Landscaperian: I do appreciate your concerns about taking too many liberties with Norberg-Schulz categorization. I am aware that this is a slippery subject and I intend to give a fuller justification after we reach, the fourth type, (Complex Landscapes) . In the meantime, some succinct notes.

 You aptly write in your Message #210:

 … "the question is not only whether something "does not conform with much of the criteria" (criteria used in the categorization) but how much is left out. If what is left out are important criteria then we might be taking "too many liberties", that is, forcing a particular case into a category where it does not belong." 

 Norberg-Schulz , instead of attempting to define a particular style, lists, for each, a number of characteristics which, if displayed by a given landscape would justify ascribing it to that particular style. The question arises: what if that given landscape displays only some of the characteristics?

   We are confronted with a somewhat similar problem when attempting to decide whether something is or not a work of Art. In the absence of wide consensus for a definition, a way out is to resort to a non-definitional account of Art, based on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, as proposed by Berys Gaut ( see British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 45, No. 3, July 2005). Paraphrasing Gaut  I would write:

  In holding that "cosmic style" (or any other) is a cluster concept, I mean that there are multiple criteria for the application of the concept, none of which is a necessary condition for a given landscape being called a cosmic one.

   Quoting Gaut from said article (pp.274):

 "A criterion is a property, possession of which conceptually counts towards an object's falling under a concept; there are several criteria for a concept. The notion of counting towards I construe as follows. First, if all of the properties that are criteria are instantiated, this suffices for an object to fall under the concept; and more strongly, if fewer than all of these properties are instantiated, this also suffices for the aplication of the concept.So there are jointly sufficient conditions for the aplication of the concept. Second, there are no properties that are individually necessary conditions for the object to fall under the concept.(that is, there is no prerty that all the objects falling under the concept must possess). Third,there are disjunctively necessary conditions for application of the concept: some of the properties must be instantiated if the object is to fall under the concept"

     My rationale for applying Gaut's cluster account is to widen the range of Norberg-Schulz three first types, thus avoiding to ascribe the wide majority of them into the fourth (complex landscape). I realize that a fuller argumentation is needed to justify the extrapolation of Gaut's proposals into the question of Style and, as said, I'd think it better be reserved for a time when the four types have been reviewed.