Dear Colleagues

the Adam Smith Review

This is to let you know that a multidisciplinary annual review on Adam
Smith  is  being  set  up by the International Adam Smith Society. The
Adam  Smith  Review aims to provide a unique forum for vigorous debate
and  the  highest  standards  of  scholarship  on  all aspects of Adam
Smith's  works,  his  place  in  history,  and the significance of his
writings  for the modern world. The Review will be open to all strands
of  research  on Adam Smith and will encourage debate between scholars
working from different perspectives.

Submissions to the Adam Smith Review are invited from any theoretical,
disciplinary   or  interdisciplinary  approach  (max.  10,000  words).
Contributors  are  asked  to make their arguments accessible to a wide
multidisciplinary  readership  without  sacrificing  high standards of
argument   and  scholarship.  It  is  planned  that  interdisciplinary
articles   will  be  sent  to  referees  with  different  disciplinary
expertise. Submitted articles will be double-blind refereed.

Each  issue  of  the Adam Smith eview will contain a multidisciplinary
symposium. The topic of the symposium for the first issue is 'Contexts
of  Interpretation?'.  Submissions  are  invited from any theoretical,
disciplinary or interdisciplinary perspective (max. 3,500 words).

Please  send  submissions,  comments  and suggestions for symposia to:
Vivienne  Brown,  Editor,  the  Adam  Smith  Review, Faculty of Social
Sciences,  The  Open  University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA,
UK; v.w.brown@...

Book  Review  Editors.  Please send books for review to either:

Anthony  Brewer,  Dept  of Economics, University of ristol, 8 Woodland
Rd, Bristol BS8 1TN Bristol, UK; a.brewer@...

James  Otteson, Dept of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, 35487-0218, USA; jotteson@...

Editorial Board (as at March 2002)
Neil De Marchi (Duke, USA)
Douglas Den Uyl (Liberty Fund, USA)
Samuel Fleischacker (U. of Illinois, Chicago, USA)
Charles L. Griswold (Boston University, USA)
Knud Haakonssen (Boston University, USA)
Hiroshi Mizuta (Nagoya, Japan)
John Mullan (University College London, UK)
Takashi Negishi (Japan Academy, Japan)
Nicholas Phillipson (Edinburgh, UK)
D. D. Raphael (Imperial College, London, UK)
Emma Rothschild (Cambridge, UK)
Ian Simpson Ross (British Columbia, Canada)
Richard B. Sher (N. J. Inst. of Technology, USA)
Andrew S. Skinner (Glasgow, UK)
Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford, UK)
Keith Tribe (Keele, UK)
Gloria Vivenza (Verona, Italy)
Donald Winch (Sussex, UK)

The  Adam  Smith  Review  will  be  published by Routledge and will be
available for sale in bookshops, but it will be available for purchase
on  preferential  terms  to  members  of  the International Adam Smith
Society.  For  details of membership of the Society please contact the
Membership Secretary,Ryan Patrick Hanley (rphanley@...).

If you have any comments or suggestions please get in touch.

Best wishes
Vivienne Brown

The  annual  Austrian  Economics Summer Seminar will be held at FEE on
June 22-28th. Confirmed lecturers include Israel Kirzner, Mario Rizzo,
Lawrence  White,  Steve  Horwitz,  Roger  Garrison,  Mark  Skousen and
myself.  In addition, guest lectures will be provided by Vernon Smith,
Karen  Vaughn,  Richard  Wagner and Frederic Sautet. Vernon Smith will
talk  on Hayek and Experimental Economics and will discuss his current
research on the relationship between labatory experiments in the field
of neuroeconomics, auction markets, and trust games. Karen Vaughn will
discuss  her  current  research on Hayek's implicit economics. Richard
Wagner   will   discuss  his  work  on  developing  a  coordinationist
perspective  in  macroeconomics,  as  well  as his work on integrating
Austrian economics and public choice. And Frederic Sautet will address
the  role  of Austrian economics in public policy formation --- Sautet
is  well  suited to address this topic as a senior economist in the NZ
Treasury  for  the  past few years! a! fter finishing his dissertation
work and publishing his work An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm.

The  seminar  is  designed  for  PhD  students and junior faculty, but
exceptional undergraduates and more established faculty are encouraged
to  apply as well. I would also encourage you to share this email with
colleagues and students. Please direct all inquires to me.

Sincerely,

Pete

Peter J. Boettke, Deputy Director
James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy
Department of Economics, MSN 3G4
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
PHONE: 703-993-1149
FAX: 703-993-1133
EMAIL: pboettke@...
HOMEPAGE: http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/pboettke
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Non-Cooperative Dynamics of Multi-Agent Teams
Robert L. Axtell
CSED Working Paper No. 27
April 2002


quote from the abstract:

"It  is  argued  that assumptions concerning attainment of agent-level
(Nash)  equilibrium,  so ubiquitous in conventional economics and game
theory,  are  difficult to justify behaviorally and highly restrictive
theoretically, and are thus unlikely to serve either as fertile design
objectives  or  robust  operating principles for realistic multi-agent
systems."

