In view of the attacks in Mumbai, my old article, published in
September 2002 in Hindustan Times, on attacking urban buildings, may
be of interest. It was published just after the attack on the
Akshardham temple in Sept 2002.

Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad

p@... r@...

Tel: {91} 9990 265 822, 98 118 36 331

==================

My article on attacking urban buildings, published in Hindustan Times
in Sept 2002


My article on attacking urban buildings, published in Hindustan
Times after the attack on the Akshardham temple in September 2002.

Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
--------------------------------------------------


Submitted to Hindustan Times on Friday, 27 September 2002

By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad


Urban Warfare in India

1500 words

Published in Hindustan Times, Edit Page

<BLURB> India’s paramilitary forces are among the few worldwide
that have operational experience in urban warfare and
fourth-generation warfare. However, DRDO should immediately begin to
develop urban-warfare technologies. </BLURB>

Following the attack at Akshardham Temple, it is clear that India
is going to be subjected to many more incidents of urban guerilla
warfare from suicide fidayeen of Al-Mansoor, Al-Afreen,
Tehreek-e-Kassas, Al-Umma, Al-Mujahideen and other home-grown
organizations inspired by Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammed, and
Hizbul Mujahideen.

India’s security planners of the early 1980s had the foresight to
envision that prominent Indian buildings, especially religious
shrines, would be subjected to hostage-taking terrorist attacks. When
they established the National Security Guards, only Israel had
comparable agencies specializing in urban warfare, and Britain’s SAS
and USA’s Berets had not had any operational experience whatsoever.

For over fifteen years, the Indian Army had already been
practicing in Kashmir, Punjab and the North East what General Charles
C. Krulak, Commandant of USA’s Marine Corps, articulated in 1997 as
the Three Block War of the Future: “In one city block, a Marine will
provide food and medicine to an emaciated child. In the next block,
this Marine will be separating two warring tribes. Then, in the third
city block, this same Marine will engage in intense house-to-house
fighting with hostile forces.”

Compared to India and Israel, other armies lagged far behind in
urban warfare doctrines and operations, being stuck in the Cold War
and Gulf War mentality of fighting in open terrain. USA’s last
experience of fighting inside cities was during its unsuccessful
campaign at Hue during the Vietnam War. After the US Marines’ lack of
experience of fighting inside buildings showed up in their many
bungled operations against Aideed’s forces in Mogadishu, Major General
Robert Scales decreed that USA would engage in warfare in built-up
areas only as a last resort. In contrast, Indian forces had already
successfully carried out Operations Blue Star and Black Thunder at the
Golden Temple.

But it was the humiliating defeat of Russia’s army in Grozny which
jolted western military planners into developing Urban Warfare
Doctrines, Tactics and Procedures. Still stuck in the World War II
mindset of artillery and tank assaults on city buildings, the Russian
Army found that (according to Colonel Timothy Thomas of the US Army’s
Foreign Military Studies Office) “its armored thrust into Grozny was
anticipated by Chechen guerrillas who ambushed them from the sides,
rear, and above….Grozny’s narrow streets were soon blocked by burning
Russian vehicles, making it impossible for the embattled Russian
armoured columns to advance, counter-maneuver, or even withdraw.”

During wargaming simulations, the US army was shocked to discover
that its field commanders would have acted exactly as the Russian ones
did in Grozny. Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper then formulated "A
Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain" in 1997.
The Pentagon also found that US Marines had difficulties in adapting
the Close-Quarters Battle Techniques that they had been taught to
fighting inside built-up areas, which turned out to be the cause of
their deaths in Somalia. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command
then developed “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military
Operations on Urbanized Terrain” in 1999.

While the training programme of the NSG compares with world’s
best, those of state police commandos, who would be the first to
arrive on the scene, need to be enhanced greatly. A useful guide would
be USA’s Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3 which
contains detailed Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). It describes detailed
TTPs for offensive and defensive operations in five types of urban
layouts, which are also found in Indian cities: (a) Dense, Random
Construction (eg. Chandni Chowk); (b) Closed Orderly Blocks of
Buildings (eg. DDA SFS Flats); (c) Dispersed Residential Areas (eg.
Friends Colony, Civil Lines); (d) High-Rise Buildings (eg. Nehru
Place); and (e) Industrial / Transportation Areas (eg. Naraina, Okhla).

The four-day training course conducted for the US Marine Corps
contains several useful guidelines which are also applicable to Indian
conditions, such as:

· Helicopter assaults are vulnerable to shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled grenades….

· Artillery and air-to-ground shells fall at too-shallow an angle
to be effective in densely built-up areas….

· It is preferable to attack at night since terrorists do not
usually possess night vision equipment….

