentially relative- ie images or concepts filtered thru the subject(ive)'s sense perception. The fact that various religious concepts are formed or derived from different sections or segments of the brain, is a scientific fact; that they originated there, (as eletric short circuits, or derived from reason, meditative experience) does not prove that they were solely caused by the brain's actions, but are effects as well of the senses, emotions, and imagination-memory storage in the individual brain. This was stated long ago by Aristotle in his "Physics", as well as by Plato; the various Buddhist schools of Tibet still debate the issue, in lively manner. The Gelugpa and the Jonangpa had an analogous argument in the 16th-17th centuries, ending in suppressing and almost wiping out of the Jonangpa during the 5th Dalai Lama's reign; the present 14th Dalai Lama now approves and supports them. Jonangpa still exists, they have been found on the Szechuan-Qinghai (Kham-Amdo in Tibetan) border. They still still teach forcefully just what Helga suggests, ie the intellect and whole body can feel and know absolute presence. (Attached photo of Jonangpa monks teaching novices).

michael

From: Helga V <helgav@...>
To: human-ethology@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, November 30, 2009 1:01:43 PM
Subject: [human-ethology] Re: Major Depression

Yes, well, where on earth did anyone expect to find God but in the workings of our thoughts and sensations? It cannot have been elsewhere; unless we believe in the existence of supernatural entities with an interest in making sure our behaviour while living is making us fit company for them after we are dead. I view this last as high irrational. Helga

--- In human-ethology@ yahoogroups. com, Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@ ...> wrote:
>
> It is premature for me to reply until I have read the referred books, but I do feel that the experience of apophatic, ie belly-wisdom focus rather than judgmental mind or desire filled heart, is a different experience than that suggested by recent brain measurements. For instance, Nicholas Wade's excellent "The Faith Instinct" (recommended by Jay) states on P. 95 that the "Good Friday" experiment of Pahnke showed that subjects who took psilocybin had much better "mystic" experience (ie answered better questions about what was considered to be "mystic") than those who did not. The actual "apophatic" experience itself, however, has no relationship, in fact is hindered by drugs, alcohol, and negative judgment. Nor does it perceive that "the self is endless...interwove n" as suggested in the quote of Neuberg and D'Aguili; I think the measurement of apophatic mystic experience has not yet been conducted.
> michael
> -USA: (213) 595-5650 -US address: 1250 Long Beach Ave., #223, Los Angeles CA 90021-Beijing: #4012, Intl Student Bldg, Sports University, Beijing 100084, Chn. phone: 853 6259 1363-Japan: Tohgendo Collection, Sanjo Doori 47-1, Kyoto, Japan; 075 212 8580
>
>
>
>
> ____________ _________ _________ __
> From: Jay R. Feierman <jfeierman@. ..>
> To: human-ethology@ yahoogroups. com
> Sent: Sat, November 28, 2009 8:35:35 PM
> Subject: Re: [human-ethology] Re: Major Depression
>
>
> ï»¿
> Michael Saso: Jay has shown
> us that Human-ethology studies of the brain, its electric patterns, and the
> actual places in the brain where religious activity takes place differs for
> atheists and believers, ie the theory is that atheism derives from physical
> evolution in one section of the brain, while religous belief comes from another
> section of the brain's activity. Zhuangzi would say that both sections have to
> be stopped, in order to be aware of God/Dao presence. Paul's 1st letter to the
> Corinthians 2/9 agrees -- "eye cannot see, ear cannot hear, mind cannot
> conceive" actual, immediate God presence.
>
> Jay R. Feierman: The following is taken endnote 17 from
> Chapter 15 in The Biology of Religious Behavior on page 160. One of the more interesting brain correlates of religious
> meditation is in Newberg, A. and d'Aquili, E. (2001). Why God Won't Go Away:
> Brain Science and the Biology of Belief. NY: Ballantine Books. They showed
> that when people enter into religious meditation they have decreased blood flow
> to the posterior superior parietal lobe, an area of the brain that keeps track
> of the you/not-you dichotomy. As a result, the "brain would have no choice but
> to perceive that the self is endless and intimately interwoven with everyone
> else and everything else the mind senses" (p.6). This may be what allows one the
> sense of communion with God.
>
> In addition, the grand daddy of all writers on this
> subject in terms of early writing on the topic was Arnold J. Mandell's chapter,
> "Towards a Psychobiology of Transcendence: God in the Brain." It is in R.J.
> Davidson & J.M Davidson (Eds.). The Psychobiology of Transcendence.
> 1980, pp. 379 - 464. NY: Plenum Publishing. I was a postdoc student
> (resident) in Arnold's Lab at UCSD from 1973 - 1975. Arnold is a
> neurochemist. One day he came into the lab all excited saying, "I figured it
> out. God is in the brain!" I didn't have the slightest idea of what he was
> talking about or why he told me that until I read his chapter 5 years later.
>
> Also, the theme that God is in the brain, or that
> one has to look inward, rather than outward, to find God is the theme of the
> forthcoming book, God's Brain by Lionel Tiger and Michael McGuire.
> Prometheus Books, in press. I'll post more about it when the publisher releases
> the announcement.
>