Download: http://www.brook.edu/es/dynamics/papers/teams/teams.pdf



Abstract

Results  on  the  formation  of  multi-agent  teams  are  reviewed and
extended.  Conditions  are  specified  under  which it is individually
rational  for  agents  to  spontaneously  form  coalitions in order to
engage in collective action. In a cooperative setting the formation of
such  groups  is  to be expected. Here we show that in non-cooperative
environments—presumably a more realistic context for a variety of both
human  and  software  agents—self-organized  coalitions are capable of
extracting   welfare   improvements.  The  Nash  equilibria  of  these
coalitional  formation  games  are demonstrated to always exist and be
unique.  Certain  free rider problems in such group formation dynamics
lead  to  the  possibility  of  dynamically  unstable Nash equilibria,
depending  on  the  nature  of  intra-group compensation and coalition
size.  Yet  coherent  groups  can  still form, if only temporarily, as
demonstrated  by  computational experiments. Such groups of agents can
be  either long-lived or transient. The macroscopic structure of these
emergent  "bands"  of  agents  is  stationary  in  sufficiently  large
populations,  despite  constant  adaptation  at the agent level. It is
argued  that  assumptions  concerning attainment of agent-level (Nash)
equilibrium,  so ubiquitous in conventional economics and game theory,
are   difficult   to   justify  behaviorally  and  highly  restrictive
theoretically, and are thus unlikely to serve either as fertile design
objectives  or  robust  operating principles for realistic multi-agent
systems.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

            NEP - New Economics Papers
            Issue: nep-hpe-2002-05-03

            ++++++++++++++++++++++++++

NEP report on History and Philosophy of Economics
            Edited by Andy Denis (andy.denis@...)

This document is in the public domain, please circulate to any.

In this issue:

*( 1 )   A Theoretical Agenda for Economic Sociology
          Mark Granovetter
          http://repositories.cdlib.org/iir/ccop/wps-2001-03/
*( 2 )   A Perspective on Psychology and Economics
          Matthew Rabin
          http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E02-313/


-------------------------------------------

This report is Copyright 2002 by Andy Denis (andy.denis@...).
It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty.
It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose.
If distributed in part, it must include this copyright notice.
It may not be sold, or placed in something else for sale.

Bruce  J.  Caldwell,  “In  Defense  of  Basic Economic  Reasoning”,
post-autistic economics review, issue no. 13, May2, 2002, article 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------

    In Defense of Basic Economic Reasoning
    Bruce J. Caldwell    (University of North Carolina, US)


    In  issue  number 12 of the Post-Autistic Economics Review, Bernard
    Gurrien  poses  the  provocative question, “Is There Anything Worth
    Keeping  in  Standard Microeconomics?” His answer seems to be, “Not
    much.”  Gurrien  complains  about  the  highly formalized nature of
    modern  microeconomic  theory,  about  the  use of assumptions that
    describe  neither  the  world  nor  the  actions of the people that
    populate it. He finds much formal theory useless and irrelevant for
    helping us to understand how the world works.

    I  agree  with  many  of  Gurrien’s  criticisms  of  formal, highly
    mathematicized  microeconomic  theory. I disagree, though, with his
    conclusion   that   the   irrelevance   of  the  theory  undermines
    microeconomics.  In  my  opinion,  there  is  a  body  of  economic
    reasoning,   something   that   might  be  called  “basic  economic
    reasoning”  that can and should be separated out from what might be
    called  “formal  microeconomic  theory.”  Much  of  basic  economic
    reasoning  is  in fact microeconomic in nature, but it preceded the
    latter  temporally  in  terms  of  its  development and it does not
    depend on formal economic theory for its validity or usefulness. It
    is  my contention that basic economic reasoning is truly important.
    My  fear is that if we take Gurrien’s advice, we will throw out the
    standard  economic reasoning “baby” with the formal economic theory
    “bathwater.”

    I  will elaborate on these claims by citing some personal examples.
    In  recent  years I have taught both a one semester “everything you
    want  to  know about economics” course as well as the principles of
    microeconomics course to American undergraduates. I use very little
    mathematics  in  either  course.  With  the  exception  of a little
    algebra  for  calculating  elasticities,  all  other  concepts  are
    handled  graphically,  with  production  possibilities  curves  and
    supply   and  demand  diagrams  being  the  chief  graphical  tools
    employed. Even with this elementary set of tools, by the end of the
    course students have learned a lot about how the world works. Their
    education  is a practical one, one that allows them to read a paper
    better  and to understand economic issues that are discussed in the
    news.  Of  course  what  I am doing in the classroom is not unique;
    many  other  economists  do the same things in their own principles
    courses.

    Basically,  I  use  the graphs to tell stories about the world. The
    graphs  alone  are  useless without the stories, and similarly, the
    stories  lose  all  focus  without  the graphs. So, for example, in
    discussing  price  fixing  we  use  a  supply and demand diagram to
    distinguish  between  price ceilings and price supports. When price
    ceilings  are  binding,  one  can  expect  to see excess demand, or
    shortages,  and  one also often encounters such things as non-price
    rationing,  deterioration  in  product  quality, and black markets.
    With  these  general  concepts,  we  can  them explore such diverse
    phenomena  as  rent  controls  in  New York City, black markets for
    tickets  to  the  theater  and  sporting  events, the use of ration
    coupons during times of war, lines at gasoline stations in the U.S.
    in  the 1970s (when gas prices were controlled), and the ubiquitous
    lines  that  one  used  to  observe  in  East  Bloc countries under
    communism.  The  price  support  diagram  is  useful  for analyzing
    current  policies  (like agricultural price supports or the minimum
    wage  law)  as  well  as  those that have been proposed (comparable
    worth   policies).  Once  the  concept  of  elasticities  has  been
    introduced, the diagrams can be used to analyze everything from the
    incidence  of  taxation  to  the “paradox of plenty” in agriculture
    (good  growing seasons can lead to a reduction in farmer’s revenues
    if  demand  for  their  product  is  inelastic) to the reason why a
    successful  “War  on  Drugs”  that  managed to reduce the supply of
    illegal  drugs  would  put  more  revenue  into the pockets of drug
    dealers. (If the demand for drugs is inelastic, a rise in the price
    of  drugs  causes  a  less  than  proportionate  fall  in  quantity
    demanded,  so  total  revenue  increases.) Production possibilities
    curves  can  be used whenever the discussion focuses on opportunity
    costs and the necessity of making trade-offs.

