#B Crown Factum for Terry Parker's Seized Pot Claim

2. JUSTICE CLEMENTS WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT HE WAS BOUND

BY THE DECISION OF JUSTICE FELDMAN OF THE ONTARIO COURT OF

APPEAL THAT THE ORDER OF JUSTICE PITT HAD BEEN PROPERLY SET

ASIDE.

JCT: And that's not what Justice Feldman was ruling on. It's

what the whole panel with Justices Doherty, Goudge, and

Simmons agreed. Justice Feldman was dealing with an

application for relief pending appeal. Clements knew he was

bound by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision, not the

Feldman decision.

34. The Appellant has submitted that "The Pitt decision

extending the criminal jurisdiction exemption granted by the

Ontario Court of Appeal cannot be set aside pursuant to the

Rules of Civil Procedure as a default judgment nor for

improper service when, pursuant to the "General Powers of

the Court" under Section 3.02(1) of the Criminal Proceedings

Rules, a court may extend or abridge any prescribed time."

JCT: The Pitt issue is the big one. A Superior Court Justice

granted Terry Parker an extension of his protection from the

"criminal prohibition," and the Criminal Rules of Practice

say he can only be overturned by way of appeal to three

Appellant judges. So Parker should have been protected the

whole time the battle to challenge Justice Pitt's decision

to extend protection was going on.

But they needed to have Pitt's statement "until the

government has complied with the Parker Court's ruling" out

of the way without having a fight over it so the Crown

applied under the Civil Rules to one equal Superior Court

judge to set the Pitt decision aside as an unconsidered,

unadjudicated "judgment by default."

Not only had Justice Pitt granted Terry the extended

protection but granted the request to abridge the time for

the application, (which any Superior Court Judge can do) and

granted the protection "ex parte," without the Crown showing

up.

Those three issues took a lot of thinking and for the Crown

tell Justice Chapnik she was setting aside a "default

judgment" just because the Crown failed to show up, is a

travesty.

35. The argument presented by the Appellant appears to be

based on a misunderstanding of the legal proceedings

subsequent to the decision of Pitt J. On April 19 2002

Chapnik J. set aside the order of Pitt J.

JCT: Remember, Civil Court set aside the order of Criminal

Court Order.

Justice Clements correctly noted that the Appellant had

exercised his right of appeal of the decision of Justice

Chapnik. The Court of Appeal ruled that Chapnik J. had made

no error when she set aside the Order of Justice Pitt.

JCT: The fact Justices Doherty, Goudge and Simmons of the

highest court in Ontario agreed that Civil Superior Court

made no error when she set aside the Criminal Superior Court

Order makes it all that much funnier.

As such, the Appellant's position on this issue amounts to a

collateral attack on the decision of the Ontario Court of

Appeal.

JCT: An attack to the Supreme Court of Canada on a silly

decision that I never bothered following up the last time

but which I now have to use since they started the fight by

seizing Terry's medicine and it's one of our best cards. I

always told Terry not to worry about prohibition while he

had the Pitt decision in his pocket until 3 higher judges

take the remedy away, not 3 higher judges agreeing that one

of his equal judges could take his remedy away.

(C) JUSTICE CLEMENTS MADE NO ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE

POSSESSION PROHIBITION WHICH WAS DECLARED INVALID IN PARKER

WAS VALID FOLLOWING THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL IN HITZIG?

JCT: Ah, now we get into the important stuff for everyone

else. POLCOA,

36. The Appellant submitted that "S.4 possession prohibition

remains repealed pursuant to the S.2.2 of the Interpretation

Act once declared invalid by the Parker Court of Appeal in

2001 despite section 4 being resurrected by the Hitzig Court

of Appeal for only being absent, not repealed, once

invalidated by the Court."

37. Section 2(2) of the Interpretation Act.

2(2) For the purposes of this Act, an enactment that has

been replaced is repealed and an enactment that has expired,

lapsed or otherwise ceased to have effect is deemed to have

been repealed."

JCT: That's what Justices Phillips, Rogin and Chen said.

38. Thus it appears that the Appellant is presenting the

argument that once the Hitzig decision determined that the

MMAR were flawed, then the Interpretation Act deemed the

prohibition on the possession of marijuana in section 4 of

the CDSA to have been repealed and thus incapable of

"resurrection."