1 of 1 Photo(s)

IMG_0533.JPG

#20350

From: Mr Michael Saso <michael_saso@...>
Date: Tue Dec 1, 2009 1:23 am
Subject: Re: Well-being and religious faith

michael_saso

Offline

Science, which essentially measures speed, motion, and quantity of particles, cannot measure "transcendent" or "absolute" act, so Aristotle, Plato, and the "middle ages" thinkers of Islam and Europe reasoned. Physical depression as well as elation do not per se depend on belief or non-belief as cause or source of occurence.
michael

From: Timothy Miller <gandalf@...>
To: human-ethology@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, November 30, 2009 1:21:43 PM
Subject: [human-ethology] Well-being and religious faith

This is a new thread, arising from the Major Depression thread, which is starting to branch and twine.

On Nov 28, 2009, at 10:37 PM, arthurcnoll wrote:

Yes, not everyone can have their emotional needs met with science, but that wasn't the question, as I remember. The question was what people who can't believe in a deity, could submit to and get the same benefit as believers get by submitting. And science was my answer.

--- In human-ethology@ yahoogroups. com, "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@. ..> wrote:
>
> Hello Arthur,
>
> I read what you wrote below. Science and religion meet different needs for the average person. For persons doing science, it meets emotional needs in them. However, for the average person who just benefits from the advances of science, emotional needs are not met to the degree that they are in religion. Therefore, I don't think that science can replace religion.

Aren't we assuming facts not in evidence? It may be that religious faith satisfies emotional needs, causing believers to be happier than they would be otherwise...

Or it may not be.

This hypotheses has never been empirically demonstrated. It's hard to imagine how it could be tested conclusively. Some evidence, noted below, suggests it is incorrect.

In the absence of good tests of this hypothesis, the circumstantial evidence seems inconclusive.

I don't think Pascal Boyer gets read and understood often enough. I'm talking about Religion Explained, in particular. His recurring theme is, "Religion is not just one thing." It's a layer cake of various evolved human characteristics combined with various memes, which differ quite a lot from one society to another.

A quick review of the commonsense facts suggests that religious faith is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (or for decent behavior, either). The sophisticated, intelligent Victorian gentlemen and women who read Darwin, understood him and believed him, did not become depressed or suicidal, as far as I know, nor did their children

Conversely, although religious conservatives are happier, and less suicidal, on the average, than non-religious people, depression and suicide do occur among people of strong faith. And happy, emotionally stable non-religious people are not a rare phenomenon.

It's likely that strong religious faith reflects certain personality traits that are partly heritable, and that "crystalize" in adolescence. (The combination of high Conscientiousness, high Agreeableness and a history of growing up in a happy, stable Christian family is a pretty strong predictor of religious faith in adulthood.) Accordingly, we need more clarity about whether we are discussing religious faith, as an independent variable, or religions faith as a correlate of personality traits and demographics.

It doesn't make sense to consider religious faith an independent variable. It's one node in a complex web of human phenomena.

One interesting fact about religion vs. well-being: Religious faith does not seem to make a difference. It's religions participation that makes the difference. Those who attend worship services regularly reliably score higher on measures of well-being, regardless of how certain they are about their faith.

In other words, your sister-in-law, who enthusiastically describes herself as "a very spiritual person," because she "has deep faith" but "does not believe in organized religion," is kind of screwed. She is burdened by superstitious beliefs, but may not benefit from them, because she does not participate.

Even more interesting: Religious participation confers higher well-being, even among people who do not socialize at church, or socialize with fellow believers. So, the benefit might not arise from social interaction with like-minded believers.

If you can make sense out of this mess of information, and draw clear conclusions from it, you're smarter than I am.

Cheers,

Timothy Miller, Ph.D.

Stockton, CA

#20349

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 6:37 pm
Subject: Evo-Devo of the Vertebrate Neural Crest

jrfeier

Offline

Zoology
Article in Press, Corrected Proof - Note to users

Review

The evolutionary origin of the vertebrate neural crest and its developmental gene regulatory network � insights from amphioxus

References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.