    Basic  economic  reasoning  and simple diagrams can also be used to
    tell  stories  that  go  beyond  economics  to what might be called
    political   economy.  The  recent  history  of  agricultural  price
    supports  in  the U.S. provides numerous insights into how politics
    and  economics interact. In 1996 a law was passed that was supposed
    to  gradually  phase  out agricultural price supports, so that they
    would  be gone by 2002. In order to induce farm interests to accept
    the  law, payments in the initial years were quite generous. But as
    we  got  closer  and  closer  to  2002, and prices for agricultural
    products  began  falling  (this  was  exactly  what was supposed to
    happen,  of  course),  farm  interests declared a “crisis” in their
    industry.  For the past few years, “emergency” farm legislation was
    passed  by  Congress  to  help agricultural interests survive their
    “crises.”  The  recurring  crises have in turn prompted calls for a
    “comprehensive”  farm bill to deal with the problems on a permanent
    basis.  And  sure  enough,  after  September  11  some  have  begun
    referring  to  the  new proposed legislation as a Farmland Security
    Bill.  A  few years ago, a dot.com at the end of a company name was
    supposed  to  ensure  that investors would love it. Now in Congress
    putting  the word “Security” into a bill’s name will help to ensure
    its speedy passage.

    Many other examples could be given. The recent decision by the Bush
    administration  to  place tariffs of about 30% on steel imports was
    analyzed in one newspaper under the wonderful byline, “In Big Steel
    States,  the  Bush  Democrat  May Be Born.” Ohio, West Virginia and
    Pennsylvania  are  major steel-producing states, and the outcome of
    mid-term  elections  there  may be crucial in deciding who controls
    the Congress. So again steel has gotten help, even though it is one
    of the most protected of all American industries: past studies have
    estimated that it costs American consumers about $750,000 (in terms
    of  higher  prices  paid)  for  every steelworker’s job saved. That
    number  will  need to be updated in the light of this recent event,
    especially  given  that  other  nations have begun retaliating with
    tariffs  of  their  own  that  will  further  raise the prices that
    consumers face.

    Though  basic  economic  reasoning is simple, it is not simplistic,
    and  indeed,  it  often  leads  one  to results that are not at all
    obvious.  For  example,  the  idea  that  the incidence of taxation
    depends  on  the  elasticities  of  supply  and  demand, and not on
    whether  a  tax is initially paid by a buyer or a seller of a good,
    is  not at all intuitive, but is crucial if one wants to understand
    who  actually  bears  the burden of a tax. Similarly, the idea that
    there can be gains from trade even when one country has an absolute
    advantage  in  the  production  of  goods – the fundamental idea of
    comparative  advantage  –  is not one that many non-economists have
    mastered.

    Some will say that basic economic reasoning is not valid because it
    rests  on  faulty  foundations  –  one  must assume that agents are
    perfectly rational, with complete information, trading in perfectly
    competitive markets to get its results. This simply confuses formal
    mathematical  theory  with basic economic reasoning. In my opinion,
    basic  economic  reasoning  does not depend on formal microeconomic
    theory  for its validity. Now, to be sure, economists have not been
    very  good  at  identifying  just what it does depend on. That is a
    topic   for  economic  methodology,  and  over  the  years  various
    contending views have been advanced. My own intuition is that there
    may  well  be  multiple  “foundations”  that  help  to  explain why
    different  parts  of  the  theory  may  work.  In any event, my own
    confidence in basic economic reasoning has less to do with the fact
    that  I know why it works, then with the fact that it does work: as
    my  examples  hopefully  demonstrate,  it can prove to be extremely
    useful  in  organizing  and  understanding  various  and often very
    diverse  social  phenomena.  The  proof  of  the  pudding is in the
    eating,  and in this regard basic economic reasoning seems to me to
    provide much upon which to feast.

    There  will  of  course  be the complaint of those who believe that
    basic  economic reasoning is simply ideology dressed up as science.
    For  them,  to say that “we live in a world in which scarcity makes
    choice  necessary”  is  an ideological statement; or to assert that
    “producing  goods for which one has a comparative advantage permits
    gains  from trade” is a not-so-covert defense of globalization; and
    so  on.  To  this  I  would reply that I think of the statements of
    basic  economic  reasoning  as being positive rather than normative
    claims.  (This is not to say that they are easily testable claims.)
    I  would  further  rejoin  that those who think that basic economic
    reasoning  is simply a defense of capitalism should look once again
    at  the  socialist  calculation  debate,  and  in particular at the
    positions  articulated by the defenders of market socialism, or for
    those  who would like to go back further, at the Austrian economist
    Friedrich  von  Wieser’s Natural Value. These economists recognized
    that  an  understanding of economic reasoning was necessary even if
    one  was in favor of organizing a socialist economy. As one wag put
    it  on  the  recent  television  production  of the book Commanding
    Heights,  ignoring  how  markets  operate is much like ignoring the
    winds and the tides – you do so at your peril.

    In conclusion, I join with Bernard Gurrien in lamenting the turn of
    the  profession  towards  microeconomic  models  of ever increasing
    formal complexity. Explaining why the profession has gone down this
    road  is  something that has increasingly captured the attention of
    (our  ever  diminishing  number,  alas,  of) historians of economic
    thought.  But  we  should not conclude that microeconomics is of no
    value. Basic economic reasoning was there before the advent of such
    modeling,  and  it  remains a powerful tool today for understanding
    how  the world works. ______________________________ Bruce Caldwell
    is  the  author  of Beyond Positivism : Economic Methodology in the
    Twentieth Century.