· Streets and open spaces between buildings are killing zones. Use
smoke cover when moving through these areas….

· Avoid windows, doors, and hallways….

· Deciding where to enter a building is critical. The rule of
thumb is to enter at the highest floor possible to minimize the amount
of upstairs fighting and to avoid enemy heavy-weapons positions, which
will usually be located on lower floors….

· Avoid entering through doors and windows because they are
usually covered by sniper fire or boobytrapped. It is preferable to
breach walls by explosives, and then enter….

· Once inside the building, the first task is to cover with
automatic weapons the staircases leading to upper floors and the
basement; and, secondly, to seize rooms that overlook approaches to
the building….

· Avoid, unless absolutely necessary, throwing grenades at upper
windows or upstairs; they may bounce back….

· Frequently, stairways will be boobytrapped…Stairs are usually
covered by enemy fires, and defenders can throw grenades into the
stairwell…Avoid stairways whenever possible….Select rooms that have
ceilings intact and place an explosive charge against the ceiling…The
resultant explosion should kill or stun defenders and provide access
to the next floor….

· When entering a room do not open doors by hand or attempt to
kick them open…Shoot the door open by firing several rounds through
the lock or blow the door in with explosives…Throw a handgrenade into
the room…After detonation, one man should quickly enter, spray the
room with automatic fire, and take up a position from where he can
observe the entire room…. A second man should then conduct a
systematic search….

Another indicator of the NSG’s expertise is the extremely low
number of casualties it has suffered. During the ten-day Operation
Black Thunder at the Golden Temple in May 1988, the NSG killed 38
members of the Khalistan Commando Force and captured over 200, without
suffering even a single casualty. Only three security personnel were
killed at Akshardham. In contrast, during exercises and simulations
performed by USA’s Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine
casualties were projected to range from 30 to 75 percent of the
defending forces. Operation Black Thunder is now regarded by urban
warfare units worldwide, especially Britain’s SAS, as a paradigm to be
emulated.

Where India can learn from the US is in development of UW
technologies and equipment, advance scenario planning, and
coordination of rescue and medical plans with civilian authorities.
Fortunately, the priests of the Swaminarayan temple were able to
immediately provide the NSG with layout maps. The temple authorities
also had the telecommunications facilities to alert worshippers to
immediately shut several doors. But how many buildings in Indian
cities have their blueprints readily available? Or how many of them
have sophisticated communications, firefighting and medical facilities
installed? While it is heartening that the Delhi government has got
its commandos familiarized with the layout of prominent buildings in
Delhi, this procedure should be immediately carried out in all major
Indian towns and religious shrines.

The Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) should
immediately begin to develop new technologies suited to Indian UW
conditions. Colonel Robert F. Hahn, director of the US Army’s Urban
Warfare projects, listed the futuristic technologies that have to be
developed and provided to the US Urban Warfighter Corps by 2025
(quotes are his words):

1. C4ISR: “The Urban Warfighter of 2025 should be provided with
comprehensive situational awareness capabilities, easy-to-use
integrated communications and navigational systems that can provide
him real-time updates, the capabilities to connect with and employ a
wide variety of robotic systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other
sensor systems to determine who or what is in the buildings or streets
around him -- day or night. He needs to be able to communicate and see
through walls.”

2. Lethality: “The Urban Warfighter of 2025 must possess precision
lethal fire assault weapons, and should be able to access digital,
voice-activated fires from a variety of robotic systems operating
semi-autonomously…He also must have direct access to precision fire
support from distant platforms.”

3. Mobility: “The Urban Warfighter of 2025 will require enhanced
individual mobility in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.”

(US defence researchers are already working on developing unmanned
ground vehicles, individual aerial assault systems, and a Vertical
Assault Urban Light Transporter that will give a soldier the ability
to leap to the top of a four-story building.)

4. Survivability: “By 2025, uniforms themselves must guarantee
survival. Uniforms must be light, offer protection from bullets,
chemical-biological agents, cold, and heat; they must also provide low
signature and chameleon camouflage.”

5. Sustainability: “The Urban Warfighter of 2025 needs to carry
lighter and more concentrated rations, and individual water
purification kits, enabling him to subsist for at least a week.”

DRDO should immediately begin to develop similar technologies
which are specifically suited to Indian UW conditions, as well as
strong, flexible, light-weight body armor; acoustic sniper detection
devices; and optical equipment that will allow commandos to look
around corners.

By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad

The author heads a group which analyzes fourth-generation warfare
and C4ISRT (Command, Control, Communications and Computers
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting) in South Asia.
Friday, 27 September 2002

Published in Hindustan Times, Edit Page

1500 words

Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad

Mobile: {91} 98 118 36 331, 9990 265 822

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Mail : Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad

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