Jr-Kai Sky Yu^a^,^b^,^,

^aInstitute of Cellular and Organismic Biology, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Road, Section 2, Nankang, Taipei 11529, Taiwan

^bInstitute of Oceanography, National Taiwan University, No. 1, Section 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei 10617, Taiwan

Received 1 April 2009;

revised 8 June 2009;

accepted 16 June 2009.

Available online 24 November 2009.

Abstract

The neural crest is an embryonic cell population unique to vertebrates. During vertebrate embryogenesis, neural crest cells are first induced from the neural plate border; subsequently, they delaminate from the dorsal neural tube and migrate to their destination, where they differentiate into a wide variety of derivatives. The emergence of the neural crest is thought to be responsible for the evolution of many complex novel structures of vertebrates that are lacking in invertebrate chordates. Despite its central importance in understanding the origin of vertebrates, the evolutionary origin of the neural crest remains elusive. The basal chordate amphioxus (Branchiostoma floridae) occupies an outgroup position that is useful for investigating this question. In this review, I summarize recent genomic and comparative developmental studies between amphioxus and vertebrates and discuss their implications for the evolutionary origin of neural crest cells. I focus mainly on the origin of the gene regulatory network underlying neural crest development, and suggest several hypotheses regarding how this network could have been assembled during early vertebrate evolution.

Keywords: Branchiostoma floridae; Neural crest development; Vertebrate evolution; Invertebrate chordates; Gene duplication

Article Outline

Introduction
Vertebrate neural crest development and its developmental gene regulatory network
Comparative genomics of amphioxus and vertebrates provides important insights into the evolution of the NC-GRN
Comparative gene expression analysis highlights the conservation and variation of NC-GRN gene deployment between vertebrates and amphioxus
FoxD gene evolution and its co-option into the NC-GRN
Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References

Fig. 1. Adult amphioxus Branchiostoma floridae. (a) Photograph of a living adult specimen, lateral view, anterior on the left. (b) Diagram of the major anatomical features of amphioxus.

Fig. 2. Diagram of the neurulation process in cross sections of amphioxus embryos at late gastrula, early neurula, and late neurula stage. The borders of presumptive neural plate (green) and epidermis (blue) are indicated by arrows. The presumptive axial mesoderm (red), paraxial mesoderm (pink), and presumptive endoderm are shown in the indicated colors. In the late gastrula stage, the embryo is ovoid with the presumptive neural plate becoming flattened. In the early neurula stage, the epidermis at the edges of the neural plate detaches from the neural plate and begins to overgrow it. In the late neurula stage the overgrowing dorsal epidermis fuses together at the dorsal midline, and the underlying neural plate curls up to form a dorsal, hollow neural tube. At this stage, neurulation is complete, and the rudiments of the notochord, anterior somites, as well as the endodermal rudiment that will form the pharyngeal tube and gut (yellow) become distinguishable.

Fig. 3. The neural crest gene regulatory network in vertebrates (a) and the putative neural border gene network in amphioxus (b). Black arrows indicate empirically verified regulatory interactions. Shaded areas represent the conserved sub-circuits between the respective gene regulatory networks. (a) In vertebrates, signals from the ventral ectoderm and underlying mesendoderm pattern the dorsal ectoderm, inducing expression of neural border specifiers and neural plate markers. These inductive signals then work with neural border specifiers to upregulate the expression of neural crest specifers. The neural crest specifiers cross-regulate and activate various effector genes, each of which mediates a different aspect of the neural crest phenotype. These include cassettes controlling neural crest delamination and migration as well as differentiation programs for neural crest derivatives like cartilage, pigment cells, and peripheral neurons. (b) In amphioxus, gene expression and BMP signaling perturbation suggest that dorsal ectoderm patterning and neural border specification are conserved between vertebrates and cephalochordates. In addition, the differentiation gene battery for pigment cell development appears conserved in both vertebrates and amphioxus (Yu et al., 2008a); the amphioxus orthologue of the vertebrate cartilage marker Col2a (amphioxus ColA) is also expressed in the embryonic and larval neural tube (Meulemans and Bronner-Fraser, 2007b). However, amphioxus lacks neural border expression of most neural crest specifiers, as well as the effector sub-circuit controlling neural crest delamination and migration, consistent with a lack of bona fide neural crest cells in this lineage.

Fig. 4. Comparison of embryonic expression of amphioxus FoxD and its vertebrate FoxD homologues. The left part of the figure shows a simplified version of the FoxD gene tree. The major expression domains of amphioxus FoxD and vertebrate FoxD paralogues are mapped onto a diagrammatic amphioxus (below) and vertebrate (above) embryo, respectively. The color of each gene on the gene tree matches the expression domain in the embryos.