    SUGGESTED  CITATION: Bruce  J.  Caldwell,  “In  Defense  of  Basic
    Economic  Reasoning”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 13,
    May2, 2002, article 4.

    http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue13.htm

New Journal for philosophy of (social) science, social epistemology, etc.

EPISTEME
URL: http://www.episteme.eu.com/

Executive Editors:
Nancy Cartwright
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/Philosophy/staffhomepages/Cartwright.htm
Alvin Goldman
http://w3.arizona.edu/~phil/faculty/agoldman.htm
Philip Kitcher
http://www.columbia.edu/~psk16/

March 2002 - New Publications

The Institutional Economy
Demand and Supply

David  Reisman,
Professor  of  Economics,  University of Surrey, UK and
Professor of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

The   institutional   economy  is  the  economy  of  rules  and  laws,
conventions  and  precedents.  It is prices but also practices, change
but also constancy, individual but also interdependence. David Reisman
argues  that  conformity and repetition as well as new initiatives and
mould-breaking departures constitute the essence of supply and demand.

This   thorough   and   comprehensive  book  examines  the  role  that
institutions  play in economic life. The discussion begins with common
values, shared traditions and individual habits which have their roots
in  the  past.  It goes on to consider consumer preferences, needs and
wants,  altruism,  malevolence,  intrinsic  motivation, organisational
memory  and  the  social  capital  that  is  embedded  in networks and
communities.   Its   conclusion   is  that  there  is  a  case  for  a
broadly-based  economics  which is a science of norms and standards as
well  as  a  theory  of  prices  and  costs. Culture is continuity and
pattern. Precisely the same is true of supply and demand.

Hardback,  1  84064  6748,  288  pp  UK and rest of world: March 2002,
£69.95 USA: May 2002, $95.00

For more information, please visit our website at www.e-elgar.co.uk

Special issue of the Review of Political Economy devoted to 'Joan Robinson's
Intellectual Legacy'

The year 2003 will mark the centenary of the birth of Joan Robinson. The
Review of Political Economy plans to publish a special issue to commemorate
this anniversary.

Over the course of a career that spanned more than five decades, Robinson
made numerous contributions to a wide range of fields, including the theory
of imperfect competition, Keynesian economics, growth theory, capital theory,
development economics, Marxian political economy and international trade. She
was a key figure in the discussions.

Those interested in contributing to this special issue should submit three
copies of their papers by June 30, 2002 to either of the issue's co-editors:

John King
Department of Economics & Finance
La Trobe University
Bundoora, Victoria 3086
Australia
e-mail: j.king@...

Gary Mongiovi
Economics & Finance Department
St John's University
Jamaica, New York 11439
USA
e-mail: mongiovg@...

Vth Summerschool in the History of Economic Thought and Economic Methodology
in Paris, France
from 2. September 2002 to 7. September 2002.
Deadline for paper submission: 1. June 2002
JEL classification(s): A, B, N, Z
Further information at: http://intranet.u-paris10.fr/uehpe

International School of Economic Research at Siena
XV Workshop
Environment, Inequality and Collective Action
16 - 23 June, 2002

Introduction 2002 Activity
The background motivation for this school is provided by the observation
that the links between environment, inequality and collective action are
manifolds. Inequality (not only in economic terms) may exert contrasting
influences upon the feasibility of collective actions which is so important
in many environmental matters. On the other hand, the state of the
environment may impact upon inequality and poverty with lasting and
widespread consequences both on environment and welfare. It is also
possible that policies aimed at improving the global environment have
relevant consequences on the level and the "type" of inequality. The
principal aim of the 2002 Iser Summer School is to provide as a complete a
picture as possible of all these complex relationships also in order to
understand which policies may have positive effects both on inequality and
the environment.

ORGANIZING BOARD
Stefano Bartolini, Marcello Basili, Salvatore Bimonte, Samuel Bowles,
Simone Borghesi, Massimo Di Matteo, Francesco Farina, Maurizio Franzini,
Frank Hahn, Antonio Nicita, Ugo Pagano, Lionello Punzo, Silvia Tiezzi,
Alessandro Vercelli

FACULTY MEMBERS
Workshop sessions will be conducted by members of the Organizing Board and
by distinguished researchers in the field. The following have already
agreed to deliver lectures (in brackets the subject):
Jean Marie Baland - (Inequality and collective action)
Pranab Bardhan - Professor at University of California, Berkeley (Poverty
and the environment)
Daniel Bromley - Professor Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison (Economic institutions and the governance
of commons)
Graciela Chichilnisky - UNESCO Chair of Mathematics and Economics,
(Environment and global public goods)
Sylvie Faucheux - Directeur Centre d' Economie et d'Ethique pour l'
Environnement et le Développement (Equity, future generations and the
environment)
Ramon Lopez - (Environment, inequality and poverty)
Anil Markandya - Professor of Quantitative Economics, The University of
Bath (Underdevelopment and the environment)
Mohan Munasinghe - Environment Department World Bank (Climate change and
the global environment)
Charles Perrings - Professor and Director of the Department of Environment,
University of York; Editorial Board Environment and Development Economics
(Biodiversity and collective action)
E. Somanathan - Associate Professor, Planning Unit, Indian Statistical
Institute, Delhi (Inequality and environmental policy)

Inquiries concerning the faculty of the 15th Workshop can be directed to
the Scientific Secretariat of the School
www.econ-pol.unisi.it/iser.html
and will be answered as soon as arrangements have been completed. The Siena
Summer School workshops are intended for advanced graduated students and
junior faculty members. The members of the School faculty will be in
residence and available to students for the whole duration of the workshop.
Enrolment will be limited to 30 fellows, all of whom will be in residence
at the Certosa. Applications for Non-Resident Fellowships will also be
considered. Applications should arrive electronically before May 20, 2002,
filling in the application form.