39. Again, the Appellant's argument appears to be based on a

misunderstanding of the order and reasons for decision of

the Court of Appeal in Hitzig. The reasons for decision of

the Court of Appeal clearly indicate that section 4 of the

CDSA was not repealed:

[166] The declarations of invalidity we propose remove the

single constitutional barrier to eligibility and sufficient

barriers to supply that ATP holders will be reasonably able

to meet their medical needs from licit sources.

JCT: On Oct 7 2003, two years too late after the law became

of no force and effect on Terry Parker Day Aug. 1 2001.

As a result, the MMAR as modified become a constitutionally

sound medical exemption to the marihuana prohibition in s.4

of the CDSA.

JCT: Two years after deadline.

[170]...

JCT: They dropped the start of the paragraph:

"First, if we do not suspend our order, there will

immediately be a constitutionally valid exemption in effect

and the marihuana prohibition in s. 4 of the CDSA will

immediately be constitutionally valid and of full force and

effect."

In R. v. Parker, supra, this court declared the

prohibition invalid as of July 31, 2001 if by that date the

Government had not enacted a constitutionally sound medical

exemption. Our decision in this case confirms that it did

not do so. Hence the marihuana prohibition in s. 4 has been

of no force or effect since July 31, 2001.

JCT: The Parker Court of Appeal said it was invalid. Here,

they Hitzig Court say it was of no force and effect after

July 31, 2001. They admit it was "of no force and effect."

Since the July 8, 2003 regulation did not address the

eligibility deficiency, that alone could not have cured the

problem. However, our order has the result of

constitutionalizing the medical exemption created by the

Government. As a result, the marihuana prohibition in s. 4

is no longer inconsistent with the provisions of the

Constitution. Although Parliament may subsequently choose to

change it, that prohibition is now no longer invalid, but is

of full force and effect.

JCT: And with those words, the Court say they brought back

to life a law which had been repealed according to S.2.2 of

the Interpretation Act.

Those who establish medical need are simply exempted from

it.

JCT: We had a big argument over this. I said that "Those who

establish medical need are simply exempted from it" and

Justice Clements presumed that to mean that "Those who

establish a medical need enough to get an exemption are

simply exempted. Kind of repetitive, isn't it. Of course, if

they have an exemption, they're exempted. But simply

exempted means simply, without Health Canada exemption, just

sick.

This consequence removes the cloud of uncertainty from

the marihuana prohibition in s. 4 of the CDSA - a cloud

which we were told in argument has created very considerable

confusion for courts and law enforcement agencies alike.

JCT: They also dropped the ending:

"A suspension of our remedy would simply have continued that

undesirable uncertainty for a further period of time."

JCT: The Court calls the period where the law was invalid,

repealed, of no force and effect, a period of "undesirable

uncertainty." The Parker Court declared the prohibition to

"undesirably uncertain." Har har har har.

[171] Second, in argument, counsel for the Government

strongly urged that if we found the MMAR to be

constitutionally flawed, we should be as precise as possible

in specifying the corrective measures to be taken. Our

remedy quite precisely determines the barriers in the MMAR

which, if removed, would render it a constitutionally sound

medical exemption to s. 4 of the CDSA. Our order represents

a minimal intrusion on the Government's scheme of medical

exemption. It leaves untouched the licensed possession

aspect of the scheme and modifies the licensed production

aspect of it only enough to make it constitutionally

acceptable.

JCT: Two years too late.

40. These passages from the decision in Hitzig clearly

reveal that the Court did not determine section 4 of the

CDSA to be an enactment that had been repealed.

JCT: Right, they said it wasn't repealed, it was only

"undesirably uncertain."

Instead, the Court determined that the marihuana prohibition

within section 4 of the CDSA was inoperative from July 31

2001 until October 7 2003

JCT: So the Parker Ruling that "section 4 is declared

invalid" really means "Section 4 is "inoperative."

but thereafter the prohibition continued to be operative.

JCT: It continued to be operative after being inoperative.

Interesting the way lawyers can bend their brains around the

truth. After going from off to on, it continued being on.

Lawyers and judges really are brain-damaged, something that

will no doubt amuse historians for generations to come.

This point has recently been confirmed by the Court of

appeal in response to a similar argument presented by Mr.

Turmel in which he challenged the trafficking offence under

the CDSA. R v. Turmel [2007]

4. JUSTICE CLEMENTS WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE

CULTIVATION PROHIBITION WHICH WAS DECLARED IN INVALID IN

KRIEGER WAS VALID FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF THE ONTARIO

COURT OF APPEAL IN HITZIG?