Fig. 5. Fates of duplicated FoxD genes in the vertebrate lineage and the possible regulatory evolution of these paralogous genes. Light-blue colored boxes with various shapes represent the functional tissue-specific regulatory elements on the cis-regulatory DNA of the gene. After gene duplication, mutation might cause the loss of function of certain regulatory elements (empty boxes), but because of functional constraints, the distribution of these deleterious mutations likely occurred in a complementary manner and led to the subfunctionalization among paralogous genes. In addition, neofunctionalization also occurred by the acquisition of a novel tissue-specific cis-regulatory element (green isosceles trapezoid) in a certain paralogue, namely, the FoxD3 gene.

Corresponding author at: Institute of Cellular and Organismic Biology, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Road, Section 2, Nankang, Taipei 11529, Taiwan. Tel.: +886 2 2789 9517; fax: +886 2 2785 8059

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#20348

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 6:43 pm
Subject: Cortisol and Threat-Selective Spatial Attention in Humans

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Physiology & Behavior
Article in Press, Uncorrected Proof - Note to users

Cortisol administration acutely reduces threat-selective spatial attention in healthy young men

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Peter Putman^a^,^,, Erno J. Hermans^b and Jack van Honk^c^,^d^,^e

^aDepartment of Clinical, Health and Neuropsychology, Leiden University Institute for Psychological Research, The Netherlands

^bDonders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, The Netherlands

^cDepartment of Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

^dDepartment of Human Biology, University of Cape Town, South Africa

^eDepartment of Psychiatry, University of Cape Town, South Africa

Received 31 August 2009;

revised 1 October 2009;

accepted 12 November 2009.

Available online 19 November 2009.

Abstract

There is mounting evidence that single administrations of glucocorticoids may acutely reduce human fear. We previously reported that administration of cortisol acutely reduced non-spatial selective attention to fearful faces and likewise reduced preferential processing of fearful faces in a spatial working memory task. Here we report the acute effects of 40 mg cortisol (administered in a double-blind, placebo-controlled crossover design) on a different experimental task for measuring threat-selective attention. Twenty healthy young males had to localize a target which was presented in a peripheral location that was either gazed at or not by a preceding dynamic happy or fearful face. This reliable method has been used repeatedly to demonstrate fear-driven selective attention. Present results showed that after placebo, as usual, the fearful gaze cues caused stronger orienting of attention than happy faces. Cortisol abolished this typical anxious response pattern, but only in low anxious participants. These data provide evidence that cortisol acutely influences also spatial threat-selective attention. Possible neuroendocrine mechanisms are discussed.

Keywords: Cortisol; HPA; Fear; Anxiety; Attention; Gaze cueing

Article Outline

1. Introduction
2. Methods
3. Materials
4. Results
5. Discussion
Acknowledgements
References

Fig. 1. Order of events for a valid target trial with a fearful gaze cue. After the fixation period, a 120-ms dynamic stimulus sequence displayed a face gradually changing its facial expression from neutral to emotional while the eyes simultaneously shifted their gaze to the side. The final frame was presented for an additional 80 ms to a total cue display of 200 ms during which the final percept was available for 100 ms. The fixation cross remained visible, to inhibit saccades. Inter-trial interval varied randomly between 1500�2500 ms. Only three size-adjusted stimulus frames are shown here for the sake of figure clarity.

Fig. 2. Means and standard of the mean error bars for the within-subject cueing effects (in ms; mean RTs for invalid conditions minus mean RTs for valid conditions) for happy and fearful faces, after placebo and cortisol, and for low (left) and high (right) anxious participants separately. High anxious participants show overall stronger cueing effects and overall better cueing for fearful compared to happy expressions, but no effect of cortisol administration. The low anxious participants do show effect of cortisol; in the placebo condition there is better cueing for fearful expressions and this typical anxiogenic response pattern disappears after cortisol administration.

Table 1.

Mean RTs (ms) and standard deviations for the various conditions on the emotional gaze cueing task, separately for high (n = 10) and low (n = 10) anxious participants.

Corresponding author. Clinical, Health and Neuropsychology, Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, PO-Box 9555, 2300 RB, Leiden, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 71 5274818; fax: +31 71 5274678.

There are three types of "Articles in Press":

Accepted manuscripts: these are articles that have been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by the Editorial Board. The articles have not yet been copy edited and/or formatted in the journal house style.
Uncorrected proofs: these are copy edited and formatted articles that are not yet finalized and that will be corrected by the authors. Therefore the text could change before final publication.
Corrected proofs: these are articles containing the authors' corrections and may, or may not yet have specific issue and page numbers assigned.