*************************************************
Dr. Giovanni Forconi
E-mail: FORCONIG@... http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/forconig/
-------------------------------------------------
Dipartimento di Economia Politica
Fax:+39.0577232661 http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/
-------------------------------------------------
International School of Economic Research
E-mail: ISER@... http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/iser.html

Università degli Studi di Siena
Piazza San Francesco, 7. I - 53100 SIENA. Italy
Tel:+39.0577232619

The evolution of focal points
Binmore,K. & Samuelson,L.
Download: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~larrysam/papers/focal211.pdf

The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses
Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer
Download: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2002/w4/biggest29nov.pdf

Coalitional Rationalizability
Attila Ambrus

Suppose that whenever it is of mutual interest for a group of players
to avoid certain strategies, the members of the group will make an
implicit agreement not to play them. This leads to an iterative
procedure of restricting players' beliefs and action choices; the
strategies that remain are called coalitionally rationalizable. In
contrast to coalitional solution concepts based on the notion of Nash
equilibrium, the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is
always nonempty. reviewed by Drew Fudenberg
Download I: http://www.princeton.edu/~aambrus/javmainpdf.pdf
Download II: http://dlevine.econ.ucla.edu/naj/cache/391749000000000519.pdf

Sometime recently Yahoo groups has set everyone's e-mail, mail, and
telephone marketing preferences to "Yes" for everything. To reset
your preferences:

- go to http://groups.yahoo.com/mygroups
- click on Account Info (upper right)
- log in with your Yahoo account/password
- in mid-page, click on "Edit your marketing preferences"

Be sure to click on the SAVE CHANGES box at bottom to save these settings.

--Esther-Mirjam
--

_______________________________
   Department of Economics
   University of Notre Dame
   Notre Dame, IN 46556
   U.S.A.

   phone: +1-574-631-6979
   fax: +1-574-631-8809

   http://www.nd.edu/~esent
_______________________________

The B.A./M.A. Degree Course in Philosophy & Economics

In the winter term 2000/2001, a new B.A./M.A. degree course, combining
study of philosophy and economics, was founded at the university of Bayreuth.
http://www.uni-bayreuth.de/departments/philosophie/english/studienfuehrer/PundE.\
html

Evolution of Institutions and the Knowledge Economy
in Debrecen, Hungary
from 3. October 2002 to 5. October 2002.
Deadline for paper submission: 20. May 2002
JEL classification(s): D, E, F, K, L, M, O, P
Further information at: http://www.econ.klte.hu/conference

Why Economics must abandon its theory of the firm?
Steve Keen et. al.
Download: http://www.debunking-economics.com/Hayek/keen2002c_Draft.pdf

Book: Debunking Economics
Steve Keen
URL: http://www.debunking-economics.com/

Debunking Debunking Economics
Christopher Auld
http://jerry.ss.ucalgary.ca/debunk.pdf


Steve Keen is currently giving an e-seminar at the Hayek-List
(HAYEK-L@...).

European Summer School in Experimental Economics
in Jena, Germany
from 22. July 2002 to 1. August 2002.
Deadline for paper submission: 30. April 2002
JEL classification(s): Z
Further information at:
http://www.mpiew-jena.mpg.de/esi/summer_school/

Did  you  know  that  the  following  interesting  paper  is available
on-line?

J.  Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R.
McElreath

Cooperation,   Reciprocity   and   Punishment  in  Fifteen
Small-scale  Societies,  American  Economic  Review,  91: 73–78, 2001.

Download: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/MacAEA.pdf

Game Theory's Hidden Holes
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_11/c3774027.htm

To  economists, Russell Crowe is the sentimental choice for Best Actor
at  this  year's Academy Awards. In A Beautiful Mind, Crowe plays John
F.  Nash  Jr.,  the  brilliant mathematician who shared the 1994 Nobel
Prize  in  economics  for  his work on game theory. The groundbreaking
theory  describes the strategies that people should employ to maximize
their payoffs in view of the strategies that others are most likely to
use. It has been deployed in everything from antitrust law to auctions
of wireless licenses.

Unfortunately,  game  theory  has  an  Achilles'  heel:  People  don't
necessarily  behave  the way that game theory says they ought to. Some
theorists  consider that a minor difficulty. But a study by economists
at  the  University  of Virginia shows just how common it is to act in
ways  that  seem,  by game-theory standards, irrational. The study, by
Jacob  K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt, was based on 10 experiments with
University  of  Virginia  undergraduates  who  were  schooled  in game
theory.  It  was  published  in  the  December  issue  of The American
Economic Review.

In  one  experiment  called  "traveler's  dilemma," two students chose
numbers  from  a  range. Each would get cash equal to the lower of the
two  numbers picked--for instance, $150. That means they would do best
if  both  picked  high  numbers. But there was a counterincentive: The
student  who chose the higher number had to pay a $5 penalty. The game
was  played  just  once so the students couldn't learn cooperation. By
Nash's theory, each should have tried to undercut the other just a bit
to  avoid  the  $5  penalty.  In  doing so, both inevitably would have
chosen  the lowest allowable number. In real life, though, most of the
students picked the highest allowable number, to their mutual benefit.
As  long  as  the  penalty for being the high-number picker was small,
there was no "race to the bottom."

Another  experiment tested Nash's theory that players should sometimes
pursue  "mixed  strategies"--vary  their  actions  to  keep  the other
players  guessing.  But  the  experimenters found that students almost
always  went  for  the choice with the highest potential payoff. Their
predictability  was  fatal: Their rivals correctly predicted what they
would  do  and  took  counter-actions  that  deprived  them of the big
payoff.