41. The Appellant has submitted that "Section 7 cultivation

prohibition and by implication section 4 possession

prohibition remain repealed pursuant to the section 2.2 of

the Interpretation Act once declared invalid by the Krieger

Court of Appeal of Alberta in 2002."

42. In 1999, Grant Krieger was charged with the offences of

production of marijuana (contrary to subsection 7(1) of the

CDSA) and possession of marijuana for the purposes of

trafficking (contrary to subsection 5(2) of the CDSA). He

brought a motion seeking a declaration that these provisions

of the CDSA violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms. On December 11 2000, pursuant to

subsection 24(1) of the Charter, Acton J. struck down

subsection 7(1) of the CDSA, but permitted the charge in

respect of subsection 5(2) to proceed to trial.

Subsequently, Krieger was acquitted by a jury on the charge

of trafficking contrary to subsection 5(2) of the CDSA. On

appeal, in a decision announced on December 4 2002, the

Alberta Court of Appeal confirmed the ruling which struck

down subsection 7(1) of the CDSA but ordered a new trial in

respect of Krieger's acquittal of the trafficking charge

under subsection 5(2) of the CDSA.

JCT: The trafficking stuff is irrelevant to our issue. And

though the Alberta Court of Appeal actually dismissed the

appeal against the Acton Order of invalidation, you could

say they confirmed the invalidation of the cultivation, and

by implication possession, prohibitions.

43. Meanwhile, Mr. Krieger was charged with counts of

trafficking marijuana on December 3 2003 and January 8 2004

contrary to subsection 5(1) of the CDSA.

JCT: Another not relevant issue.

In that case, Mr. Krieger argued that the MMAR failed to

comply with section 7 of the charter.

JCT: The same as when he won the first time.

However, on September 25 2006, the Alberta Provincial Court

ruled that the MMAR were constitutional, and Mr. Krieger was

found guilty on both charges.

JCT: And of course, Krieger didn't argue that the law was

still dead since the had killed it the first time. No,

Krieger helped his lawyer plant the idea that the Court

didn't strike down the prohibitions for everyone but only

for Krieger. So how come he didn't use his past win? Too

long a story though you can find my posts on it at medpot.

44. Justice Clements correctly noted that the initial

decision of Justice Acton J. in the original trial of

Krieger concerned events that pre-dated the introduction of

the MMAR.

JCT: It doesn't matter since the Hitzig decision ruled that

the MMAR hadn't worked. So what effect and the MMAR that

did not work could not have had much effect on the Krieger

invalidation of the cultivation and possession prohibitions.

It didn't work. How can it be relevant?

That decision was issued prior to the Ontario Court of

Appeal's decision in Hitzig.

JCT: Just like the Parker invalidation was issued prior to

the Hitzig decision. So what? Fixing the exemption system

brought the possession prohibition back to life and the

cultivation back to life too?

For these reasons, the decision of Acton J. has been

effectively superceded by the MMAR and the subsequent

decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

JCT: Sounds great that 3 of Ontario highest judges

superceded one little Alberta Superior Court judge but the

Crown is really saying that the Ontario judges are also

superceding the three Alberta Highest judges and the three

Supreme Court of Canada judges who threw out the Crown's

appeal. But it's easier to say the Krieger decision was just

one lowly judge and ignore it's three equals to Ontario and

three Supremes.

Besides, the Hitzig Court did not rule they were

resurrecting the cultivation prohibition, only the

possession prohibition. No one even knew that the

cultivation prohibition had been declared invalid until the

Crown's application for leave to appeal was thrown out by

the Supreme Court of Canada two months after the Hitzig

decision.

45. Subsequent decision of other courts across Canada

demonstrate the limited value of the Alberta Court of Appeal

decision in Krieger.

JCT: Sure, all the judges forgot their Interpretation Act

and obeyed the new judge-created prohibition to start

oppressing innocent victims again, so what? They all use the

Nazi alibi, they must follow higher orders, right or wrong.

Following the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling in Hitzig and

the subsequent government response (amendments to the MMAR

and the entrenchment of the Supply Policy), a number of

cases considered the validity of the scheme developed by the

government and found it comply with the Charter.