Physiology & Behavior
Article in Press, Uncorrected Proof - Note to users

#20347

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 12:40 am
Subject: Determining the Adaptiveness of a Morphological Structure

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Why some rails have white tails: the evolution of white undertail plumage and anti-predator signaling

Journal	Evolutionary Ecology
Publisher	Springer Netherlands
ISSN	0269-7653 (Print) 1573-8477 (Online)
Issue	Volume 23, Number 6 / November, 2009
Category	Original Paper
DOI	10.1007/s10682-008-9283-z
Pages	943-961
Subject Collection	Biomedical and Life Sciences
SpringerLink Date	Thursday, November 27, 2008

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Original Paper

Why some rails have white tails: the evolution of white undertail plumage and anti-predator signaling

Alexandra T. Stang¹ and Susan B. McRae¹

(1)	Department of Biology, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858-4353, USA

Received: 27 May 2008 Accepted: 6 November 2008 Published online: 27 November 2008

Abstract Conspicuous plumage patches have evolved in birds as conspecific signals for mate attraction and assessment, intersexual competition or to signal alarm. Signals may alternatively be directed at potential predators to discourage pursuit. Rails (Family Rallidae) are ground-dwelling birds, many of which inhabit wetlands, while others occur in forests and grasslands. They are renown for their secretive nature and the tendency to flick their tails when observed. This behavior is more conspicuous in species with white undertail coverts that contrast sharply with darker body plumage. Using species comparisons and controlling for phylogeny, we investigated four hypotheses for the evolution of white undertail coverts in rails. We found little support for the hypothesis that white tails are sexually selected: white tails were not more common in species with polygamous as opposed to monogamous mating systems, species with sexual dimorphism, nor species that display their tails in courtship. Nor did our results support the hypothesis that white tail plumage evolved for intersexual competition during territorial interactions. Instead, we found that species that flock for at least part of the year and species found in open as opposed to concealing habitats were significantly more likely to have white undertail coverts. Rail species inhabiting concealing habitats are less commonly gregarious and more likely selected for crypsis. Using phylogenetically-controlled statistical inference we found that adaptation to open wetland habitats significantly precedes the evolution of white undertails, whereas gregariousness likely evolved later in some lineages. The inferred order of trait evolution suggests that this plumage characteristic could have been selected primarily for enhancement of an anti-predator signal rather than a social signal for conspecifics.

Keywords Character evolution - Concentrated changes test - Discrete - Omnibus test - Phylogeny - Plumage color - Pursuit deterrent - Rallidae - Signaling

Susan B. McRae
Email: mcraes@...

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#20346

From: "Jay R. Feierman" <jfeierman@...>
Date: Thu Nov 26, 2009 12:32 am
Subject: Does Devoutness Delay Death?

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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume 97, Issue 5, November 2009, Pages 866-882

Does Devoutness Delay Death? Psychological Investment in Religion and Its Association With Longevity in the Terman Sample

References and further reading may be available for this article. To view references and further reading you must purchase this article.

Michael E. McCullough^a^,^,, Howard S. Friedman^b, Craig K. Enders^c and Leslie R. Martin^d

^aDepartment of Psychology, University of Miami

^bDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Riverside

^cDepartment of Psychology, Arizona State University

^dDepartment of Psychology, La Sierra University

Received 29 April 2008;

revised 26 March 2009;

accepted 23 April 2009.

Available online 19 November 2009.

Religious people tend to live slightly longer lives (M. E. McCullough, W. T. Hoyt, D. B. Larson, H. G. Koenig, & C. E. Thoresen, 2000). On the basis of the principle of social investment (J. Lodi-Smith & B. W. Roberts, 2007), the authors sought to clarify this phenomenon with a study of religion and longevity that (a) incorporated measures of psychological religious commitment; (b) considered religious change over the life course; and (c) examined 19 measures of personality traits, social ties, health behaviors, and mental and physical health that might help to explain the religion�longevity association. Discrete-time survival growth mixture models revealed that women (but not men) with the lowest degrees of religiousness through adulthood had shorter lives than did women who were more religious. Survival differences were largely attributable to cross-sectional and prospective between-class differences in personality traits, social ties, health behaviors, and mental and physical health.

Author Keywords: religion; longevity; personality; development

This work was funded by grants from the John Templeton Foundation and the Metanexus Institute. Michael E. McCullough's effort was also supported by the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, and Howard S. Friedman's effort was also supported by National Institutes of Health Grant AG08825.

Department of Psychology, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248185, Coral Gables, FL 33124-0751.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume 97, Issue 5, November 2009, Pages 866-882