Holt says the purpose of the paper was to "shock theorists into seeing
situations  where  game  theory  doesn't  work." Without insights from
behavioral  economics  and  other  fields,  pure  game theory can be a
beautiful minefield.

NEW from NAJ Economics (http://dlevine.econ.ucla.edu/)
Volume 4 - March 05, 2002

Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms
Vasiliki Skreta

Download locations:
(1) http://www.econ.umn.edu/~skreta/data/paper1.pdf
(2) http://dlevine.econ.ucla.edu/naj/cache/391749000000000488.pdf

Review by Michele Boldrin:
You  would not renounce selling a good just because the first round of
bargaining   fails.   The  literature  on  bargaining  under  complete
information   assumes  you  would.  This  paper  looks  at  sequential
mechanism   design   without   committment.   When  designing  today's
mechanism,  you  cannot  commit  to  tomorrow's  mechanism. Hence, the
revelation  principle does not apply. After characterizing the optimal
dynamic  incentive scheme for arbitrary agent's type, the author shows
that,  in sequential bilateral bargaining, the optimal mechanism is to
post a price each period.

Michele Boldrin's Home Page:
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~mboldrin

VI. Buchenbach-Workshop zur Evolutorischen Ökonomik für Nachwuchswissenschaftler
in Buchenbach bei Freiburg/Brsg., Germany
from 14. May 2003 to 17. May 2003.
Deadline for paper submission: 15. December 2002
JEL classification(s): A, B, D, G, J, L, N, O, P, Q, Z
Further information at: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwvwlme/mehome.html

Vth Summer School
in the History of Economic Thought and Economic Methodology

organized by

PHARE
CNRS, Universities of Paris X Nanterre and Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.
PARIS
Cité Universitaire Internationale
19 boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris
FRANCE
(RER B, Cité Universitaire)

Monday 2 * Saturday 7 September, 2002.

Contact:

André Lapidus, lapidus@..., University of Paris I, PHARE,
MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital * 75647 Paris cedex 13 * France.


Mailing address for paper submissions before June 1, 2002:

Sandrine Leloup, leloup@..., University of Paris I, PHARE,
MSE, 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital * 75647 Paris cedex 13 * France.


Web: http://intranet.u-paris10.fr/uehpe

Created in 1998, the Summer School in History of Economic Thought aims at:

offering a specialized thematic formation for young scholars in
History of Economic Thought;

ensuring the circulation and scientific evaluation of their research
work within the community of historians of economic thought;

increasing their awareness of developments in contemporary economic
analysis and of their affiliation with the entire economic discipline.


In this perspective, the Summer School proposes:

Workshops where Ph.D. students and young Doctors may present their
papers and discuss them with specialists of their discipline; and,
Conferences by invited professors, dealing each year with a different subject.

About thirty Ph.D. students and young doctors form the usual public of
the Summer School, usually joined by some fifteen senior scholars.
From this year onwards, the call for papers is also sent to young
scholars from different countries in the European Union. Oral and
written presentations in English are accepted, but at least an
understanding of Frenchis required.


Paper Presentation Workshops

Between three and six papers will be presented every day by young
scholars on free subjects, organized according to their research
field. These presentations will take place in presence of the invited
lecturers and senior scholars. Two discussants will be assigned to
each contribution, including the president of the session.

The list of the chosen contributions will result from a selection
based on the call for papers. An abstract or the full version of the
paper in French or English, should be submitted before June 1, 2002.
During June 2002, the Scientific Committee will proceed to the
selection of papers, according to the usual criteria of the scientific
community.


Thematic Orientation

In 2002 the subject of the invited lectures is:

"Stability and Instability in the History of Economic Thought"

This theme follows the line given by the previous Summer Schools. The
aim remains at bringing closer the history of economic thought and
more recent theoretical considerations. The question of stability has
an ancient origin: it appeared, for example, during the mercantilist
period, through the debates on the "stability of contracts", or in
Quesnay's reflections on the formation of the "good price" of wheat.
Today, it is as present as before, behind more recent investigations
concerning the dynamic properties of economic systems:

It underlies the study of the price formation process in the market
(gravitation, tâtonnement, non-tâtonnement) associated with the
emergence of equilibrium magnitudes.

It also lies behind the Keynesian thesis, according to which an
economy might spontaneously reach a stable unemployment equilibrium.

It is also present behind the controversies of the classical period
about the possibility of overproduction or under-consumption crises.

It is obviously present in the different variants of the theories of
the economic cycle, as well as in growth theories.

It still plays a decisive part, in multiple aspects of economic life,
as a property of beliefs in the decision process.


Invited Lectures

Each morning during the Summer University is dedicated to a particular
aspect of the subject. The conference by one or several specialized
lecturers will be based on a document and followed by a discussion
with all the participants.


Monday, September 2, 2002:
Christian Bidard (University of Paris X), Jean Cartelier (University
of Paris X), Ingrid Kubin (University of Mayence): The Stability of
Equilibrium in Perspective: Gravitation, Tâtonnement, Non-tâtonnement.
Tuesday, September 3, 2002:

Jean-Marc Tallon (CNRS, EUREQua): The Stability of Beliefs;
Christian Schmidt (University of Paris IX): Stability and Games.
Wednesday, September 4, 2002:

Guido Cazzavilan (University of Venice): Growth Stability and Instability;
Richard Arena (University of Nice): Theories of Economic Cycle,
Yesterday and Today. Thursday, September 5, 2002:

Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira (University of Strasbourg I), Michel De
Vroey (University of Leuven): Alternative Interpretations of the
Keynesian Unemployment Equilibrium.
Friday, September 6, 2002:

Jérôme de Boyer (University of Paris IX), Ghislain Deleplace
(University of Paris VIII): The Classical Debates on Monetary,
Financial, and Banking Stability.