JCT: We're not arguing it isn't working now. We're arguing

it didn't on time then. Of course, legally-trained minds

seem able to keep some truths out of their thought

processes.

46. In Kubby, the B.C. Court of Appeal held that s.4(1) of

the CDSA and the MMAR constitute valid legislation.

JCT: What would we expect from camp followers of Marc The

Narc Emery? Just like the Young-Emery Hitzig crew's case is

a boon to the prohibitionists, now the Young-Emery crew's

Kubby case is a boon to the prohibitionists. They can lose

all they want and the Crown can refer to their Hitzig,

Wakeford, J.P, Kubby losses all they want. Am I to be

impressed by losses by the Young-Emery team of Judas Goats?

Ms. Kubby had brought a petition in B.C. Supreme Court

seeking a declaration that the MMAR were invalid as being

contrary to section 7 of the Charter.

JCT: Pulling an other Hitzig again. Not challenging the

prohibition system but the failed exemption system.

Rice J. dismissed her petition, and ruled that the MMAR were

valid and that the application had not been supported by

sufficient evidence to succeed.

JCT: When the narc moles are trying to lose, you don't

expect them to be using good cards like Parker and Krieger.

47. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Kubby's appeal. In

doing so, it commented on the constitutional validity of the

MMAR as follows:

JCT: Keep in mind, we're not arguing about the MMAR not

being constitutionally valid, we're arguing that it wasn't

constitutionally valid by Terry Parker Day. And once it had

failed and Parker Order repealing the prohibition took

effect, only Parliament could resurrect it. Not the Hitzig

judges. So all this is completely not relevant to the issue

at bar.

"Contrary to the appellant's submissions, the MMA Regs must

be taken to have effectively addressed the constitutional

deficiencies in the relation to section 4(1) of the CDS Act

JCT: Yes, but not on two years after repeal, way too late.

with respect to the blanket prohibition against the

possession of marijuana. At this point, the MMA Regs and

s.4(1) of the CDS Act constitute valid legislation.

JCT: I can agree that the MMAR may constitute valid

legislation but I can't agree that the court-created

prohibition on possession in s.4(1) became valid after

repeal.

48. Finally, in R. v. Wood, the New Brunswick Court of

Appeal considered a constitutional challenge to s.5(2) of

the CDSA and the MMAR and concluded that the scheme that was

put into effect following the Court of Appeal's decision in

Hitzig "easily passes constitutional muster."

JCT: I don't care how many judges accept judge-created law.

So they don't know or forgot their Interpretation Act? Cite

as many incompetent judges who accept court-created penal

sanctions all you want, it doesn't change the fact that

Justices Phillips, Rogin and Chen are right and all the rest

are wrong.

5. JUSTICE CLEMENTS PROPERLY REJECTED THE APPELLANT'S

ARGUMENT THAT THE MMAR WERE INEFFECTIVE DUE TO THE LACK OF

PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION.

49. The Appellant has submitted that "By the MMAR failing to

mandate that Parker's doctor participate in the government's

exemption program, S.7 cultivation and S.4 possession

prohibitions cannot apply to Parker because he grandfathered

exemption for the sick."

50. It appears that the Appellant is presenting the argument

that he has a right to possess marijuana that trumps the

regulatory regime established by the MMAR.

51. The Respondent submits, however, that the MMAR is a

valid regulatory regime which must be complied with by the

Appellant. In Hitzig, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that

is is appropriate for the MMAR to require doctors and

specialists to act as the gatekeepers of the issuance of

ATPs:

[138] The second attack on the eligibility barriers created

by the MMAR focuses on the use of physicians as gatekeepers

in the sense that every application must be supported by a

doctor and it is that doctor who must declare that marihuana

is recommended to mitigate the symptom involved. It is

argued that this places unwarranted power to determine

whether an individual receives a medical exemption in the

hands of physicians rather than letting the individual

decide for him or herself or having the Minister of Health

do so. It is further argued that the serious concerns of

several central medical groups about the gatekeeper role for

physicians means that doctors will not assist individuals to

obtain medical exemptions.

[139] Again, we do not agree. Whether marihuana will

mitigate the particular symptom of an individual with a

particular serious medical condition is fundamentally a

medical question. Just as physicians are relied on to

determine the need for prescription drugs, it is reasonable

for the state to require the medical opinion of physicians

here, particularly given that this drug is untested.[11] The

second argument is answered by Lederman J.'s finding that

despite the concerns of central medical bodies, a sufficient

number of individual physicians were authorizing the

therapeutic use of marihuana that the medical exemption

could not be said to be practically unavailable...

