The Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3
NORTH-HOLLAND

Edited by
R.J. Aumann
S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

2002 / Hardbound / ISBN: 0-444-89428-4 / 832 pages / EUR 134

Description

This is the third and last volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with
Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a
decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace,
and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three
volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide
range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications
to political science and individual chapters on applications to
disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law,
psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners
in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners.

The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash")
equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games;
noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games;
industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the
Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies,
to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science;
law mechanism design; and game experimentation.

Contents

Preface (R.J. Aumann, S. Hart).
Strategic equilibrium (E. van Damme).
Foundations of strategic equilibrium (J. Hillas, E. Kohlberg).
Incomplete information (R.J. Aumann, A. Heifetz).
Non-zero-sum two-person games (T.E.S. Raghavan).
Computing equilibria for two-person games (B. von Stengel).
Non-cooperative games with many players (M. Ali Khan, Y. Sun).
Stochastic games (J-F. Mertens).
Stochastic games: recent results (N. Vieille).
Game theory and industrial organization (K. Bagwell, A. Wolinsky).
Bargaining with incomplete information (L.M. Ausubel, P. Cramton, R.J.
Deneckere).
Inspection Games (R. Avenhaus, B.V. Stengel, S. Zamir).
Economic history and game theory (A. Greif).
The shapley value (E. Winter).
Variations on the shapley value (D. Monderer, D. Samet).
Values of non-transferable utility games (R. McLean).
Values of games with infinitely many players (A. Neyman).
Values of perfectly competitive economies (S. Hart).
Some other economic applications of the value (J-F. Mertens).
Strategic aspects of political systems (J. Banks).
Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions (J-P. Benoit,
L.A. Kornhauser).
Implementation Theory (T. Palfrey).
Game Theory and experimental Gaming (M. Shubik).