Continuing my latest Post on Lynch's "Image of the City" : perhaps it'd be better if I quote and then proceed to comment on its relevance to landscapes.
" An environmental image may be analyzed into three components: identity, structure and meaning. It is useful to abstract them for analysis, if it is remembered that in reality they always appear together. A workable image requires first the identification of an object, which implies its distinction from other things, its recognition as a separable entity. This is called identity, not in the sense of equality with something else, but with the meaning of individuality or oneness. Second, the image must include the spatial or pattern relation of the object to the observer and to other objects. Finally, this object must have some meaning for the observer, whether practical or emotional. Meaning is also a relation, but quite a different one from spatial or pattern relation" (my italics)
Being myself very far from the discipline of Architecture I cannot give an opinion about the relevance and usefulness of the above to city planning. On the other hand, on reading the above, I was amazed to see how Lynch managed to condense so elegantly in one paragraph a workable approach to the understanding of landscapes in general and to landscape appreciation in particular.
Lynch doesn't use the word "appreciation " at all and the following are my views, for all they are worth. If we say we appreciate a certain landscape we are implying that it has value for us. That's sort of obvious but, if we accept that appreciating a landscape goes far deeper than registering vague impressions of the effect of a landscape on us, we must reflect on "what of the landscape" is what we value. A sizable part of the discourse on the matter has been centered on the aesthetic value of a landscape, however, I think that most of us in this Group realize that there is far more in a landscape than its mere aesthetic qualities.
In my reading of Lynch's quote, the first step in a landscape encounter leading to its appreciation would be its 'identification as an object' ; again sort of obvious but only apparently so; in the case of a landscape painting, its identification as an object is straightforward: someone has framed it for us; whatever lies outside the frame is not "It" and we focus our attention in whatever is inside the frame. In the case of a landscape it is the observer, the individual that brings forth the distinctions, the one that does the 'framing'; (While the landscape photographer can freeze in time her distinction, the person in a landscape encounter remains dynamically aware of the surroundings around her distinction).
The second component, which Lynch calls Structure concerns the relations of the distinguished image with what lies outside it, the most prominent of which is the observer itself. ( from here we are led into the subjectivity/objectivity question that I'll skip for the time being). In this second component we include also the internal relations within the composite unity; prominent among these are the ones leading to the aesthetic experience, but for the ecological , geological , archeological or anthropological minded the relevant relations may be of a quite different sort. It is perhaps mainly concerning Structure from where the various outlooks of "sense of place/landscape", which we were discussing here a few months ago, seem to arise.
The last but not least important component is meaning. "Meaning for the observer, whether practical or emotional" arises from the affective and/or cognitive relations landscape-observer. Our ways of relating to a landscape are seldom of the dispassionate, disinterested, detached kind that (classical) aestheticians aspire to for appreciating. We have dealt in this dimension previously here when discussing "landscapes of childhood", in the approach towards "Decoding the Landscape" (Collins) in "Historical and Mythical Landscapes" and others. I'd venture to say that what we value of a landscape it's predominantly given by its meaning to an observer and that the other relations are brought forth as a sequel.
Finally, a note on a seemingly innocent sentence of Lynch but which should be taken as a warning never to be put aside: "It is useful to abstract them (the components) for analysis, if it is remembered that in reality they always appear together". Although we may discuss them separately, they always appear together; what gives a landscape its identity is its oneness and, if dissected into parts, it is no longer a unity.
The following quote from Heinz von Foerster brings-in boldly that point :
"Note that the components are components only to the extent that they compose the composite unity. That is to say, a component is a component only as a component. There are no free (spare) components hanging about the world. Nothing is a such a component. Something is a component only in composition. In composition the relation between components and the unity that they compose is always unique. "