[140] The third attack on the eligibility conditions of the

MMAR, and the one focused on in the argument before us,

rests on the requirement that the physician support for a

medical exemption for individuals in category 2 and category

3 must come from specialists...

JCT: For some reason, the Crown leaves out paragraph 141:

[141] First, they say that because marihuana is an untested

medication there is no justification for requiring medical

support beyond the individual's own general practitioner

since the specialist has no knowledge advantage. They say

that when this is combined with the practical difficulties

that exist in accessing specialists, particularly in rural

areas, the specialist requirements for categories 2 and 3

constitute an unreasonable barrier which significantly

interferes with those in medical need from accessing the

medication they require.

JCT: No wonder, it's a pretty good reason for why it was

hard to quality.

[142] In our view, this argument too does not succeed...

The requirement for a declaration in this form....

JCT: Whoa. The ... is whatever the requirement is. So what

was the part they cut out:

"In order to qualify for a medical exemption, both

individuals in category 2 and those in category 3 must have

a declaration from a specialist practicing in an area of

medicine relevant to the treatment of the individual's

medical condition causing the symptom to be mitigated. The

declaration must say that all conventional treatments for

the symptom have been tried or considered and why each is

medically inappropriate."

The requirement for a declaration in this form serves

substantial and compelling state interests. First, it serves

the state interest in protecting the health and safety of

its citizens in relation to an untested drug. Second, it

serves the state interest in complying with international

conventions aimed at restricting the use of drugs such as

marihuana save for legitimate medical and scientific

purposes. A specialist in the treatment of the particular

medical condition is likely to have more knowledge than a

general practitioner of the complete range of possible

treatments, including ones that may just be emerging. The

specialist requirement thus better assures that marihuana is

used only if no other more conventional medication is

effective. Given that marihuana is an untested drug, this is

a substantial and compelling state interest. So too is

compliance with international conventions that are designed

to restrict the use of drugs save for legitimate medical and

scientific purposes a state interest which the specialist

requirement also serves.

[143] Moreover, on this record, the Hitzig applicants simply

have not shown that the specialist requirement is a

significant impediment to obtaining a medical exemption...

Thus, on this record we conclude that the specialist

requirement does not constitute an undue constraint on the

individual's ability to get a medical exemption and

represents a fair balance between the interests of the

individual and the state.

52. Recently, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court ruled that a

person is not exempted from compliance with the MMAR merely

because they have encountered some difficulty in obtaining a

prescription from a doctor.

JCT: Enough difficulty makes the MMAR unworkable. How much

"some difficulty" is not too much difficulty?

53. The validity of the MMAR post-Hitzig were also

considered in the 2006 Alberta Provincial Court decision in

R. v. Krieger.

JCT: Another Krieger loss to balance the win he won't use?

Besides, we're not challenging the validity of the MMAR

post-Hitzig, we're challenging whether it brought the dead

prohibition in the CDSA back to life.

The accused was charged with trafficking in marijuana on two

occasions.

JCT: And of course, section 5(2) arguments have no bearing

on our Section 7 and 4 issues. But if the Crown insists on

wasting time on stuff that won't come up...

By an Agreed Statement of Facts he admitted he was sending

the marijuana to individuals in Manitoba who were in medical

need of marijuana. Mr. Krieger argued that the MMAR did not

comply with section 7 of the Charter.

JCT: After winning and not collecting the pot last time, why

not do the same all over again now?

The Court dismissed the application concluding that "it is

clear that the regulations providing for a medical marijuana

exemption are working successfully.

JCT: 1600 exemptees out of the millions who medicate

illegally is not "working successfully." Doctors are

deterred by making them answer answer to Health Canada's

examiners who are pharmacists. Would a professional engineer

want to have to explain his requirements to the stockboy?

Are doctors deterred by having to explain their

prescriptions to Health Canada pharmacists in the same way?

Anyway, the issue is raised. Can the chance of finding a

compliant doctor being 1/60 be a successful exemption system

for the sick and dying. "Gee, he died while on his eighth

doctor-shopping interview!"

More persons are authorized to possess and more physicians

are participating in the program.

JCT: "More?" Instead of 1 in 65 doctors, it's more, 1 in 60.