ORGANIZATION


The Summer School will take place at the:

Cité Universitaire Internationale,
Collège d'Espagne
19 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
(Metro station: RER B, Cité Universitaire)
from Monday, September 2, to Saturday, September 7, 2002


The registration fee is 45 euros. This includes accommodation, breakfasts and
lunches


SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

Richard Arena (LATAPSES - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis), Daniel
Diatkine (PHARE - Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne), Ragip Ege
(BETA-THEME - Université Strasbourg I Louis Pasteur), Pierre Garrouste
(ATOM - Université Lyon II Lumière), André Lapidus (PHARE - Université
de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Ramon Tortajada (CEPSE - Université
Grenoble II Pierre Mendès-France)

ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE

Andrés Alvarez (PHARE - Université de Paris X Nanterre), Christophe
Depoortere (GRESE - Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Daniel
Diatkine (PHARE - Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne), Jimena
Hurtado-Prieto (PHARE - Université de Paris X Nanterre), André Lapidus
(PHARE - Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Sandrine Leloup
(PHARE - Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Jean-Sébastien
Lenfant (GRESE - Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), Rozenn
Martinoia (PHARE - Université de Paris XII Val-de-Marne), Arnaud Orain
(PHARE - Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne).

------------ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ------------
For information, send the message "info HES" to lists@....

Keen Seminar on Hayek-L      March 4-14


The KEEN SEMINAR on the Hayek-L list begins Monday,
March 4.

Steve Keen, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Finance at
the University of Western Sydney, Australia, will be
hosting a seminar on his recent book _Debunking Economics:
The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences_ between Monday,
March 4 and Monday, March 18 on the Hayek-L email list.

All list members are invited to take part in the
conversation as it develops over the next few
days. Please remember to give the subject header
  KEEN SEMINAR  to your postings. Everyone
should feel free to participate in the discussion.

During the seminar Hayek-L subscribers are asked to
restricted all postings to the Keen seminar.

Steve has a web site dedicated to his book _Debunking Economics_
on the web at:

    http://www.debunking-economics.com/

This site includes selections from his book, interviews,
book reviews, as well as short articles and other material
supplementary to his text.

Read an interview with Steve Keen here:

http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/Keen1.htm

REMINDER:  Please remember to accompany your posting
with your "signature" -- your full name -- along
with affiliation information, such as your institutional
affiliation, its snail mail address, your email address,
web page, etc.

Steve Keen's book _Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor
of the Social Sciences_ is available from Amazon books at:

(hardcover)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/185649991X/ref=nosim/thefriedrhayeksc

(softcover)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1856499928/ref=nosim/thefriedrhayeksc


Steve Keen's email address is:

s.keen@...

his academic home page is at:

http://bus.uws.edu.au/Steve-Keen/


Information on the Hayek-L email list, along with information
on past Hayek-L seminars can be found at the Hayek-L email
list web page, on the web at:

   http://www.hayekcenter.org/hayek-l/hayek-l.html


Those who wish to participate in the seminar may subscribe to
the Hayek-L email list thru the Hayek-L web site, or by sending
the message:

  subscribe Hayek-L <yourfirstname> <yourlastname>

to:  LISTSERV@...


If you have any questions about the Hayek-L list or
the Keen seminar, please send a message directly to:

   gregransom@...

Greg Ransom
Hayek-L list host


The Hayek-L list & the Hayek Center are
pleased to be associated with Laissez Faire
Books and Amazon.

Two Concerns about Rational Choice: Indoctrination and Imperialism
Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp104.pdf (pdf)


Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists?
Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp103.pdf (pdf)

Title: First Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society
Topics: Game Theory and Applications
Date: 7/28/2002 - 8/3/2002
Location: Univeristy of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
Submission deadline: 3/15/2002

Announced at:
http://www.economicsbulletin.com/DisplayList.asp?Type=All&Code=4#EB-02CC0012

Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models
Theodore C. Bergstrom http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/papers/wp8-01.pdf

Chris Goldspink (2002)

Methodological Implications Of Complex Systems Approaches to
Sociality: Simulation as a foundation for knowledge

Journal  of  Artificial  Societies and Social Simulation vol. 5, no. 1
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/1/3.html>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Abstract

There is growing advocacy for the adoption of computational methods as
a  substitute  for,  or  complement  to, traditional research methods,
particularly  for  examining  social phenomena derivative of organised
complexity.  This paper examines some of the reasons for this advocacy
and the specific advantages of the method for studying such phenomena.
It  considers  also  the  limitations  and  problems  that  need to be
addressed if the method is to gain wider acceptance. In joining in the
advocacy of these techniques, a framework is proposed which can assist
with  the  incorporation  of  computational  techniques  in  a broader
methodological  mix.  Such  a  mix  has  the  potential to harness the
strengths of the method while offsetting some of its weaknesses.

Keywords:
Complexity; Computer Simulation; Methodology; Social Research

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

"HOW DO INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE?"

Organised by the Centre for Research in Institutional Economics,
University of Hertfordshire, UK.

Including lectures by major international speakers (see programme below).

This residential workshop will be held in
Offley Place, Great Offley, Hertfordshire, UK

3-5 July 2002

This workshop is designed to provide in-depth discussion of cutting-edge
issues in institutional economics, in a forum that permits the attention to
detail and definition that is often lacking in larger, conference-style
events. The maximum number of participants will be 40. Please book early to
avoid disappointment.