Instead of 1000 in millions, it's more, 1600 in millions.

More is proof it works. To a judge. Har har har.

54. In this case, the evidence reveals that the Appellant

has made only a minimal effort to comply with the regime.

The Appellant has not been examined by a medical specialist

since 1997 and claims that he cannot "trust neurologists

when all they're interested in is lobectomy." The Appellant

has not approached any medical specialist for assistance

since 1997. The appellant admits that he could go see a

doctor but that he does not "want to worry about my brains

coming out" and objects to having "to go back to criminals

[i.e. doctors] to get further assaulted," and objects to the

MMAR requirement that he provide medical authorization.

55. The evidence also reveals that the MMAR regime is

working well and is effective in providing ill persons with

the marihuana that they desire.

JCT: It's 1/60th as effective as it is for any other

necessary medication that all doctors would prescribe.

Based on information pertaining to the period July 1st 2005

to November 1st 2006, the Marijuana Medical Access Division

received, on average each month, 75 new applications for

authorization to possess, as well as 78 renewal

applications, for a total of 153 applications received every

month. As of Nov 3 2006, 1603 persons in Canada had an ATP

under the MMAR. Of these persons, 701 ordinarily reside in

Ontario and are supported by 431 practitioners registered

and entitled to practice the profession of medicine in

Ontario.

56. The fact that 431 medical practitioners had participated

in the MMAR as of November 3 2006 is a complete rebuttal of

the Appellant's anecdotal evidence concerning the lack of

physician participation in the MMAR.

JCT: 431 sounds like so many, to a legally-trained mind. Out

of 27,000 in Ontario, not so many.

As such, there is simply no evidence on which to conclude

that the MMAR are deficient as a result of a lack of

participation of physicians and the decision of Justice

Clements on this point should not be disturbed.

JCT: Sure, the evidence has provided a ratio. That the

chances of finding one of the 431 doctors from among

Ontario's 27,000 doctors who might be amenable to the stress

and intimidation Health Canada's pharmacists put them

through, much detailed in my first year's battles at

http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group/MedPot/messages/1

6. THE RECENT DECISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT IN SFETKOPOULOS

IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT.

JCT: This is the first time I've ever of of Sfetkopoulos!

57. On Jan 10, 2008, approximately one month after Justice

Clements released his decision in this matter, Deputy Judge

Strayer of the Federal Court released a decision declaring

paragraph 41(b1) of the MMAR constitutionally invalid as

inconsistent with section 7 of the Charter. Deputy Judge

Strayer found that the impugned provisions which limited the

size of marijuana production facilities violated section 7

of the Charter.

JCT: Is this a problem in the MMAR the Hitzig Court failed

to fix so that their decision didn't resurrect the law?

58. However, the decision of Deputy Judge Strayer did not

invalidate the entire MMAR, only s.41(b1). Therefore, the

possession prohibition remains valid despite the decision in

Sfetkopoulos and the Appellant cannot rely on that decision

in support of his argument that he now has a right to

possess marijuana.

JCT: We didn't raise it and do not rely on it. We argue they

didn't resurrect the law because they don't have the power

and this argues says they didn't resurrect the law because they

forgot they were missing one incantation for their spell.

59. Furthermore, the issue before Deputy Judge Strayer was

whether persons authorized to possess marijuana have

reasonable access to a licit supply of marijuana.

JCT: And we're not challenging whether exemptees have

reasonable access to marijuana, we're challenging whether

Parker has reasonable access to an exemption.

The provisions of the MMAR which are germane to this appeal,

namely those provisions governing how an individual obtains

authorization to possess marijuana, were not at issue in

Sfetkopoulos. As such, the decision should have no impact on

the case at bar.

JCT: Which is why it was raised by the Crown, to have no

impact.

60. In any event, the Federal Court of Appeal has stayed the

decision of Deputy Judge Strayer pending the resolution of

an appeal initiated by the Attorney General of Canada.

Therefore, the decision of Deputy Judge Strayer is of no

force and effect for the purposes of this proceeding.

PART IV - ORDER REQUESTED

59. The Respondent requests the following relief:

(a) An order dismissing the Appeal;

(b) An order granting costs to the Respondent, and

(c) Such other relief as this Honourable Court determines to

be just.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Dated at Toronto this 11th day of July 2008.

James Gorham

Of Counsel for the Respondent,

Her Majesty the Queen.