Great Offley is a beautiful Hertfordshire village. It is a 4-mile taxi ride
from London Luton Airport (with cheap flights by Easyjet - see
www.easyjet.com) and a 3-mile taxi ride from Hitchin railway station (with
regular trains from London Kings Cross). There are regular bus services
connecting London Luton Airport with London Heathrow and London Stansted
airports.

---------------------------------------------------------------

"HOW DO INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE?"

DRAFT PROGRAMME

---------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY 3 JULY 2002

14.30 Registration

15.30 Opening and Welcome

16.00 Seminar 1: Geoff Hodgson (University of Hertfordshire) "Is Social
Evolution Lamarckian or Darwinian?"

18.00 End of session

---------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY 4 JULY 2002

09.00 Seminar 2: Geoff Hodgson (University of Hertfordshire) "Darwinism in
Economics: From Analogy to Ontology"

10.30 Coffee

11.00 Seminar 3: Robert Aunger (University of Cambridge) "Taking memes
seriously"

13.00 Lunch

14.00 Seminar 4: Thorbjoern Knudsen (University of Southern Denmark)
"Evolutionary Explanations in the Social Context: Development or Population
Change?"

15.30 Tea

16.00 Seminar 5: Jack Vromen (Erasmus University) "Co-evolution: How do
different types of evolutionary process interact?"

17.30 End of session

---------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY 5 JULY 2002

09.00 Seminar 6: Markus Becker (University of Southern Denmark) and
Nathalie Lazaric (CNRS, Nice) "Defining Routines"

10.30 Coffee

11.00 Round table session and discussion

13.00 Lunch

End of Workshop
---------------------------------------------------------------

For further information, see our web site on
http://www.herts.ac.uk/business/esst/Staff/g-hodgson/CRIE.htm
or go to
http://www.herts.ac.uk/business
and either click on "Research" or find Geoff Hodgson's web site in the
directory of staff

Please note that places and local accommodation are both limited and you
are asked to book your place in the workshop, as well as your local
accommodation in the next few days.

-----------------------------------------------------------
COSTS:
-----------------------------------------------------------

STANDARD RATES:
Attendance, accommodation (single bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 3 July
to 14.00 on 4 July - 130 GBP
Attendance, accommodation (single bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 4 July
to 14.00 on 5 July - 130 GBP
Attendance, accommodation (single bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 3 July
to 14.00 on 5 July - 220 GBP

REDUCED RATES:
For a limited number of people on low incomes and without any other
financial support, these costs will be reduced to the following:
Attendance, accommodation (shared bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 3 July
to 14.00 on 4 July - 90 GBP
Attendance, accommodation (shared bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 4 July
to 14.00 on 5 July - 90 GBP
Attendance, accommodation (shared bedroom) and meals from 14.00 on 3 July
to 14.00 on 5 July - 160 GBP

NON-RESIDENTIAL RATES:
Attendance and refreshments from 14.00 on 3 July to 14.00 on 4 July - 50 GBP
Attendance and refreshments from 14.00 on 4 July to 14.00 on 5 July - 50 GBP

Residential prices include accommodation breakfast, lunch, dinner, tea and
coffee. In the event of cancelled attendance, a 20GBP administration charge
will be deducted from any refunds.

Those wishing to apply for low-income rates should send a letter or email,
briefly outlining your financial circumstances, to Geoff Hodgson
(g.m.hodgson@... - mailing address below) ideally by 30 April 2002.
This information will be treated in the strictest confidence.

(The above costs apply also to members of, and students at, the University
of Hertfordshire, who are advised to claim these expenses from their own
departmental account.)

-----------------------------------------------------------
REGISTRATION PROCEDURE
-----------------------------------------------------------

To reserve a place on the workshop, please send a cheque or international
money order for the full amount required in Sterling, plus a completed
application (see below) to:

Professor Geoff Hodgson, University of Hertfordshire Business School,
Mangrove Road, Hertford, Hertfordshire, SG13 8QF, UK

Reduced rate applications for those on low incomes require prior approval
from Geoff Hodgson (see COSTS above).

Cheques should be made payable to "University of Hertfordshire
(SBE0003/001/640)". Please include the reference number in brackets.

APPLICATION:
The cheque should be accompanied with a letter with the following information:
Your surname:
Your first name(s):
Your institution:
Your email address:
Your preferred mailing address:
Your telephone number(s):
Your fax number:
Your dietary limitations or preferences:
Indicate periods of attendance at the workshop:  3-4 July / 4-5 July / or
3-5 July
Indicate whether you wish to be resident or non-resident.

Non-residential status is designed for those living in commutable distance
from Hitchin or Luton. Otherwise, residence is advised, because of the taxi
costs and the limited alternative accommodation in the area. The booking of
any such alternative accommodation is the responsibility of participants
themselves.

-----------------------------------------------------------

I hope very much that you will be able to participate in this event.

Geoff Hodgson
Research Professor
Ben's Cottage, University of Hertfordshire Business School, Mangrove Road,
Hertford, Hertfordshire, SG13 8QF, UK

g.m.hodgson@...

-----------------------------------------------------------

A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aunger, Robert (ed.) (2000) Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as
a Science (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1993f) Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back
Into Economics (Cambridge, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Polity Press and
University of Michigan Press).

Laurent, John and Nightingale, John (eds) (2001) Darwinism and Evolutionary
Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Nelson, Richard R. and Winter, Sidney G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of
Economic Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Vromen, Jack J. (1995) Economic Evolution: An Enquiry into the Foundations
of New Institutional Economics (London: Routledge).
------------------------------------------------------------


Geoff Hodgson
Research Professor
University of Hertfordshire
http://www.herts.ac.uk/business/esst/Staff/g-hodgson/hodgson.html
Mailing Address:
Malting House, 1 Burton End, West Wickham, Cambridge CB1 6SD
------------------------------